The Weekly Grapevine

Super Aguri's future

One of the strangest stories doing the rounds in the Catalunya paddock concerned Super Aguri.

More precisely, it concerned the possible implosion of the all-Japanese dream, which had its beginnings in the period immediately after last year's Japanese Grand Prix, when it became clear to fans of Takuma Sato that Honda's 2006 line-up of Jenson Button, Rubens Barrichello and Anthony Davidson meant Sato - only the second Japanese to record a podium - was out of a drive come 2006.

The jury is still out as to whether the hurried formation of Super Aguri F1 was a direct consequence of the remorseless backlash inflicted upon Honda in its base country by "Satorites", or whether the timing was purely co-incidental.

Whatever, the company agreed to provide seed funding of sorts and engines to long-time Honda stalwart Aguri Suzuki (Japan's first F1 podium conqueror), and Taku was appointed Number One driver to the nascent outfit now known as Super Aguri F1.

History records that Yuji Ide was granted the second berth; it further records that, just four races into his maiden F1 campaign, the former Formula Nippon front-runner and All-Japan GT star was deprived of his F1 superlicence after a series of incidents.

He was not replaced by a compatriot, but by, note, Frenchman Franck Montagny - who, further note, had been appointed third driver despite the team having only two cars. Initially the World Series by Nissan champion, and, forget not, former Renault F1 test driver, was granted the seat for Nurburgring, then confirmed for Spain and Monaco.

Franck Montagny drives the Super Aguri Honda in the Spanish Grand Prix © LAT

"We decided just before the Nurburgring to take Franck, but now we have more time to decide in the future. Anyway, he drives in Monaco also and then we have two or three weeks to decide," Suzuki last week told autosport.com.

"We will have some more discussions with Montagny and other drivers, but I am quite happy using him. He is good. He hadn't driven our car before the Friday of the Nurburgring and he was immediately on the pace."

Whilst Suzuki subsequently denied that he needed two Japanese race drivers to satisfy the demands of his (all-Japanese) commercial partners, he certainly did not do so before the season started, and most in the paddock believed strongly that that had been the case.

Either way, all-Japanese Super Aguri F1 is no longer, and, if gathering rumours are to believed, the only "Made In Japan" ingredient could well be Bridgestone tyres, which become non-optional in 2007.

It is a sadly complicated tale, with more chicanes than Ide missed in his four races, but here goes:

When Suzuki cast about for capable people to turn his dream into reality, he persuaded Daniel Audetto - ex-Ferrari, ex-Fiat Motorsport boss; ex-Lamborghini, ex-Ligier-Mugen under Flavio Briatore's watch; Engine Director and more latterly Business Development Director at Briatore's Renault, before running commercial matters at IRL team Menard - to join as Managing Director.

A remuneration package reflecting the serious pressures of (and considerable career risks associated with) the start-up was negotiated by the art college-trained, politically adept Italian, a man well-versed in the sporting and commercial realities of Formula One, a man well connected within FIA corridors and with easy access to Ecclestone.

In fact, such is Audetto's reputation that many doubt whether Aguri could have been up and running in the time-frame available without his network. Inherent in said deal, though, are said to be punitive clauses should the employment not run its full period, believed to be three years, for whatever reason.

But, five months into the deal the relationship between the two is said to be all but over, and, in the words of a well-connected paddock source, "unless they start talking to each other and settle their differences quickly, one or other will have to leave..."

"One or other"? Surely it is Suzuki's team? Yes, but, according to the source, so draconian are the financial penalties governing any termination of Audetto's services that the team's rather precarious situation would be totally decimated.

Under the circumstances, Suzuki's only options, should push come to shove, would be to place the outfit into liquidation (thus risking the $48m bond somehow lodged with the FIA), or to voluntarily remove himself from the equation, handing the operation over lock, little stock and barrel to the former rally co-driver.

Where, though, would such a desperate move leave Honda? First, it would secure the $48m said to have been paid by the Big H on behalf of Super Aguri (which would be forfeit should the team go under).

Aguri Suzuki and Daniele Audetto © LAT

Second, the furore over Sato appears to have died down somewhat in the interim.

Third, it would free Honda to concentrate upon moving its own team up the grid rather than concerning itself with problems at the blunt end, and, if desired, supply a second team with greater performance potential - such as, for example, Williams, who are said to have been snubbed by Toyota/Lexus.

If rumours from a totally different, but equally respected, source with strong Japanese connections are to be believed, Honda seems to be regretting its liaison with Aguri and is attempting to distance itself there from.

"In fact," confided the informant, "last week, when Aguri requested specifications for the new seamless shift transmission said to be forthcoming, Honda sent a bill for 20 engines instead," before adding that "whatever transmission is provided will have a cast casing, not the latest carbon fibre one."

So, assuming the worst, how would it all pan out?

Majority opinions have Audetto "inheriting" the team, with Suzuki exiting honourably. Honda's (financial) interest remains safeguarded until end-2007 (when the FIA drops the $48m requirement), with Renault supplying engines courtesy of Audetto's pal Briatore, who has yet, of course, to agree an extension to his present contract, and levers same as part of his negotiations.

His rewards? A non-active shareholding in "Audetto F1" and the Renault contract extension.

For their part, Renault have a guaranteed berth for Montagny - pleasing the partisan media no end - and input into a junior outfit in which to place Renault Driver Development (RDD) talent. All whilst satisfying the GPMA ideal of supplying a second team, which would, of course, be no threat to the Mother Ship initially, and could always mutate into a Nissan-supported operation at very short notice.

It would, of course, be exceedingly sad to see Suzuki's F1 dream blown out of the paddock by internecine war, for the Japanese is an exceedingly popular fellow, but so high are the stakes, so big the pressures, so complicated the politics that arriving in F1 with a pile of wedge and an engine (whatever the respective sources) is no guarantee of corporate security.

Honda Racing F1 Team, which hit the scene as British American Racing after being formed seven years ago by an assortment of shareholders focusing upon a particular driver (Jacques Villeneuve) before going through various changes of direction, is living proof of that - as Craig Pollock never tires of relating.

Is history about to repeat itself?

Too early for optimism?

It was unusual, to say the least, to have Honda F1's Nick Fry and McLaren boss Ron Dennis optimistically gushing forth about the new Sporting Working Group established by the FIA to fine tune the 2008-onwards sporting regulations and those non-technical aspects which affect car design.

But since the occasion, Friday's FIA Press Conference in Spain, matters have become a lot more transparent.

Nick Fry and Ron Dennis © XPB/LAT

According to one or two team managers present, last Wednesday's SWG meeting, the first such get-together and convened under Charlie Whiting, the FIA's Race Director and Safety Delegate, went off swimmingly until the question of engine homologation was sprung upon the delegates, who were, in the main, team managers representing teams whose entries for 2008-2012 had been accepted by the governing body.

When the meeting proposed that engine 'freezing' be pushed back a year to mid-2007, the votes came in at nine for and three against - with the anti faction being, rather predictably, Ferrari and both the Bulls. Later came a second proposal - that the 'frozen' period be extended from three years to five - which was voted against by eight to four, with the three aforementioned, plus Prodrive (attending its first F1 meeting), being in the minority.

One man, one vote, thus had spoken.

Fry and Dennis used their Friday platform to tell the world thereof in the hopes that the FIA's World Motor Sport Council and Max Mosley, who previously stated that rule changes agreed by the SWG and F1 Commission would be accepted by the WMSC if they were "in the overall interests of the Formula One World Championship or motor sport in general," would not overturn the democratic process.

As it turned out, their dramatic emphasis of the situation turned out to be in vain.

Come Sunday, of course, the five Grand Prix Manufacturers' Association outfits - BMW, Honda, Mercedes, Renault and Toyota - agreed a deal to sign up with the commercial rights' holder for the 2008-2012 period, and, come Monday, Mosley let it be known that the SWG votes did not conform to his interpretation of "in the overall interests of the Formula One World Championship" and vetoed the majority decision.

Whether he waited until the GPMA members agreed their Memorandum of Understanding before taking the unilateral decision or whether such veto would have occurred regardless is, of course, not known and can only be speculated upon. But, with the teams not yet actually having put pen to the 2008-2012 Concorde Agreement - if that be the name of the revised governing document - the move is sure to inflame any resistance.

In a fax announcing his rejection of the vote, Mosley stated:

By entering the championship, a team accepts the regulations as published and, equally importantly, is entitled to rely on them when deciding whether or not to enter. A major factor in deciding whether or not to enter is the cost of competing. No responsible governing body could agree to rule changes which increase the cost of competing once entries have been accepted.

Totally true, of course, but they are equally entitled to rely upon processes written into the regulations. Clause 3 of Article 5 reads "Decisions in the Technical Working Group and Sporting Working Group will be taken by a simple majority vote. The FIA representative will not vote unless the teams' representatives are equally divided, in which case he will exercise a casting vote", which would appear to be at total variance with what Mosley has decreed.

Could Formula One's much vaunted peace be in jeopardy?