What has the Strategy Group actually achieved?

Following the 'radio silence' debacles at Silverstone and the Hungaroring, Formula 1's Strategy Group met on the Thursday ahead of the last round before the summer break, the German Grand Prix.

Team bosses gleefully reported back that not only had they managed to persuade the FIA to derestrict driver-to-pit communications, but the governing body agreed to in future treat double waved yellow flags during qualifying as reds.

As an aside, they mentioned track limits would be less stringently policed, and that regulations for safety car starts under wet conditions were up for revision, with the most likely outcome being an acclimatisation lap or two behind the silver Mercedes, after which drivers would be on their own. Work on cars under red-flag conditions would also be outlawed, they suggested.

All well and good, but if that is F1's concept of 'strategy' - defined as a "plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim" - then the championship really is in deep trouble. What is plain common sense should surely not require extended debate by F1's top management brains at a time when its live and TV ratings are dwindling across the globe, while the commercial rights holder battles to fill three calendar slots.

It has long been suspected that F1's supremos lack appetite for change, and perusal of a document dated 18.04.2014 and titled 'F1 Improvement Plan' as discussed back then by the Strategy Group certainly suggests this to be the case. A raft of forward-thinking concepts for introduction through to 2017 are included in its seven pages, yet the items eventually adopted can be counted on the toes of one foot.

Saliently, at that stage F1 had staged just two grands prix under its much-vaunted 'eco-friendly' hybrid engine formula that had been framed with much optimism - and originally included items such as ground-effects tunnels and wider wheels - yet was diluted to such extent by the time the regulations were enacted that these emasculated, whisper-quiet cars were decried by the commercial rights holder, fans, the media and promoters.

Whatever, the Plan's targets are detailed on the front page, and include: Reduce costs required to be competitive in F1; Reduce performance disparity across the field, achieve levelling; Reduce operational demands on F1 teams and personnel; Target items that are invisible to fans; Improve the great and sellable aspects of F1, including technology.

The listed items were to be phased in over a three-year period (2015-17), and implemented through regulations, having first been debated at FIA-constituted 'mini working groups'. Given that the cut-off for 2017's regulation changes was February 28 2016, how has the Strategy Group actually fared? In a word: dismally.

The first item on the list, a ban on tyre warmers, was said to have been "already approved", yet blankets are as visible as ever. Simplifications to brake ducts, front wings and fuel systems were due in 2015/16. If anything, winglets have become increasingly more complicated. Plans to use the same engine/gearbox combination throughout a race weekend also came to nought.

True, F1 has adopted revised aero regulations, but just recall the pain with which they were forced through in March this year - only for Mercedes to attempt to revisit them a month later.

Two headline-hitting items slated for 2017 - 18-inch wheel rims, to "attract competitive supply tenders across more tyre suppliers", and the adoption of FIA-specified active suspension systems - were chucked out quicker than it took this finger typist to tap out these words.

Yes, wider wheels and tyres have been adopted from next season, but still 13-inch wheel rims will prevail. This means that F1's aspect ratios - the relationship between sidewall height and contact patch - at around 45% is not much better those of the tyres (55%) on the trucks that haul F1's kit across Europe. That at a time when high-performance road cars regularly run on 30% ratios!

Equally, of the various 'Future Discussion' items, only titanium spark "blocks" made the cut, with glowing turbos and brakes, and vapour trails not making it beyond the back page. Reviews of weekend formats - shorter races, etc, - remain on the backburner three years after first being suggested. Instead, knockout qualifying was (catastrophically) adopted earlier this year, yet lasted just two races.

Of 12 'Future' items only one (engine cost reductions) was implemented, and even then only partially, after threats from Ferrari about triggering its veto. Standing starts/restarts under safety cars are again at the discussion stage, yet only because of recent debacles that caused massive outcry from fans and media alike. Again the question must be asked: do any of these items actually qualify as strategic?

Consider the Olympics. For all the IOC's faults (and there are many), the body cannot be accused of navel-gazing. A host of outdated sports have recently been dropped from Olympic competition - with many more due to lose this hallowed status - while activities such as BMX and beach volleyball are now recognised, and skateboarding is slated for inclusion in Japan's Games in 2020.

How long before javelin-hurling and shot-putting are dropped? After all, who in this nuclear age still chucks spears about, or lobs iron balls over castle walls? What was relevant around the time of the first Games held during the 8th Century BC and adopted for tradition's sake when the revivalist IOC was formed during the 1890s surely has no place in current sporting arenas. The IOC recognises that, and is reacting accordingly.

Such brave experiments, not fretting with fiery running spikes or experimenting with smoke-emitting bicycles, count as "strategy". Instead F1 seems obsessed with sticking to two-hour races at a time when the Millennial generation (or Gen Y, typically those born between 1980 and the turn of the Millennium) is switching off sport in droves.

Notwithstanding initiatives to embrace emerging sports, the IOC's latest extravaganza lost 25% of its 18-49 audience rating, with some observers estimating that the figure would have been substantially higher had the sporting body stuck to antiquated/traditional sports. Take note F1: your numbers mirror these latest trends.

All this begs the questions - just what do the great and good of F1 do in Strategy Group meetings for four or so hours every month? Why do they not simply admit that what in 2014 looked good on paper - and lured the likes of Red Bull Racing, Ferrari, McLaren and Mercedes into signing lucrative, but arguably anti-competitive contracts ahead of F1's planned Singapore IPO - is, in real terms, an unmitigated disaster?

At the root of the Group's failure to serve F1's best interests lies a lack of common purpose. Each of its eight entities - FIA, represented by president Jean Todt; commercial rights holder Formula One Management, represented by CEO Bernie Ecclestone, and six team bosses representing the quartet of teams mentioned above plus Williams and the highest-placed non-SG outfit (currently Force India) - is driven by its own agenda.

Then, Todt and Ecclestone hold six votes each - each equal to the combined team block - and are therefore able to sway teams either way despite seldom singing from the same hymn sheet. Finally, team bosses invariably report to boards, and so are seldom able to vote on sticky items without deferring to their paymasters. Is it any wonder F1 finds itself in limbo until crises force it into (compromised) action?

The pre-2013 structure of Technical/Sporting Working Groups agreeing rule changes before forwarding these to the F1 Commission - on which all major players sit - for preliminary approval, then escalating carried motions to the FIA World Motorsport Council for ratification worked a charm for four years.

The subsequent insertion of the Strategy Group between Working Groups and Commission created such inertia that F1's best brains agreed just two (wholly logical) 'clarifications' during a four-hour meeting despite a backlog of ideas running to seven pages. Reason enough, surely, to scrap the so-called 'Strategy' Group forthwith, for to date it has done immeasurably more harm than good.

In its place, the FIA/FOM should appoint a team of strategists well-versed in the intricacies of motorsport and charge them with fearlessly devising action plans covering the period 2020-25, with a further outline plan rolling F1 from 2026-30, and so on.

Consider the recent revitalisation of top-line sportscar racing with the creation of the World Endurance Championship and the resurgence of the World Rally Championship after years of neglect as proof of the FIA's ability to reform its championships. Or the collective vision that transformed Formula E from concept to reality in four years flat. Clearly, then, this lack of appetite for change does not emanate from Paris.

Is it not utterly perverse that the best brains in this complex business consider 'strategy' to be their pitstop timing and tyre compound choices - not a blueprint to ensure F1's continued survival in the face of an extremely challenging socio-economic environment that has caused even the Olympic Games' ratings to tumble?