The Weekly Grapevine

Ominous Deadline

The sentence has but seven words - 'I have been given two more years' - but, taken to its logical conclusion, the long-term fall-out has the potential to change the face and make-up of Formula One way beyond the projected life-span of the sport's prevailing regulations.

When Toyota Motorsport GmbH chairman and Formula One team principal Tadashi Yamashina made the written statement last week it was nothing if not an unusually honest (by both corporate and F1 standards) admission that the Japanese giant's Formula One endeavours have failed to deliver, despite the team having one of the largest annual budgets in the sport.

At the time Toyota announced its intention of entering F1, the expectations - both internal and external - were huge.

The 2001 Toyota launch © LAT

In fact, so filled with fear was the then-opposition, that F1's engine regulations were specifically changed from open configuration to mandated V10s after it became known that the world's number two car manufacturer (by volume, and then as now by far the most profitable) was bench-testing a V12 design engineered by ex-Ferrari engine guru Luca Marmorini.

Internally, too, talk was upbeat: in year one (2002) the team planned to finish races and score lower points; in the next they aimed to regularly score points and fight for podiums.

Year three was to see race victories; the fourth season should see wins delivered regularly, and in the fifth (2006) Panasonic Toyota Racing F1 would challenge for the championship on merit. And, if they failed to capture a world title in season five, then surely 2007 would favour the team.

Sadly, reality paints a somewhat more sombre picture: no championships, no victories, a not-so grand total of eight podiums and a total of 213 points scored in six years.

Given that most estimates have the team spending at least $2.5bn USD during this six-year period - although, to be fair, the largest portion of their spend was on the capital equipment required to mount a respectable challenge, items that the Ferrari, for example, acquired over a 60-year period - Toyota's F1 bang-for-buck ratio to date works out at an (estimated) staggering $12m per point scored.

By way of comparison, the only other team building car and chassis in one location (Ferrari) last year spent an estimated $1.5m per point won en route to both championships.

But again, this assessment must be measured against the Italian team's long-standing history and the expertise and facilities (i.e. a state-of-the-art test track right on their doorstep) that they acquired along the way.

Yes, the value of many of these facilities will, from here on in, diminish as newly-regulated aero and computational fluid dynamics restrictions take hold.

But if anything, relative newcomers who are still in the process of amassing data from recently constructed wind tunnels and suchlike (for which read 'Toyota') stand to be punished more than the long-established operations (for which read 'Ferrari').

Despite the team's lack of hard results, many within Toyota (company and race operation) swear that the programme has paid its own way by way of increased vehicle sales. (Toyota is well on track to break the 10-million-units-per-annum barrier next year, having taken the hallowed No. 1 spot off General Motors earlier this year).

The company also lowered the average age of its targeted customer base (which, in turn, increases the life-time purchasing potential and affluence), and enhanced corporate and product image (crucial for a company whose products are often equated with white goods). And, last but not least, improved employee, dealer and supplier motivation.

John Howett and Tadashi Yamashina at the 2007 Turkish Grand Prix © LAT

However, none of the foregoing can disguise the fact that the team failed to deliver on-track, and hence Yamashinasan's admission, which was included on page 15 of Toyota's comprehensive, 88-page 2007 annual motorsport report.

Of course, revolving door management is nothing new within the motor industry - nor in F1, as so graphically proven by the career realignments which hit Jackie Stewart, Neil Ressler, Bobby Rahal and Niki Lauda at Jaguar Racing, and Tony Purnell's short-lived tenure at the helm of the green team.

On that basis, Yamashina, who was appointed to the role only last year, may well have been referring only to his own career.

However, many have assumed that the entire TMG operation - and not merely Yamashina - has been given 'two more years' to prove itself, and, as he did not specifically rule out that option, it must certainly be considered to be one of the scenarios facing the team come the end of the 2009 F1 season.

Surely, if Toyota did indeed hold a long-term commitment to the sport, it would have been reinforced at that point, for Japanese companies are never slow in coming forward with such assurances.

There is, of course, nothing novel in manufacturers departing the sport - all have done so at some stage; some, like Renault, almost on a serial basis.

In fact, of the six major car companies presently represented on the grid, all bar Toyota have at some point upped sticks and folded their tents, only to return when their boards dictated that this most globally-visible of all pastimes should form part of their marketing mixes.

So, should it come to that, departure from F1 by Toyota would certainly not be a unique situation.

What all manufacturer departures from F1 had in common was that either the parent companies were haemorrhaging red ink (Jaguar and Renault are just two examples of this phenomenon), or that the teams had been outstandingly successful, making it a case of mission accomplished (think BMW, Mercedes and, in 1992, Honda).

In other words, in the first instance there was little choice in the matter if the company wished to remain in business; in the latter scenario, the companies had more to lose than gain by their continued presence in the sport. Both are powerful reasons for departing, even if the latter is by far the more respectable.

What should, though, strike fear into the hearts and minds of all those close to the sport, including Formula One's massive fan base, is that should Toyota choose to depart before the end of this decade, its decision will have been driven by neither of the reasons outlined above.

Toyota's accountants have not purchased red pens for 50 years now, while the chances of it departing on a high are, with all due respect, somewhat slim.

Max Mosley speaks at the Toyota announcement during the 2000 Belgian Grand Prix © LAT

Its premature departure, if it comes to that, will have been driven by the realisation that success in Formula One can be a bridge too far for massive corporations, which, by definition, react slowly to constantly changing conditions and forces.

As example, reflect for a minute on the multitude of rule changes the sport has faced in the past two years, and the number facing it over the next couple of seasons. Does Toyota's road car division face that many regulatory changes in a decade? In all its markets worldwide? Even if combined? Hardly likely.

Has the road car engine division been ordered to switch from twelve cylinders to ten to eight, to four cylinder turbos and then to kinetic energy systems of open specification in the course of six years?

Has the car body division been mandated to restrict the number of hours its designers spend in the studio, or the electronics division had all its freedoms removed? Have drive train engineers been restricted to just one make and compound of tyre?

And, should such legislative restrictions one day chronically restrict creativity within Toyota's road car division, then the company will no doubt adapt accordingly - for road cars are Toyota's core business. F1 is not.

The Toyota Way patently works superbly in stable manufacturing and marketing environments, whereas its continuous improvement philosophies cannot be expected to thrive in the face of haphazard change.

Any wonder, then, that in the face of a conspicuous lack of success coupled with such restrictions, Toyota has not signalled a long-term commitment to the sport?

Ironically, these rule changes, aimed at making the sport more affordable and attractive for teams and manufacturers in the long run, may have exactly the opposite effect in the short term.

Then, Toyota's potential departure would take place slap-bang in the middle of the current commercial agreement period, which runs from 2008 to 2012 despite the lack of a prevailing Concorde Agreement (which many believe will not see the light of day, in any event).

In its place, the teams have a Memorandum of Understanding with Formula One Management, which requires all signatories to commit to the sport until 2012.

But, the document is, by its nature, a non-binding agreement, meaning Toyota may be able to withdraw without penalty or fear of litigation. In any event, what chance of successful litigation by FOM given that the rules and goal posts have been changed unilaterally without number over the past six years?

And, what chance of successful litigation by FOM against TMG under any circumstances?

Williams-Toyota © XPB/LAT

That being so, how long, then, before other motor manufacturers withdraw? There can only be, after all, one or two teams crowing about F1 success per year, and it does not take particularly sharp knives to realise that every year nine or ten outfits face their boards of directors with bare hands.

And, six of the 11 current teams are motor manufacturer-owned, whether in full or partially. Should they see one fly the coop without penalty, what chances their suits get similar ideas?

The loss of just one major company could, in fact, affect two teams, in this case Toyota and engine customer Williams (or substitute Renault and Red Bull, or Honda and Super Aguri, etc. should the trend continue.)

Then there are the potential job losses: Toyota employs upwards of 600 heads, some of whom are dyed-in-the wool F1 specialists with no desire or motivation to work in other fields.

Sure, Toyota's European operations could absorb some of the redundancies, but the rest? Can the remaining teams really mop up these experts just at a time when their specialities are becoming increasingly restricted?

The engine customers face equally torrid times. What happens to Williams should the team not be able source engines from alternate suppliers now that Cosworth is lost to the sport?

Yes, Toyota may choose to continue as engine supplier to Williams (or any other team, for that matter), but then Yamashina-san did not even allude to that possibility, either.

Yes, Mr Yamashina's sentence was short, but hardly sweet, and its potential effects are, frankly, frightening for F1. In the past the loss of a single team had very little effect on the overall show: newcomers simply slotted in (as Toyota did), but F1's current engine-supply structure means that for every major team lost, a second team could be in equal danger.

As proven by the Prodrive debacle and the triple sale of Jordan, there is a definite lack of qualified aspirants out there.

And with the cost of entry rising on a monthly basis (despite, ironically, a raft of 'cost-saving measures'), there seems little chance of GP2 teams or others stepping up to the plate unless customer cars are permitted. But, that is another matter entirely.