The MotoGP model that proves F1 B-teams' worth
F1's history with customer cars has been contradictory throughout the decades, and the development of B-teams has led to scorn inside and outside F1. But a glance at MotoGP shows how they can be key to F1's future
The jury was always out on customer cars in Formula 1. A huge part of the category's formative years, in which private entrants frequently bought up machinery from the likes of Lotus and March, 21st-century variants were looked upon with greater disdain.
Some weren't particularly happy that the Super Aguri team could get away with buying up previous-spec Hondas, or that Toro Rosso could use the same car as sister squad Red Bull. The resulting opposition nipped a potential Prodrive entry in the bud, having agreed a deal with McLaren to buy its cars for 2008.
As it happened, any last vestiges of the customer car era were swept away at the end of 2009, closing up the loophole Toro Rosso used to get access to an Adrian Newey-designed chassis - meaning it would have to design its own for the first time since the Minardi days.
Every now and again, the conversations in F1 would return to the subject of customer cars, presented half-heartedly as a solution to lure more teams onto the grid. But, like one of Theresa May's Brexit bills in the House of Commons, every customer car-related proposal was shot down.
Like it or not, the ersatz-customer car is a distinct part of the current grid. These aren't customer teams per se, as teams have to produce their own cars, own the intellectual property to them, and sufficiently demonstrate a certain degree of independence.
Instead, they're known as something else entirely - a "B-team". Today, still wanted by the governing body, they survive as racers of fortune. Either reviled as a parasitic entity with no chance of tangible success, or as a pragmatic approach to sustainability and slashing costs in F1, there's a difference in opinion about whether the B-team model is a help or a hindrance to the category.

In both the technical and sporting regulations, there's an extensive collection of designs, parts and assemblies that each team must produce itself. These are known as 'listed' parts, and cover areas such as the aerodynamics package, the chassis and its associated roll structures.
For everything else not covered by that, these are 'non-listed parts', and the team is free to purchase those - that's engines, gearboxes and rear suspension geometries, along with multiple other parts.
B-teams and satellites, on the other hand, have tangibly proven some success, and even some of F1's current teams have decided to adapt to the trends set by Haas
And so, our crop of B-teams are those which buy up as many of those unlisted parts as possible, which has a not-insignificant effect on the packaging of the rest of the car. When the gearbox is the same, the rear suspension mountings are the same, meaning that the rear end of the car is going to be designed within the same box as its partner outfit.
It's a business model that Haas has used to great success. The crop of teams introduced in 2010 died off one by one, a fate that CNC machine mogul Gene Haas wanted to avoid. Hence, the American team set out its stall early and aligned itself with Ferrari - a move that not only allowed Haas access to all of the non-listed parts produced by the Scuderia but allowed Ferrari to enjoy the benefits of Haas's unrestricted windtunnel time.
Even Toto Wolff applauded the nerve. Immediately, Haas was quick on the draw on its debut in 2016, scoring a sixth and a fifth in the hands of Romain Grosjean, scoring more points in the season opener than any of 2010's 'new' teams ever did. Only Esteban Gutierrez's flaccid performances in the second car stopped Haas's first-year tally from transcending a still-respectable 29 points.

Weighing the two models against each other when starting from scratch, the B-team model is the only sure-fire way to be competitive in F1's current climate.
Either that, or come in with full manufacturer backing and fund an entirely new operation bankrolled by one of the biggest global automotive concerns. But their attention has been swayed by the more forward-thinking Formula E, and so luring the likes of Audi or Porsche might be bordering on the impossible.
If there's an example where the B-team model works, let's cast a glance over to another premier-tier racing series - albeit on two wheels, not four.
MotoGP takes a similar model but to greater extremes; it's a genuine customer team model, where satellite operations purchase either current or year-old bikes and go racing.
The effect of that is clear to see, and any divide between the top manufacturer teams and those satellite operations simply isn't there in MotoGP. Meanwhile, the gaping chasm plagues contemporary F1 - waiting keenly for something to fill the void.
MotoGP thrives with a field where nigh-on anyone is capable of challenging for good results. Honda satellite LCR has picked up three victories in the last three seasons, courtesy of Cal Crutchlow, while Tech3 and Pramac have historically been in the hunt atop Yamahas and Ducatis respectively - prior to Tech3's switch to KTM. Often, those satellites outperform manufacturers, and that's accepted as part of the category.

Suzuki, with some hard graft, finally seems to have pulled clear of the satellite bikes on a regular basis - underlined by Alex Rins' thrilling victory in Austin last weekend - while Aprilia and KTM battle with them on a regular basis.
In F1, the likes of Renault are continually at odds with the B-team model; frequently, the Renault team is happy to chastise them, perhaps in an attempt to deflect its own shortcomings. And in those admonishments - either from Renault or others in the field - one of the parallels drawn to the current contingent of B-teams is to MotoGP's short-lived 'Claiming Rule Team' (CRT) entries.
There, teams were able to run cut-price machinery with concessions to fill the grid, on the proviso that any manufacturer could theoretically purchase - or "claim" - their engines after each race for the fixed price of €20,000 to keep others from running expensive and experimental machinery.
That parallel is better saved for those teams brought into F1 during 2010; it filled the grid up at a time when it looked depleted on the promise of low costs, but ultimately ended up tooling around the back of the field some way off the pace - Aleix Espargaro's heroics on CRT machinery almost exactly mirrored those of Heikki Kovalainen, who periodically annoyed the Q2 regulars in his Lotus.
B-teams and satellites, on the other hand, have tangibly proven some success, and even some of F1's current teams have decided to adapt to the trends set by Haas; Alfa Romeo has also hooked up with Ferrari support, while Toro Rosso was readymade to link up with Red Bull on a greater technical sharing basis - especially now both are supplied by Honda.

Even to a certain degree, Racing Point enjoys support from Mercedes - although that partnership is less involved than the other examples on the field.
That leaves Renault, trying to find its way back to the front as a manufacturer team, and history book staples McLaren and Williams, trying to stay true to the 'old ways' of sovereign team status.
If F1's going to be attractive to future manufacturers, then enticing them wouldn't simply become a case of whether the team can be competitive
From a technical standpoint, changes in the rules pipeline look set to benefit those teams, drawing away some of the perks associated with joining Formula 1 as a B-team entity. Brake ducts seem set to join the ever-growing catalogue of listed parts, with further consideration into suspension components also due.
Although the gearbox internals are set to be standardised, the casing seems primed to become a listed part too. All of that adds expense. F1's cost-saving drive therefore seems hypocritical, as teams which have stumbled upon a model that limits expense are - instead of being lauded - going to have to sink greater costs into developing, testing and building those new components.
It would be like asking the Pramac team to develop its own gear barrel and front forks externally from Ducati. Rarely would a satellite team have the resources to do that, and the work that MotoGP has done over the past decade to restore grid numbers to a reasonable level would risk falling apart in one fell swoop.

Sure, budgets in F1 are far higher than those in MotoGP, but that's reflective of the motorcycle industry's representation against car manufacturers. The market's smaller, so the costs are proportional. Place the same limitations on the F1 teams, and the grid could potentially shrivel up.
Haas has nailed its colours to the mast, Toro Rosso may cease to become an attractive option for Red Bull to maintain, and the Alfa Romeo moniker could disappear from the grid - and without that support, the Sauber name might not even factor in a return. It's a product of the time.
If F1's going to be attractive to future manufacturers, then enticing them wouldn't simply become a case of whether the team can be competitive, but also whether the expenditure in developing multiple different components can in some way be recouped.
Alternatively, if F1's going to be attractive to an independent concern, they'll be looking at ways to build a team without the sky-high costs of having to build every single component.
If you have a problem with start-up costs, nobody else can help, and you can find a team to link up with, maybe you can become... a B-team.

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