The Weekly Grapevine

Saving the lost generation

There was a time when the development path for young drivers was, much like the training of budding doctors or lawyers, relatively simple. Just as the route to qualifying in more 'accepted' professions entailed some form of tertiary training followed by spells of internship, so young drivers progressed through junior ranks before hitting Formula One.

Invariably they moved from karts to Formula Ford (where chassis choice was free), then F3 and onwards to F2 or F3000 - usually combined with an F1 test role - and, finally, a seat with a back-of-the-grid F1 team, more often than not paid for as part of an apprenticeship by a front-running outfit.

There were exceptions, of course, with some drivers taking detours into sports cars or US or Japanese series, but the basic template was simple. Extremely effective, too: as proven by the system's list of graduates, too lengthy to detail in full here, but one encompassing approximately 75 per cent of all grand prix winners and world champions.

Eddie Irvine wins the 1987 Formula Ford Festival at Brands Hatch © LAT

Each step taught new skills whilst building on what went before. Karting instilled wheel-to-wheel combat, FFord taught drivers how to setup cars and provided 'full' size racing, F3 opened the door to wings and slicks, F2 (F3000) threw power at drivers and the lessons provided by F1 test and development roles are self-explanatory.

However, the primary factor in this educational chain was that, in essence, crucial decisions needed to be taken at each point along the way: championships needed to be defined (the UK alone had up to four major FFord series), then the perfect team for that category identified.

That decision was, in turn, driven by numerous factors, not least the various engine/chassis/tyre permutations prevailing in these 'open' formulae. This choice of hardware opened development opportunities, and thus drivers gained essential test experience every step along the way to the very top. However, getting it wrong often meant staying back for another year.

Contrast this with contemporary careers where youngsters progress from one standard chassis/engine/tyre formula - with an increasing number of series also supplying cars from 'central pools' and allocated by ballot - to the next, with the only discernible difference being a power increase, a different badge on the nose, and a bigger support package provided by the manufacturer promoting the series.

So, the career path for a kid hoping to make it to F1 typically goes as follows: karting, then, say, Formula BMW or Formula Renault to F3 or World Series by Renault, then GP2, before, finally, the young driver gets appointed to a test role with an F1 team, then sits and waits for a chance.

(Yes, F3 is an open formula, but testing and tyres are tightly controlled, and it can become a one-make formula in everything bar name when a single chassis/engine package dominates.)

The FBMW-F3-World Series path was trodden by Sebastian Vettel, who went on to become BMW Sauber's tester/reserve driver before being promoted to racer in the wake of Robert Kubica's Montreal accident, in the process becoming the only teenager to score a championship point when he finished eighth in Indianapolis.

But even test/reserve roles for young drivers are close to extinction.

Testing in feeder formulae is all but forbidden, tyre compounds are pre-determined for the season, as are, in most instances, gear ratios, whilst setup and aero windows are purposely kept narrow in order to keep it simple and level the playing field.

Thus, it is conceivable that a young driver could move from karting to F1 test driver, skipping all the steps in between, where he would then be charged with the role of enhancing the performance of the mostly complex racing cars on earth. Yet he will be required to do so without having been exposed to even the most basic intricacies of the role, let alone having been granted opportunities of developing the requisite skills unless a team makes available extensive driver simulator time.

Giancarlo Fisichella wins the 1994 Formula 3 Monaco Grand Prix © LAT

Moreover, many of these junior formulae concentrate on European circuits, whereas F1 seems hell-bent on forsaking its heartland for territories far away, therefore providing little in the way of long-term F1 circuit knowledge.

One could hazard it to be akin to an intern treating malaria whilst unaware of its cause, or a young lawyer defending a client on a murder rap without pursuing an alternative of manslaughter.

In the past, unlimited testing meant F1 teams occasionally took punts on young drivers, who invariably paid for the opportunity to gain an F1 track record. If in the process they impressed, then good and well and a place on next year's F1 grid beckoned; if not, so what - but at least they had been granted a chance of breaking into the big time.

Even when limits of 30 000 test kilometres per annum were (voluntarily) agreed by the teams, openings still existed for young drivers by way of the 'Friday driver' clause - which enabled Kubica and Vettel to publicly prove their mettle during grands prix weekends.

But when a rule change at the beginning of 2007 demanded that a team's two cars must be shared by their quota of drivers on a Friday, the concept became outdated and with few exceptions outfits kept their regular racers in the cars in order to maximise their circuit time. With spare cars now banned altogether, such a concept would find little traction through the risks involved.

Variously age and experience restrictions were introduced to encourage teams to test youngsters, but these came to nought as teams either worked around the incentives or simply did not venture out during certain sessions.

Now, with interim testing restricted and Friday testing non-existent, teams have been increasingly forced to substitute computational fluid dynamics calculations and simulation programmes for pukka test sessions.

These engineering aids have virtually reduced test runs to validation sessions at which drivers are required to do little more than verify computer predictions, then comment on the 'feel' of developments - not tasks that can easily and confidently be delegated to young drivers with little testing experience.

With testing further restricted to a handful of calendar circuits (Barcelona, Silverstone, Hockenheim, Monza) plus the standard fare of Valencia, Jerez and Paul Ricard, teams require reserve drivers with widespread experience lest they be required to step into the breach at short notice in places such as Shanghai and Singapore.

Renault test drivers Romain Grosjean and Lucas di Grassi racing in the GP2 event in Valencia © LAT

Thus, as BMW Motorsport Director Mario Theissen pointed out in Valencia, the top three teams no longer rely upon young drivers, but have, without exception, experienced racers in reserve roles: Marc Gene (and Michael Schumacher) at Ferrari, Pedro de la Rosa (McLaren) and Christain Klien within Theissen's own operation.

"Today the circumstances are such that one must have an experienced reserve driver who can immediately step into a race seat if something befalls your regular drivers," said the German, "and I can see this trend increasing."

When young drivers are contracted, they are generally used for 'donkey' tasks or B Grade PR work, and now teams at the blunter end of the present grid, such as Honda and Force India, have experienced 'third' drivers: Alex Wurz and Tonio Liuzzi respectively. Even Red Bull Racing, with access to the largest young driver pool in F1, has amongst the oldest drivers on the grid!

A quick look at 2008's testing statistics shows that the most prolific 18 drivers, all have regular F1 race seats, with BMW's Nick Heidfeld (34 days) and Robert Kubica (31) topping the table - despite the team having Klien (7) and GP2 driver Marko Asmer (4) under contract. A similar trend prevails across the spectrum.

While talking F1's expansionist plans with teams in Valencia, the message was clear: should the number of grands prix increase, interim testing would have to reduce to avoid fatigue amongst teams and drivers.

"Twenty races is the maximum the teams could support, but then we would have to reduce testing. We have always supported the idea of Friday testing, because our equipment is present and we are able to test at the actual circuits, plus we provide the promoter with added value," said Theissen, before pausing. "But then we would have to employ an experienced third driver."

Test opportunities for up-and-comers would be even further reduced as teams sought ways of maximising track time for regular drivers, and as new venues join the fray, so the need for such practises will increase. The net effect is that (corporate) F1 will be less inclined to gamble on unproven young drivers, no matter how exciting they could prove to be.

Already five of the present crop of racers or testers feature amongst the top dozen of F1's 'most starts' list, suggesting an entire generation of talent has been lost to the sport as it stuck with this safe-hands-over-youth policy.

Single specification formulae, particularly where initiated by motor manufacturers may have opened doors for many young talents, but these series have (not insurmountable) downsides, some of which have ultimately locked out their better exponents.

It is a brave team principal who gambles on driver choice, particularly if said executive is in the employ of a motor manufacturer who rates guaranteed race finishes over some fast flashes. Yet management courage is absolutely crucial to success as a team boss, and nowhere is this more evident than in the present drivers' championships standings.