Engines could be F1's next knee-jerk victim

Formula 1's qualifying farce once again brought into sharp focus its utterly flawed decision-making process.

Having had forced upon it a format that is best termed a 'compromised solution to a question posed only by those obsessed with spicing up a show rather than caring for world class sporting spectacle', F1 then reacted in worst possible fashion once the true depth of the format's flaws became apparent.

Rather than rationalising the issues inherent in what was subsequently revealed as being the fourth-favourite proposal - after one-hour Saturday sprint races to determine grids, time penalties linked to results of previous races, and the cheesy concept of reverse grids - F1's bosses defaulted to classic knee-jerk mode in their haste to revert to last year's format, which was blamed for F1's predictability in the first place.

Consider: the revised format was devised specifically to juggle grids in order to reduce predictability; yet, rather than awaiting the outcome of the race before conducting post-mortems, team principals/managers met five hours before the start to vote (Force India, which expressed reservations was accused of disrupting due process) on reverting to the previous format.

The reaction smacked of desperation to be seen to be doing something, anything, yet the original proposer of making changes, namely F1 tsar Bernie Ecclestone, was not even present in Melbourne to chair the meeting or suggest alternatives to what he told Autosport was a "pretty crap" qualifying session, then warned against reverting as that would not solve the issue of predictability.

This was the man who had, remember, told the media F1 "was the worst it's ever been" on the eve of the new season, so reverting would be a damning indictment that nothing had changed. Although the Melbourne meeting agreed to change for the next race in Bahrain, one team boss feared, "Someone in Princes Gate (home to Formula One Management) could derail the process by voting against any change".

The fact is, though, that Sunday's pre-race meeting was not empowered to take decisions; purely to make recommendations or gauge appetite for change. F1's regulatory process requires immediate changes to regulations to be voted through at Strategy Group level (simple majority), then unanimously by the F1 Commission before being escalated to the FIA World Motorsport Council for ratification by simple majority.

Failure to adhere to the process could result in litigation, and this writer hears that the word is increasingly bandied about in F1 meetings.

True, the process could be short-circuited via e-vote, and meetings called at short notice, but still the specified procedure must be followed for regulation changes - bar where necessitated by safety issues - for the current season, or subsequent year if tabled after March 1.

This complex issue is complicated by the fact that delegates at the meeting voted for what they considered as the best interests of F1, not for their respective teams - and their bosses could conceivably force them to resist change when push comes to shove at F1 Commission level. The debacle has, after all, handed independent teams a weapon to use in their ongoing quests for regulatory change and cost caps.

Then, consider that the 11 teams present at the Melbourne meeting constitute just over 40 per cent of the 26-seat F1 Commission, with the balance of votes collectively held by representatives from FOM, the FIA, race promoters, technical partners and sponsors - any one of whom could derail the process to whatever end.

Nor is it a matter of simply voting 'yes' or 'no' for the previous format, for further alternatives could well be tabled, or change delayed beyond the next race. Three questions need to be posed, each requiring unanimous approval by the F1 Commission before ratification by the WMSC - assuming, that is, the Strategy Group agrees in the first place. These are: 'Do we change?'; if yes, 'Which format?'; finally 'When?'

From the foregoing, the paddock's elation after Sunday's meeting was clearly premature, and smacked more of wishing to be seen to instituting change than actually amending a format that was not only flawed, but had been proposed for the wrong reasons.

It beggars belief that a sporting activity that relies so heavily on computer modelling programmes - whether for aerodynamic development, engine design or race strategies - should only subject its crucial qualifying format to simulations after change had been approved. Remember how Ecclestone wished to delay introduction until the fifth race due to FOM's computers not being ready?

However, the FIA overruled FOM, insisting on any changes being implemented by the first race as it did not wish to be seen as tinkering with formats in-season. That said, who knows whether the elimination format contributed to one of the most exciting races in recent years, possibly due to faster cars being forced on to softer rubber in Q2. Certainly, Pirelli's Paul Hembery suggested that could be the case - and he should know.

Change to whatever format may well eventually be ratified after due process, possibly even prior to the Bahrain Grand Prix, but F1's latest debacle serves as an abject lesson to those who propose change without thinking through the full consequences. Ironically, if F1 does revert or adopt another format it will be subjected to the very in-season regulation change the FIA so robustly resisted.

On the other hand, the process may stymie any change, in which case F1 would be saddled with a flawed format to which no one has claimed 'ownership' - clearly the vote at F1 Commission level was carried unanimously given that change was adopted at such short notice, yet all parties now are pointing fingers in every direction bar at self, which, again, is in keeping with F1's denial syndrome.

Although the fiasco dominated paddock talk in Melbourne, team bosses still found time to express fears that F1's convoluted governance procedure could result in derailment of the FIA's latest attempts at resolving the engine dilemmas, namely costs of supply, guaranteed supply to all teams, performance parity, and aural appeal - failing which an independent engine, likely of a different configuration, would be introduced.

A meeting of the (unofficial) Power Unit Working Group - comprising delegates from Mercedes, Ferrari, Renault, Honda on the engine side, with Red Bull, McLaren, Force India and Sauber batting for the teams - was convened at Heathrow's Sofitel Hotel the previous Monday.

By most accounts the meeting descended into acrimony, with one team allegedly questioning the FIA's jurisdiction over commercial matters such as enforced supply contracts, which would empower the governing body to act as arbiter where teams are unable to secure competitive power unit contracts.

Should the FIA succeed, it could, for example, force Honda, which currently services one team, to supply, say, Red Bull, or demand that Mercedes supplies Sauber - capacity permitting.

This follows Ferrari's warning that it would invoke its regulatory veto should the FIA impose price caps of 12million euros (initially 10m) for two-car annual supplies. Independent teams fear the EU Commission's 2000 ruling that the FIA desist from involving itself in commercial issues as condition of approving the 113-year lease of F1's commercial rights to FOM could stymie the best of intentions.

As for performance convergence: the FIA aims to close the gap between power units to within two per cent of the best - a target engine suppliers are confident of meeting provided their myopic token system, which bans open development and prevents suppliers from chasing Mercedes levels of performance, is waived regardless of financial implications. How this squares cost caps remains unanswered.

However, according to sources FOM's legal eagle is adamant the two-per-cent difference must be achieved or an independent engine formula will be pursued. Helmut Marko, former grand prix driver/Le Mans winner turned Red Bull's motorsport consultant, recently referred to this convergence factor in an interview during which he revealed that Red Bull had considered commissioning its own engine.

"There are still discussions to equalise power within two per cent, or bring the so-called independent engine in again. Let's see what happens with the regulations," he told Autosport during the launch of a joint venture between Red Bull Technology and Aston Martin aimed at producing a low-volume hypercar.

The way things currently stand the Power Unit Working Group has until April 30 to make recommendations that are acceptable to the FIA/FOM, failing which the independent alternative, likely a naturally-aspirated 2.2-litre V6 with IndyCar roots and a rudimentary KERS system (to provide a 'green' theme), will be imposed from 2018.

Remember, though, that tenders had been previously been called for before the April 30 moratorium was granted, so the concept could be readily resurrected.

However, such an engine would need to follow due process - and withstand whatever legal actions the anti-factions may institute - and fears in the paddock are that Mercedes and Ferrari will drag the issue out until just two seasons remain under the current engine formula, due to expire in 2020.

In that case F1 may as well stick to what it has, no matter how costly or flawed, to the glee of Mercedes and Ferrari and chagrin of such as Sauber and Force India. Already Formula 1 has sleep-walked into one fiasco, then tried to solve the widely-predicted consequences through knee-jerk reactions.

Will it do the same with engines over the next month or so?