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Feature

The Weekly Grapevine

This week: Williams sit on the fence; Ferrari and testing.



By Dieter Rencken, Belgium


That Williams have admitted, despite a release from Grand Prix Manufacturers Association (nee GPWC) implying the contrary, to not having committed themselves to the GPMA's 'binding agreement to race together only in a series which satisfies the fundamental principles of a clear and equitable World Championship', is no great surprise.

In fact, when the GPMA release was digested last week, the implied inclusion of Sir Frank's eponymous team was a surprise, for, with their impending divorce from BMW, Williams are a privateer team in the true sense of the word. Even truer than is the case of Red Bull Racing, Midland-Jordan and, from 1 November, Red Bull-Minardi, for they have multinational patrons - from paid-for Cosworths to the shares in the holding company - Williams Grand Prix Engineering Ltd - being held by the founding individuals, Frank Williams and Patrick Head.

As such Williams need cash, and piles of it, just to maintain their status quo in the midfield, let alone movement towards the front where once they ruled so effectively. Given that HP have taken an early bath, and certain sponsors, in particular Allianz and Castrol, are expected to jump ship to BMW, which brought them to Williams in the first place, newly-appointed CEO of the company, Chris Chappel, could just discover that the team's biggest 2006 benefactor remains a certain J. Button, Esq., who certainly won't be insisting upon airbox space in exchange.

Under those circumstances, would it be unreasonable to believe that Williams could 'do a Ferrari' and sign up to Bernie Ecclestone's 2008-2012 Concorde Agreement, exchanging the long-term promises made by GPMA for the short-term income offered by SLEC's Chief Executive? After all, what use mega-piles of folding stuff in 2008 when the FW28 requires urgent aero fettling for 2006; what use promises of Toyota motors three years hence when pitching title sponsors - at a reputed cut rate of $30m - for next season?

Of course, Williams have positively spun the situation. "It is correct to say that Williams is not yet a signatory to the (GPMA) agreement, but we do not consider it appropriate to discuss the reasons for this at the moment," they said earlier this week. "We will continue to work for a resolution that is in the best interests of both Formula One in general, and Williams too, in a non-confrontational manner."

So, Williams, that most British Bulldoggish of teams are seeking to avoid confrontation? FW, who recently suggested Max Mosley is corrupted by power, who, with Ron Dennis, initiated legal action against the FIA, backing away from confrontation? Head, a bark or two from whom put hellish fear into the likes of Carlos Alberto Reutemann, Heinz-Harald Frentzen, Alex Zanardi and even Juan Pablo Montoya, wilting in the face of showdown? Hardly likely.

More likely they know the lay of their land, and, from previous negotiations with Ecclestone - about which Williams (the team principal) could write tomes - know that they who sign last, sign for crumbs. Williams, for example, were one of the last, with McLaren and Tyrrell, to acquiesce to the present Concorde, one which compounded Ecclestone's wealth tenfold in as many years. Williams' signature came only after the dissenters extracted from Ecclestone certain conditions. In the event, these were not met after a deft, but legal, change in the septuagenarian's modus operandi.

Following the realisation that Ecclestone had outfoxed them, costing them many millions in the process, Williams and Dennis allegedly dumped their respective former legal advisers and issued legal proceedings against them on the grounds of professional negligence, all of which, particularly in Williams' case, hardly points to a company out to avoid confrontation.

Realistically, in GPMA circles, a 2006-edition Williams, whether confrontational or not, is the outsider, the only team not linked directly or indirectly to a manufacturer. Come the new season, the manufacturer alliance draws upon the combined mights of BMW (Sauber), Honda (wholly-owned BAR come 31/12/2005), Mercedes (40% stake in McLaren), Renault (wholly owned team) and Toyota (ditto), whilst Concorde 2008-2012 enjoys support from an ailing Ferrari, marketing-driven Red Bull Racing and Minardi operations and floundering Midland-Jordan.

In the former organisation, Williams, as a 'Cossie' engine customer, sit rather uneasily with Honda, Renault and BMW - all ex-partners, remember - with no realistic chance of being supplied with Mercedes power. Toyota, a possible saviour in the works engine stakes, seems increasingly unlikely to supply power units to Williams, whether badged 'Lexus' or not, thus relegating the British team to relative pygmy status in a body controlled by automotive giants. Across at SLEC, though, Williams would be second in the pecking order, streets ahead of RBR, Jordan and Minardi in stature, and behind only Ferrari - with whom, of course, they share Bridgestone tyres next year. No prizes for guessing where Williams would feel most welcome.

Let us assume, though, that Williams' non-commitment is mere posturing for the best deal - from Bernie - whilst wisely keeping their GPMA options open. Ecclestone may just increase his offer, said to consist of an upfront cash sum of up to $100m, with a 50% increase in the size of the total 'pot' shared by those committed Concorde, if he senses a Williams about to crumble. On the flip side, a GPMA desperate to hold on to their slender majority, could up their ante. Sir Frank could thus play one off against the other for at least another year whilst being privy to most secrets.

If, however, SLEC tables a one-time 'take or leave' offer, Williams could be tempted to jump, in the process splitting the ranks 50/50 and considerably weakening GPMA's collective bargaining power, even if F1's economic clout remains with the breakaway organisation, who could, though, strengthen their ranks, by six teams to five, should the much-rumoured Honda #2 operation come to fruition.

It was, of course, exactly a year ago that suggestions first surfaced of two new teams: Team Dubai F1 and Midland. As history records, the former, at that time said to be a McLaren 'B' outfit, is no closer to reality - in fact, its instigators have not been seen in the paddock this year - whilst the latter, having switched tack and acquired Jordan at knock-down price, seems intent upon continuing Eddie Jordan's mismanagement of the operation. That net result is zero new teams despite all the excitement.

Any wonder, thus, that rumours of an eleventh team are being treated with caution, even with Honda said to be involved? Forget not that Team Dubai allegedly enjoyed the blessing of McLaren and the Dubai Royal Family; forget not that Alex Shnaider a year ago seemed intent upon throwing billions at his dream; forget not that, subsequent to rumours of a second Honda-powered outfit, the Japanese company announced the purchase of the remaining 55% of BAR still owned by British American Tobacco. So, now, where should Honda's management's immediate priorities lie - in consolidating their own, 100%-owned team, or in the supply of engines to fledgling outsiders? Against that background, GPMA (or SLEC) membership by the newcomer appears the least of Honda's concerns.

Immediate membership of either will hardly be of particular concern to the newcomer, for the present Concorde makes not provision for TV revenues or benefits to be paid during the first two years of operation - by which time the present deal will have expired - whilst GPMA, in any event, cannot hope, nor wish, to be up and running before 2008. So, in assuming Honda #2 to be a real deal, cognisance must be taken of its lack of immediate political clout.

Whether or not Williams eventually subscribe to Bernie Ecclestone's ideals or stones depends very much upon their medium-term - three-year - sponsorship and engine situations. The short-term - one-two years - is sorted - compensation from HP, compensation from Button, existent peripheral deals and Cosworth power - whilst the longer term - four-five years - is too far distant to require Frank Williams' immediate attention. Saliently, onset of the new Concorde is three years hence.

It has been a year in the coming, but, at last, Ferrari have indicated a willingness to accept reductions in private testing. Of course, being Ferrari, nothing, though, is quite what it seems to be: conditions have been imposed, and reasons, which bear no resemblance to their ongoing refusals to subscribe to test cuts, given.

"We are in discussion about this, (test reductions) yes," Ross Brawn, Technical Director of Ferrari said last week. "The situation will be very different next year. We will not be the only strong team on Bridgestone tyres. With the greatest respect to Minardi and Jordan, they have not been able to help us with tyre development this year.

"An agreement is possible, but it would have to be a solution that does not disadvantage us with regard to Fiorano. That's something that we would have to resolve."

Flashback to Friday, 22 October 2004 in Brazil: at the time a Bernie Ecclestone desperate to finalise a 19-race calendar at minimum compensation to teams, suggested an enforced reduction in private testing as pay off for the increase in race dates. A meeting, to which Ferrari sporting boss Jean Todt was allegedly invited, was called. Todt stated then he had remained uninvited, and gave that as reason for non-attendance. Test cuts were discussed amongst the nine teams present, no binding agreement reached and the meeting adjourned until the next day.

The next day Michael Schumacher crashed in third practice, with Todt subsequently concentrating on the return of Schumacher's car to the weekend's proceedings. He again skipped the meeting, later again vowing he had not been invited. Whatever, he refused flatly to subscribe to any notions of reductions in testing. A policy of 'Naming and Shaming' was adopted by the Group of Nine teams who agreed to privately test no more than 20 days - later increased to 30 - between March and October of this year.

At that time no-one, not Todt, not Brawn, not Chief Designer Rory Byrne could have foreseen the massive drop-off in Ferrari's 2005 performance relative to 2004. Only recently - yet not a day too soon - have Ferrari acknowledged that Bridgestone alone should not shoulder the blame for one of the most controversial showings in recent times by a reigning team, all of which implies that Ferrari, a year ago, believed their chassis to be right up there. Else, why did they not fix the problem then?

Prior to, and during, the Brazil meetings, Bridgestone, and by extension Ferrari, enjoyed the support of three partner teams: the exiting outfits, plus Sauber, who, of course, ran a chassis often described as an F2003 dressed in the blue drag of - Ferrari-supplied - engine sponsor Petronas. So, at a time when Todt refused to agree to test caps, there existed a fourth team - one with close ties to Ferrari - on Bridgestones.

Only (much) later, at end-November, did Sauber announce their switch to Michelins, implying at the time that they no longer intended doing the Rampant Stallion's donkey work. If Todt knew same in Brazil, he had a month to take corrective action by persuading Sauber to remain allies.

So much for Brawn's comments that Jordan and Minardi "have not been able to help us with tyre development this year" - there existed a fourth team in the frame, who fled the Bridgestone coop on account, certainly partially, of Ferrari's attitude.

All of which pushed Ferrari into increasingly greater test schedules, despite the knowledge that their balance sheets seemed printed in the very red hue they made their own 55 years ago. Well after being forced straight into Bernie Ecclestone's awaiting, yet undefined Concorde by straitened circumstances and offers of upfront cash, Ferrari insisted upon testing as, when, where and how they liked - in the process covering, by some estimates, 300% of the distances tested by the two teams lying way ahead of them in both Championships.

But, all fine and good - it was Ferrari's right to opt out, and so they did. In the process of digging their heels in over the Sao Paulo deal, though, they broke two 'gentlemen's agreements: running no more than 50 kilometres in the week immediately preceding a Grand Prix, and adherence to a no-test deal during F1's 'summer holidays'. It was, thus, with some glee, that many watched Ferrari, having tested virtually non-stop whilst G9 operations were on holiday, flounder about like grounded fish in Turkey - the first Grand Prix after the break.

Now, though, just when Ferrari are being seriously challenged for fourth place in the Constructors' by Toyota - who, likely, will be on Bridgestones in 2006 - just when pitlane pundits are questioning the potential of a Cosworth-powered Williams - the other 'strong team' on the Japanese rubber, when incoming Felipe Massa requires as much track time as can be made available, Ferrari are prepared to cast aside a large part of an unregulated advantage. Maybe their cash-crisis really is hitting harder than believed?


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