Weak F1 engine deal neglects the future

Formula 1 excels at patting itself on the back for its past, and is superb at criticising its present. But, when it comes to framing its future, it invariably fails.

The engine 'agreement' struck during the last three weeks provides ample proof of this myopic syndrome, for so proud are the FIA and power unit suppliers of what they consider a job well done that scant regard has been paid to future engine regulations.

The deal encompasses four points: obligation to supply if called upon to do so; performance convergence within two per cent; price reductions for existing customers and caps for incoming teams; and synthesised noise generators to improve F1's aural quality. "Underwhelming" and "very soft" were words used by Christian Horner, boss of Red Bull Racing, to describe the deal during last Friday's FIA press conference.

Force India's Bob Fernley was clearly equally unimpressed, twice stating that the team "is reserving its position" when asked about the deal. Given that Force India, together with Sauber, filed a complaint with the EU Commission's Competition Department - in the process of being restructured to incorporate a division dealing with sporting matters - there could be good reason behind his refusal to expand.

On the flip side Renault's Cyril Abiteboul welcomes the deal, as did Ferrari team principal Maurizio Arrivabene, the former saying "We are pleased with this agreement in particular, but what's good now is to have a clear understanding of what's coming up for the next few years. We all know stability is important, so we have agreed for some stability up to 2020."

However, the major points - to be "monitored, not mandated", with breaches reported to F1's ineffectual Strategy Group, on which the engine suppliers are represented but not all teams, for action - are predicated upon engine suppliers respecting the agreement. This in itself proves that the deal is more voluntary charter than regulatory framework, and hence Horner's comments.

To quote Fabrice Lom, the FIA's head of powertrain: "We are not mandating convergence; there is no prescribed convergence. So we just put [in place a] measure that should help convergence.

"If [the convergence] is considered to be not at the level that we expect to be, we will come back to the Strategy Group and report, and then what will happen will be a decision of the Strategy Group, according to the F1 governance we have today."

Therefore where once the FIA, via race director Charlie Whiting, issued rule clarifications, the poachers could conceivably now dictate remedial actions to the gatekeepers. A second governance procedure seems to be in play.

It appears that the engine pricing issue for existing teams will not be regulated either, being subject to a series of "very soft agreements" between power unit suppliers and teams. To illustrate the point: far from benefiting from the much-vaunted €12million target for an annual, two-car supply, Red Bull Racing - not aligned with a works manufacturer partner - will pay €24m even after cumulative discounts of €1m (2017) and €3m (2018-onwards) are applied.

Asked about the apparent variance, Lom explained: "I think the good word is 'apparently' - because with the figures I have, we are not far. Even, very close." Many of the teams disagree with the latter comment.

And, again, the engine prices will not be regulated - the €12m price will be enforced only where new teams apply for engines - but monitored against commitments given in "soft" letters, explaining why Horner was "underwhelmed". That said, there is little sympathy for the Red Bull team boss, who last year vociferously criticised the Renault engines that have now delivered four victories for his team since Canada 2014.

It appears far from being concerned with rectifying its dysfunctional governance procedure - that contributed to the controversy in the first place - F1 now seems intent on creating a twin-stream regulatory procedure, with the secondary process operating alongside (i.e. outside of) the regulatory framework via a series of unregulated "very soft" agreements to be subjected to deliberation by the Strategy Group.

So in a nutshell, the official function of the Strategy Group is to react to potential breaches of a deal that was approved by e-vote after a meeting convened to discuss the issue collapsed in the absence of a quorum.

What next? Overall governance by the Strategy Group, that is to say rule enforcement by the very same self-serving group that has a history of marginalising independent teams? Any wonder Force India and Sauber are itching to have their case heard in Brussels?

Let us, though, for the sake of this column imagine that F1 achieves a first, and this group of highly competitive individuals, each of whom have every motivation to win at all costs so seek advantage at every turn, adheres to the spirit of deals rather than the letters of (unpublished) parallel agreements, then surely they would serve F1 better by strategising its future and planning for post-2020 rather than governing.

The current hybrid concept was first mooted in 2007, and outline regulations devised in 2009 for 2013 introduction, with the initial framework put to the FIA World Motor Sport Council for ratification during former FIA president Max Mosley's final session before handing over to present incumbent Jean Todt.

That was when it went wrong, for at that stage obligations to supply and cost caps should have been mandated, but were not in the mistaken belief that motor manufacturers would fight to supply teams with this new-fangled technology. Instead, hit by the global economic crisis and sick of F1's politicking, they departed in droves, with the first returnee being Honda in 2015.

Crucially, the introduction of the engines was planned to chime with the introduction of a new Concorde Agreement after the 2010-12 covenant expired, therefore providing for clean commercial and technical breaks. Various revisions, not least a switch from inline four-cylinder architecture to V6, delayed the date to 2014, immediately throwing F1 out of commercial and regulatory kilter - plus, no new Concorde was agreed.

At the time these factors were deemed "not important" by team bosses - so why have they suddenly become significant now that 2020-onwards regulations should be discussed remains unclear - but it seems indicative of the make-it-up-as-we-go along attitude that prevails in F1.

Consider now that timing: From concept to introduction lasted seven years, while regulation to race took four full seasons - but not before three pre-season tests, during which engines smokily popped and banged about, prompted bookmakers to offer odds on the 2014 opener having no finishers. Count now the seasons remaining under "guaranteed" stability: four.

For proof that it takes at least four years to hone a winning engine look no further than Honda: the world's largest engine manufacturer returned to F1 last year after preparing for almost three years, yet has spent its return very much on the back foot. Its latest points haul (for ninth in Spain) came after two Mercedes cars crashed out of the lead, with the other McLaren-Honda again retiring with engine-related gremlins.

Against that background would any manufacturer considering an F1 entry do so in the knowledge that its engine would still be uncompetitive when the regulations expire in 2020? The answer is encapsulated in the response of a particularly astute F1 team executive to that question: "The runway is [now] too short..."

After two seasons the current engines are reaching maturation and are, without a shadow of doubt, technological masterpieces offering levels of road-car relevance rivalled only by the World Endurance Championship's LMP1 category, while their horrendous initial costs - the four current suppliers are estimated to have invested a combined billion dollars in their development - have by now been mostly amortised.

While the odds are better than good that the current V6 architecture and energy recovery systems will be retained, albeit with enhancements - to not do so would be utterly daft, but, as history relates, F1 is not immune to such deficiencies - multi-national boards base decisions on data, not promises; on hard regulations, not "soft" agreements. They need to see commitments, not vague promises.

Accordingly F1 is unlikely to welcome additional engine suppliers before 2020 at the earliest. However, surely it is incumbent upon the Strategy Group to start the process of persuading manufacturers to enter F1 as soon thereafter as possible, with the shiniest calling card being stable, long-term regulations regulated by enforceable cost controls. Indeed, all the mechanisms that are so glaringly absent at present.

Given the four-year (minimum) "runway", it follows that now is the time F1 as a whole and the Strategy Group in particular needs to consider its post-2020 regulations rather than preening itself for eventually incorporating the clauses it should have embraced in 2009. Failure to do so will reinforce perceptions that the Strategy Group exists only as a titular body more obsessed with qualifying formats than F1's future.

Intriguingly, there has been a push to extend the regulations to 2023 - a strange date, indeed, given that Renault is committed to '24 - but the initiative has allegedly been blocked by other factions, notably Mercedes, on the basis that a clean break is preferred when the current commercial agreements and guaranteed stability period end. Deja vu?

According to a Mercedes source "the contracts end then, so why extend the technical regulations?", but such an argument is devoid of logic as the company is at this stage committed only to 2020, and free to exit F1 thereafter - extended technical regulations or not. Should, though, the Three Pointed Star elect to remain, such regulatory extensions could only save it a packet.

Therefore the assumption must be made that Mercedes fears the presence of market competitors, who could be attracted by rules stability, early notice and cost controls. Sorry, Toto - I'd be delighted to be proven wrong...

While perfectly aligned commercial, technical and sporting agreements are the ideal, early agreement (even if only in principle) to retain the basic concept and architecture of current engines is vital, for not only would that serve to attract new manufacturers - solving pricing and supply issues - but equally ease the way for commercial negotiations, given that past Concorde Agreements included long-term regulatory appendices.

Asked what lessons had been learned from the recent engine controversies, Whiting said "The one thing that we could learn from the introduction of the current power units would be that we could have a better consultation process prior to doing the regulations. We could have done a slightly better job on that in the beginning - but we live and learn and we'll move on."

Now surely is the time to start with that "slightly better job" of consulting, then to commence planning new regulations ahead of that post-2020 "new beginning".