How F1's American nightmare happened

The 2005 United States Grand Prix at Indianapolis was an unhappy chapter in motorsport's history. It caused serious damage to Formula 1's image in a key market, one in which Bernie Ecclestone had tried for so long to gain a foothold.

Indeed, some of the key players are keen to forget that the nightmare took place.

"I've got a good way of getting on in my life," says Formula 1 ringmaster Ecclestone. "I'm in a good position to forget the bad things, and only remember the good."

Former Indianapolis boss Tony George has a very similar feeling.

"I've been trying to forget it," he says. "It was one of my worst professional weekends. I've tried to put as much of that out of my mind as I can!"

So how did we end up with a scenario in which the 14 Michelin-shod cars pulled into the pits at the end of the formation lap, leaving just Ferrari and backmarker Bridgestone teams Jordan and Minardi on the grid? Here's how it played out.

FRIDAY JUNE 17

The saga began on Friday morning when Toyota third driver Ricardo Zonta spun in the infield after his left-rear Michelin went down. That attracted little attention, and it was only when Toyota race driver Ralf Schumacher crashed heavily in FP2 when exiting Turn 13 - the banked right-hander onto the pit straight - that alarm bells started to sound.

John Howett (Team principal, Toyota): "Ralf's was a fairly big shunt, and we were all relieved that he got out of the car. They were replaying pictures of the incident, and it looked like the left-rear tyre had gone down. I think we still ran a bit in that session, and when Jarno [Trulli] came in there were what looked like vertical cuts in the sidewall of the rear-left. So we knew we had a problem, and it was, 'Why is it us?' First of all Michelin thought we were running underinflated pressures, but there was no issue there. So we were thinking, 'Why have we got this problem?'"

The story took a different direction when it emerged that tyres on other cars were showing danger signs.

Howett: "One of the Michelin guys came along and said they had identified a similar situation to Jarno's in three or four other teams. So an hour or so after FP2 it became obvious that there was an issue with the tyre. Michelin called a meeting, and they said we've got to work overnight to understand it. They wanted to see if it was a batch issue, but I think even at that time they were fairly sure that those tyres hadn't been produced from the same moulds, or in the same batch. They wanted to verify that."

SATURDAY JUNE 18

The following morning, the news from Michelin's Clermont-Ferrand base was not positive and, with no alternative tyres available, teams were told to take precautions in morning practice, including using pitlane rather than the last corner.

Howett: "By then they were fairly sure it wasn't a batch issue. They couldn't simulate any sort of failure, even at their extreme running. So at that stage they couldn't tell us a great deal. We were all recommended to run towards the top end of the tyre pressures and, if possible, not do extensive running in practice, and to run low fuel, so we were putting less force on the tyre.

Howett's Toyota was central to the drama from the very outset © XPB

"So on Saturday morning most of the Michelin runners were doing fairly short runs. We didn't have any tyres that we could see any severe issue with, but I think one or two of the other teams had done longer runs, and they identified this slight mark starting in the sidewall of the tyre.

"We then ran fairly light fuel in qualifying in both the cars. Jarno took pole, but probably we had less fuel than the others, because we seemed to have a more severe problem, so we were extra cautious."

Charlie Whiting (FIA race director): "The fundamental problem was that in those days the tyre companies came along with a tyre that was the so-called prime. And then they were supposed to have a back-up tyre should the prime not be suitable. But that's not how it worked, of course. The back-up tyre became the option, so it became edgier, as opposed to a safe back-up. So rather than say, 'We've got a problem with our prime, we can use the back-up now,' they were in deep trouble."

By now everyone knew there was a serious issue. It was at a meeting of the Michelin teams that night that the idea of introducing a tyre chicane took hold. A similar thing had been done at the last minute at the 1994 Spanish GP, so team bosses felt that there was a precedent.

Howett: "The only consistent feeling was that Turn 13 was the problem. That's where Ralf had had the crash, and Ricardo had had his deflation coming into the infield, which was only a few corners after Turn 13. The proposal then to Bernie and Tony George was we should look to putting a chicane in before Turn 13 to slow the cars down.

"Bernie said, 'OK leave it with me,' and Tony said it was no problem, he would get his crews out there. As we left on Saturday night we assumed we'd come in on Sunday morning and there would actually be a chicane in. The Michelin teams also said if there's an issue we'd be happy not to race for points."

Whiting insists he said from the off that a chicane was not an option. He was backed up by his boss, FIA president Max Mosley, who kept in touch by phone from his home in Monaco.

Whiting says installing a chicane at short notice wasn't a workable solution © XPB

Whiting: "I'm responsible for the safety of the circuit, the circuit is homologated in a certain configuration. Without doing proper simulations I'm not going to say, 'Let's just put a chicane in there.' What if a car hits the chicane and a wheel goes over the fence? There was absolutely no way that was happening.

"On matters of circuit safety I can't make any compromises. It would just be so amateur, and even if you could make a proper chicane with nice kerbs, instead of a tyre chicane, which is what they wanted to do, I still wouldn't want to put my name to it without doing the proper research."

Meanwhile, in a last-ditch attempt to investigate the issue, a random selection of 26 tyres was flown to a Michelin R&D base in Akron, Ohio, on a small cargo plane. The FIA agreed on the basis that technical delegate Jo Bauer chaperone them, and along with three Michelin engineers the German was given the use of a McLaren private jet.

Ron Dennis would have been unimpressed had he seen the four men, still in their work kit at the end of a long day, munching their way through their takeaway pizzas... Bauer watched as the tyres were put through various tests, but nothing new was learned, and it proved to be a fruitless journey. He and the tyres got back to Indianapolis at around 6am on Sunday.

SUNDAY JUNE 19

Come Sunday there was no sign of the chicane or any other solution. The first of many heated meetings that day was quickly convened by Michelin. Legal liability issues became paramount.

Howett: "Bernie and Charlie came. The Bridgestone teams were invited, but Ferrari didn't come. Basically the FIA position was that they weren't prepared to put the chicane in, as it hadn't been tested, and they considered that it was unsafe. Because a precedent had happened at a previous race in Spain some of the teams were quite excited that this couldn't happen now. Flavio [Briatore] was getting hot and bothered, and Ron..."

A decade on, George declares it "one of my worst professional weekends" © LAT

Tony George (Indianapolis Motor Speedway president): "I was in meetings with team principals and Formula One Management, listening mainly. I had Max on the phone at one point and there was a whole discussion about what we're accustomed to, and that's trying to have the show go on and give the fans what they paid to see."

Whiting: "We said basically we're not going to do anything, we're not going to put a chicane in, that's completely out of the question. But we have got a few ways that we could suggest to help you, all of which proved unpalatable to the teams."

Those ideas included running the cars through the pitlane on every lap and, perhaps more realistically, imposing a speed limit for the Michelin-shod runners, while allowing the Bridgestone runners to lap at normal speeds.

Whiting: "We could have painted a line through the corner - Bridgestone cars could stay outside the line, and Michelin cars inside, or something like that, so they were separated. They could have just used the pitlane speed limiter. We would probably have monitored it with a speed gun, as in those days we didn't have timing loops in as many places. But there were ways of doing it very simply, really.

"OK, it would have been disastrous for the Michelin teams, but we would have had a race, and the Michelin cars would have had a good race among themselves, and you would have had a full field. It would have been very straightforward. I was pressing them to tell me what they thought a safe speed was through that corner, and they could never tell me. So if I put a chicane in how does that guarantee that the speed is going to be safe through the corner? I gave them all the reasons why a chicane wasn't going to happen."

Michelin spent much of the weekend deep in discussion with its partner teams © LAT

The meetings continued as the clock ticked down towards the start of the race. Then, to Whiting's surprise, he learned that steps were being made towards building a chicane, seemingly at the specific request of Ecclestone.

Whiting: "There was a Porsche race and then after that someone said, 'They're moving tyres from Turn 10 to make a chicane.' I said, 'I beg your pardon?' They said Bernie had told them to do it. I said, 'If you move any tyres this circuit's no longer homologated; there won't be a race at all. That's what's going to happen. So move the tyres back now, or there won't be a race.' It was being done as I went out onto the track, I saw these tractors moving a load of tyres."

George: "We were ready to do what we needed to do, build the chicane. I don't recall if Bernie had authorised it or not - it was all subject to getting hold of Max, as I recall. Charlie's opinion was, reading the rules and interpreting them literally, that it was not an option. We offered solutions that were considered, but ultimately rejected. I understand about the circuit being homologated and the sporting code and the rules and all that, but it became clear that this was something which was beyond our control."

Howett: "Michelin said, 'Sorry, if we can't put the chicane in we don't think we can allow our partners to race.' Their position was the risk was too high, that there wasn't a satisfactory solution. They then got reasonably strong on the issue. We thought there were more-than-reasonable options on the table, the teams were prepared not to score points, we accept the responsibility for the tyre issue, we want to provide a race for the teams, we think that having the two lap speeds isn't a race."

One big problem was that Ferrari's Jean Todt - at that time a close ally of Mosley's - saw no reason why he should give any ground.

Jordan and Minardi eventually finished third through sixth, but nearly joined the Michelin teams on the sidelines © XPB

Howett: "Two Bridgestone teams decided that they would support us and wouldn't race if there wasn't a chicane put in, and that was Paul Stoddart [Minardi] and Colin Kolles [Jordan]. Bernie said he would try to renegotiate with Todt, as Ferrari had tried to block it on the basis that it was unfair towards them. That was one of the arguments coming from Max and the FIA.

"Flavio went off with Bernie to talk to Todt, and to phone Max. There was another meeting called, a very brief one, because it was getting very close to the race start, where it was made clear that Max absolutely refused to put a chicane in. If they did anything like that the FIA couldn't accept it as an FIA race, and if it wasn't an FIA race it wouldn't be part of the World Championship."

By now things had reached the point of no return. The FIA made it clear that with a chicane, it would withdraw its officials. Among the teams there was even wild talk of how they would quickly fill the key jobs with their own people. Eventually the teams came to the decision not to take the start, and they had to persuade their drivers to go along with it.

Fernando Alonso (Renault): "It was very a strange weekend with the problems of the tyres, many discussions, many meetings in different motorhomes, trying to come to an agreement of racing but maybe not taking some kind of decision to make everyone happy. In the end it was not possible, which was a shame for the people, because the show was affected."

Howett: "If you were really serious about giving the crowd a race you've got to do something sensible. The Michelin teams in the end thought there was no difference between coming in after a lap or having a two-speed banking or coming through the pitlane. At the last meeting all the Michelin teams agreed not to race.

Fans had little indication about the race they'd soon be watching © LAT

"We would go to the grid because we were contractually obliged to do so in the Concorde Agreement, and then we'd come in and stop. Kolles didn't come to that final meeting, and Ferrari weren't there. I think Stoddart was pressured by Bridgestone, so he apologised to the Michelin teams."

Jacques Villeneuve (Sauber): "The most frustrating thing was that at the time Ferrari and the FIA would not accept that we change the track, even though we would give them all the points. They didn't want to play the game and think about the good of the sport. It's not like we could have done anything. No Michelin cars would have finished the race, we would have all ended up in the wall there. It was just not possible."

Whiting: "I'd been told what was going to happen. They said they were going to do the formation lap and then all come in. I was prepared for it, but I wasn't sure it was going to happen. But I was sure of one thing, and that was we were going to start the race and run it, and we weren't going to be pressured into not running the race."

George: "Ultimately the FIA conduct the competition, we don't. That's where our hands were somewhat tied. At an IndyCar-sanctioned event we would probably have arrived at different conclusions. When the final decision was made and we knew what was going to take place I thought there's no way in hell I'm going to go out there and wave the chequered flag, I don't want to be standing out on a podium and have people throwing beer cans at me!"

Some of the drivers took a bit of persuading, but in the end all the Michelin runners followed poleman Trulli into the pitlane at the end of the formation lap, leaving just the six Bridgestone cars on the grid. It was particularly difficult for Michelin's two main title contenders, Alonso and Kimi Raikkonen.

Alonso: "I was fighting with Kimi for the championship, and he was second on the grid, and I was sixth. I had this instruction, 'If he goes to the grid, you to the grid; if he goes to the pitlane, you go to the pitlane.' We had all agreed to go to the pitlane, but in case Kimi changed his mind at the last moment, I had to do the same! So there was some stress on that formation lap!"

Felipe Massa (Sauber): "When you're talking about safety, it's the most important thing. If you stop because there's danger, it's not a problem; it's a problem when you stop for a different reason. I think we were right to stop, instead of seeing a driver hurt, which is a lot more serious than that."

The two Ferraris cut lonely figures at the front of the 'grid' © LAT

The stunned crowd had little knowledge of what had been happening. As soon as the Michelin cars pulled off, they made their feelings known.

Whiting: "I wasn't convinced that there would be complete solidarity, but they'd obviously all cut their palms and made this big pact and they all did it, which to this day probably surprises me slightly. But I suppose they'd been told they had to by Michelin. It was pretty awful starting that race.

"My goodness, the crowd opposite, when I climbed down off the start platform, you should have heard the boos. It was horrendous. I wanted to run inside, but I tried to walk in as dignified a fashion as possible! Obviously it wasn't me they were aiming their boos at, but what really worried me was when they started throwing beer cans onto the track at the first corner. I thought if that gets a hold, we'll have to stop the race."

Jenson Button (BAR-Honda): "I've tried to get rid of it from my memory! It was a tough weekend for the sport, but what can we do as drivers? We have to follow the lead of the tyre companies. It was a very bad weekend for F1, and obviously the American fans weren't best pleased, which you can completely understand."

The Michelin teams suspected that Mosley was playing a long-term game, and by blocking the chicane plan was trying to put pressure on them for political reasons, amid talk of a breakaway. In his new book, Mosley says he believed Bernie was trying to curry favour with teams by presenting "the FIA as the common enemy", which strengthened his resolve.

Whiting: "They [the Michelin teams] wanted us to hobble everyone, because they didn't have anything suitable. If they had set a speed [limit] then obviously we could have done something, and it would have rendered them all completely uncompetitive. I think it was a gamble that didn't work, basically. They could have raced, albeit uncompetitively, if they'd wanted to do.

"I'm sure that they were convinced that they would win the day, but equally we showed that we don't succumb to pressure like that. If they don't come along with the right stuff we can't change the rules just because they haven't come prepared. That was the thing that got me; had the boot been on the other foot would the Michelin teams all have said, 'Let's put a chicane in for those three Bridgestone teams?'"

Ecclestone: "It's a pity it happened. We could have done a lot of different things, but forget what could have happened, it was quite a political decision. Nothing to do with me. Speak to Max..."

For more on the 2005 United States Grand Prix, including analysis of why Michelin's tyres failed and the fallout from the event, see the current edition of AUTOSPORT magazine.