Back to the Future

In an exclusive interview for autosport.com during the launch of Ferrari's latest championship challenger, the 248 F1, at Mugello on January 24, the Scuderia's South African-born chief designer Rory Byrne indicted that his plans for retirement in early 2007 had changed.

"I don't want to give away details, but I have been asked by the team to act as engineering consultant," said the design wizard. He would, he added, be extending his contract by another two years to run to February 2009.

Last week Byrne, a diving fanatic who was in the process of setting up a diving school in Thailand in 1996 when Ferrari sporting boss Jean Todt called with an offer to return to Formula One, made his almost-customary trip to Monza (he gave the Italian race a miss last year), and confirmed that his consultancy plans were still in place.

However, when asked whether he had at all contributed to the development of the Aldo Costa-designed car, more specifically its rear wheel 'dust bin lids', Byrne indicated that he was far removed from direct engineering, and had been working on a total restructure of the company.

His comment provided further proof, as though any were needed, that the

Ferrari Kimi Raikkonen will be lining up for will be a somewhat different Ferrari to the team Michael Schumacher leaves behind on October 22.

True, not every salient aspect of the company and team will change in the short- to medium-term, and therefore the Finn will not be stepping into a team as different as is, say, BMW-Sauber compared with its Swiss incarnation. But widely suggested personnel and manpower changes as well as confirmed and rumoured sporting and technical regulatory impositions will heavily impact the team as Formula One has come to know it.

In dissecting any business - and F1 teams, for all their sporting veneer, are businesses operating within some of the most hostile and volatile commercial conditions on Planet Earth - market analysts examine the 'Five Ms': the company's Management, their Manpower, the Market Place they operate in, their access to Money, and the quality of their Machinery. In this instance there can be added a sixth 'M': The Michael Factor.

How, then, is a Schumi-less Ferrari likely to stack up in these areas and, thus, how will the futures of Raikkonen and Felipe Massa be affected?

The Management Factor

While there is no reason to believe that the company's president Luca Cordero di Montezemolo (dob 31/8/1947), and its sporting director and de facto managing director Jean Todt (dob 25/2/1946) will cease dreaming in red for the foreseeable future, the indisputable fact stands that both will be over 60 years of age at the end of Kimi's first (and Felipe's second) Ferrari season.

Formula One does not, of course, subscribe to obligatory retirement ages - and, at times, more can be the pity - so there are no regulatory threats to their respective employments. But operating at the highest levels in F1, and the Italian motor industry, is utterly demanding at the best of times, and soul-destroying for the rest. There are, however, commercial threats to their positions.

Montezemolo is increasingly becoming the Captain of Italian Industry and with the FIAT group requiring massive investment not only to meet future product demands but also to raise $800m needed to buy back 29 percent of an almost 40 percent stake in Ferrari it was forced to relinquish during a major cash crisis four years ago, the aristocratic Italian's focus will necessarily be diluted in future. Which will impact upon the team.

Todt, too, is reconsidering his future, with some rumours suggesting that he will depart Maranello within 18 months. If not, expect the Frenchman, whose biggest assets have been his somewhat inordinate abilities to absorb enormous political pressures and play every rule in the book to Ferrari's singular advantage, to take over as president of the company when Montezemolo accepts ever-larger challenges. Then, too, some form of downwash is expected in medium-term.

Again, whatever direction Todt's future takes within the next two years will affect Kimi's chances of becoming Ferrari's ninth world champion in 60-odd years and, by extension, will affect Felipe's chances of succeeding the taciturn Finn, who, whilst blindingly quick, may soon tire of having to satisfy the idiosyncrasies of tifosi weekend in, weekend out.

Ross Brawn (dob 23/11/1954), arguably the most ambitious technical director in F1, is, it is increasingly said, off on a year's fly-fishing sabbatical if not totally deserting Ferrari for 2007 and beyond come October 22. Whether or not all that comes to pass is another story, for Ferrari's powers of persuasion can be, well, powerful. But the mere fact that such matters are being openly discussed would indicate some substance.

Ferrari's worst nightmare must be, of course, that Brawn heads off to another team. The 'swing' effect so soon after Michael's departure could seriously affect the team, particular as F1 heads towards less adventurous technical waters where every non-engineering advantage will count for more than ever before.

Rumours increasingly link him with a move to the Honda F1 Racing Team - as team principal, no less. And it makes sense: The Englishman, recognized as the tactician on the pit wall, has longed to return to his home in Oxford; Honda is a technically-driven company supplying the financial and other resources as required, thus removing that burden; he has worked closely with Rubens Barrichello and thus has a ready conduit; and, above all, he has the ambitions and nous to make it all happen. Or he could be joining Williams for similar reasons.

All involved parties have publicly denounced the rumours, but then, in the best tradition of Profumo Girl Mandy Rice-Davies, they would, wouldn't they. Whatever route his immediate future takes, that Ross won't be wearing red next year seems a given, resulting in potentially the biggest internal threat to Kimi's ambitions.

At Monza (as at Mugello in January) Byrne (dob 10/1/1944, and thus also over 60) did allow that he would be shuttling back and forth between Italy and the resort-home he and his Thai wife are constructing on the coast of her homeland. Therefore, even with the best will in the world, Rory will be unable to commit as much time to the red cause as in the recent past and, again, this aspect will result in critical changes to the modus operandi of the technical department - even without factoring his very obvious absence from the drawing board into the equation.

Engine director Paulo Martinelli (dob 26/09/1952) joined Ferrari upon graduating from the University of Bologna in 1977, moving to the F1 division in 1995. He seems a Ferrari careerist, but that does not necessarily imply his future lies solely within the Gestione Sportiva, particularly given the sport's new green direction, which seems at loggerheads with Ferrari's image as a producer of achingly beautiful, politically incorrect machines of the highest order.

The Modenese may, too, decide that designing one new engine every three years is not what he toiled at school and university for, and seek a return to road cars.

Which brings us to present chief designer Aldo Costa (dob 5/6/1961), who this year for the first time saw a car attributed to himself take the chequer. With Ferrari since 1995, the Parma-born suspension specialist seems a fixture in Maranello, bringing much-needed stability to the mutating technical department - but, forget not, as FIA president Max Mosley's new-look F1 gathers pace, so the demands on design will decrease, heavily reducing the need for out-and-out design geniuses.

Under MANAGEMENT, then, various changes are expected. Of Ferrari's top five honchos - Montezemolo, Todt, Brawn, Byrne, Martinelli and Costa - the first two are expected to decrease their F1 involvements in the medium-term; the next-named would appear to be off, for a year at least; the next will spend decreasing amounts of time in Maranello; and the last two listed will find decreasing demands for their areas of specialty.

The Manpower Factor

One of the FIA's future aims, reinforced this week by way of a media release, is to 'restrict the use of wind tunnels, simulators (test rigs), simulations, and where appropriate, the numbers of personnel.'

Given that Ferrari have a figure right up there with the highest manning levels, if not absolutely the top, it stands to reason that it has the most to lose, all of which creates havoc with morale and continuity. Further, the team's rural location means any redundancies will trickle down through the local economy, creating further dissension in the immediate region.

Then, many staff members stayed with Ferrari for the simple honour of working with and for Michael Schumacher; will they feel the same about toiling for Kimi, whose leisure pursuits are known to be somewhat more exotic than the German's. Would they be quite as willing to sacrifice what few wholesome hours are available during a season for a driver whose dedication to his art has been questioned in the tabloids?

Already, race and test technical manager Nigel Stepney has voiced his concerns at Kimi's initial input. "It will be a difficult winter," he said. "We are losing what has been for us the focal point all these years, that's why I'm saying pre-season testing will be difficult for us, because we'll have to build with Kimi the same level of confidence."

Or consider chief race engineer Luca Baldisserri's comments: "He (Schumacher) contributed to produce winning cars, while now it will be up to us to give the driver a car capable of winning."

Not exactly ringing welcomes, are they? And if they seem unfair, these are the initial (publicly aired) perceptions of some senior staff members. Will the welcomes be any better down the line? All of which could create a snowball effect just when Ferrari, and thus Kimi and Felipe, can least afford it.

The Market Place Factor

Ferrari operates primarily in three market places, all of which are symbiotically linked: The exotic road car sector, Formula One, and high-end merchandising. The company had promised never to exceed 5,000 road cars per annum - a promise recently broken by 10 percent on the back of emerging markets - and it does not advertise in the traditional manner, instead racing to publicise its products.

In the past profits from road cars, mostly sold in North America, and memorabilia royalties subsidised the race programme, with sponsors and trade partners covering the rest. And a cosy circle it was, too. Then, just as a softening dollar hit margins on 60 percent of Ferrari's vehicle sales, FIAT hit trouble and sold off a chunk of the company - with the new owners (a brace of Italian banks) demanding dividends on their portions.

Since then Ferrari has relied increasingly on royalties and sponsors to fund its F1 programme, signing long-term deals with the likes of Marlboro and Shell, but, as F1 becomes cheaper (if it ever does), so sponsors will reduce their spend. A cheaper F1 implies others will move in to fill the gaps, but Ferrari is sure to meet resistance over its cigarette deal, and could ultimately lose, particularly as a Raikkonen/Massa pairing is expected to have less gravitas than the previous line-up.

Also, with F1 moving to a single-tyre there is less reason for Bridgestone to pump commercial funding into the team, as is believed to have been the case. Will Ferrari, thus, be struggling in future?

Hardly, but the team is unlikely to have the best motorhomes and kit (already the team's hospitality units are older than most in the paddock), which, in turn, initiates downmarket perceptions, then downward spirals.

Merchandising sales, too, are likely to take a knock. In an unguarded moment Schumacher's manager Willi Weber once admitted that he could not believe that Ferrari had granted the German the right to use Ferrari's marketing devices almost without restriction. But, sales to Schumacher fans fed further Ferrari sales, particularly as Weber had made a fine art of selling red caps, at one stage being Europe's largest milliner. Somehow, it is difficult to foresee red 'Ice Man' caps reaching similar levels.

The Money Factor

Ferrari's recent financial woes have been referred to - and FIAT's intended buy-back of shares is hardly likely to alleviate the situation. To this must be added another consideration: the (relatively) decreased Formula One Management (FOM) 'legacy' pay-out which, in the past, had been paid to the Italian team via funds forfeit by the balance of teams. From 2008 onwards this will be paid by FOM, and, in addition, all teams will receive vastly increased sums.

The nett effect is that, although Ferrari received a one-off payment believed to be $100m (and said to be already spent) for signing up to the F1's new commercial agreement, the rest (11 teams) will receive vastly higher sums relative to Ferrari.

Then, Ferrari is carrying way higher overheads than most others (and where they are not, there is no denying that their rivals can afford those costs, as in the instance of Toyota) and with testing and simulations to be reduced, the Italian will end up funding unproductive facilities unless it finds other uses for them. Will FIAT, for example, pay top dollar for using Ferrari's wind tunnel or the Fiorano test facility? If not, who will?

Add in redundancy packages, as outlined above, and other associated costs, and Mosley's 'budget' F1 could end up costing Ferrari more than the rest - to the detriment of Kimi and Felipe and their title hopes.

Finally, while there is no disputing that Ferrari's present track successes directly contribute to road car sales - and therefore company revenues - there is equally no denying that technology transfer (from F1 car to road car) has played a part. Witness Enzo, witness the FXX, witness paddle shift changes and various in-house competition programmes.

Will, though, purchasers feel quite the same when Ferrari's 248/09 (or whatever) is equipped with green equipment, including hybrid batteries and heat exchangers? Possibly, but, then, possibly not - which, in turn, may affect income and budgets.

The Machinery Factor

This category encompasses three distinctly different sections: car, engine and factory/facilities. The latter, and their impact on the Ferrari Kimi is set to join, has been discussed in length (above), leaving little to add save for a reiteration that Ferrari is likely to benefit the least (and be penalised the most) by the upcoming rule changes.

That the Formula One car of 2008 will be a different animal to what is presently fielded goes without saying - too much time, energy and money has to date been 'invested' in dumbing down beast. What is salient here is whether F1 2008-style will benefit Ferrari (and thus the incumbents) relative to the opposition, and, again, the answer is likely to be a resounding 'No'!

First off, Ferrari will not, for the foreseeable future in any event, have access to the bespoke tyres it enjoyed every season from 2001. With 'level' rubber, and therefore less need for testing, Ferrari will likely come down a notch or three. Then, where Ferrari was able to rely upon the undisputed design genius of Byrne for the last decade or so, that avenue is now fundamentally closed, certainly on a regular basis.

Just where will Ferrari source the sort of regenerative components required to meet the 2009 regulations, and at what cost, particularly given that they have no immediate road car relevance for the company? Toyota, for example, can rely upon Panasonic (its partner in Prius and Lexus hybrid versions), while all major manufacturers have 'pull' with prospective suppliers.

True, Ferrari could lean on FIAT for assistance, but the company surely has other priorities at present and, as far as is known, does not yet even have a hybrid at the design stage. Ferrari could, thus, be forced to buy in expertise and components, likely from direct track competition, which could make for some interesting speculation.

Finally, where the team was able to design and build, say, 100 different floors and discard 99 after wind tunnel testing, the proposed restrictions will again hit Ferrari and level the field.

Further examples of this trend could be offered, but the message is clear then technically Ferrari will suffer more than most in the medium-term. Which, realistically, is when first Kimi, then Felipe, need to win their championships, given their present ages.

...And The Michael Factor

Michael may not have been the only contributor to Ferrari's incredible success record since 2000 but, without doubt, he remains the biggest single contributor to a run the likes of which the sport has never seen before and is highly unlikely to even smell in the distant future.

His tactical, shrewd brain, instinctive racecraft, incredible work ethic, physical fitness, supreme sensitivity and spatial awareness all contributed, but many drivers have had and will have such combinations in more or less similar permutations, yet will not touch anywhere near the heights Michael reached without apparent difficulty.

True, Schumacher enjoyed what so (too) often became a contractual right to win, and it is difficult to imagine Kimi having been granted similar privileges, certainly contractually, particularly given that Nicholas Todt manages Massa, and Todt Snr, like any father, must harbour some professional ambitions for his son. But, a contract alone does not a perpetual front-runner make.

So, where does the difference lie?

Simply in the bond between driver and technical director, the bond between Michael and Ross. Apart from explaining why Brawn feels the need to either rest or move on now that Michael is hanging up his Schuberth, it was this almost telepathic relationship which permitted Brawn to suggest the most outrageous strategies secure in the knowledge that Schumacher could execute them - whether pre-planned or sprung upon him on the fly.

Will such a bond develop between Kimi and whoever takes Brawn's perch on the pit wall, between Felipe and N Todt?

Conclusion

Within two to three years every strength Ferrari has enjoyed over the past eight years will have evaporated, mutated or been replaced. But, by what?

The political, sporting, technical and financial landscapes, all once so ruthlessly exploited by Montezemolo, Todt, Brawn, Byrne, Martinelli and Schumacher, have been replaced by ever shifting sands of indeterminate substance and variable depth.

These unknowns alone make it highly unlikely that Ferrari will ever again be that 'special something', the marque recognized above all by most observers, even if, towards the end of Schumacher's career, it became revered by fewer and fewer fans.

The Ferrari Kimi has joined will, for the reasons outlined, be fundamentally different from the one Michael joined and will soon leave. Even the hue changed during Schumacher's tenure - from deep Italian crimson to brash cowboy red - and, in future, that, in all likelihood, will change again as an altered Ferrari faces an altered Formula One.

One question, though, remains: Can Kimi achieve his life's ambition at Ferrari? The answer is a resounding 'Yes' - but with a rider. Such is the Finn's set of skills that a championship could be won by him with any number of teams, but only now that Michael has gone.

That is not to denigrate Kimi, for patently he has what it takes; it is merely a reflection of the ultra-special team Ferrari was for the ten years past, for the decade since Montezemolo and Todt persuaded Brawn and Byrne and Martinelli to join Michael's Gestione Sportiva.

It's like will never be seen again, for it was created by special circumstances arising in a special period in F1's history, but, as Raikkonen never knew that Ferrari, he won't miss it, and, in typically Kimi fashion, he'll get on with the job of going after his first title. And, then it will be Felipe's turn, under very similar circumstances...

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- The Autosport.com Team

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