Why would anyone want to buy an F1 team?

That Manor - now under its third ownership after its founders sold control to a Russian billionaire, before the team plunged into liquidation - is in the process of completing the sale of a majority share to outside investors just two years after current owner Stephen Fitzpatrick saved the team from an ignominious end, begs the question: "Why on earth would anybody buy (into) a Formula 1 team, particularly a tailender?"

The question is raised not to at all cast aspersions on Manor, or its ownership/management/employees; indeed, that there is interest out there is a credit to them all. But is posed rhetorically in view of the raft of sporting, technical and commercial challenges that face all teams outside the top four outfits. Indeed, the question applies as readily to start-ups: "Why would anyone start a team?"

The easy answer is, of course, that F1 has never been easy. That is usually accompanied by comments along the lines of "Or everyone would do it" - followed by myriad reasons such as "passion", "investment" "challenge", or "bringing glory to brand/company/country" (delete as applicable), but this disingenuously overlooks the fact that the playing field has never before been as tilted against independents as it currently is.

For proof, look no further than the survival rate of incoming teams since 2010, during which period no fewer than five new entrants' licences were issued. USF1 was never made it to the grid, two (HRT and Caterham) disappeared entirely, Manor is under its third owner even before the pending sale, while Haas, backed by a billionaire, interpreted the rules creatively simply to make the 2016 grid. Crucially, many of those loopholes are now closed.

Naysayers argue that approximately 130 'team names' contested the world championship during its 65-odd years: a mortality rate of two per year. However, this conveniently overlooks sales and re-sales: For example, Mercedes F1 is rooted in Tyrrell (pictured), which became BAR, which begat Honda before mutating into Brawn, from which Daimler acquired the team.

Also, many entrants started as one-hit customer teams, while numerous 'entrants' hark back to the pre-constructor days when teams from regional F1 championships, mainly using cast-offs, entered their country's grands prix on an annual basis. All these factors served to blur the line between bona fide teams and the list of grand prix entrants.

Indeed, of the 11 currently on the grid, only five teams - Ferrari, McLaren, Williams, Sauber and newcomer Haas - race under their original names. Force India has been through four changes in 25 years and Renault is now under its fifth badge since 1981, when it was born as Toleman. So the purified figure is approximately 65 company registrations in as many years, of which 11 survive - making for less than one team 'death' per annum.

There is no denying that current barriers to entry are significantly higher than was the case, say, 50 years ago - when a Frank Williams could buy a second-hand Brabham, fit used Cosworth engines and Hewland gearboxes, bolt on off-the-shelf Goodyears, then go off and finish second in Monaco.

The new crop - despite doing it 'on the cheap' - are vastly better prepared, having factories, 200 staff and £100million start-up budgets, but still they fail spectacularly. The last turnkey start-up was Toyota, which converted its rally/sportscar facility to F1 spec, built two windtunnels - still reckoned to be among motorsport's best a decade or so on - then blew £500m per year (at noughties economics) in failing to win.

The recent battle between Sauber and Manor for 10th place in the constructors' championship epitomises the lot of tailenders. Ninth in the sodden lottery that was the Brazilian Grand Prix and the accompanying $15m could spell the difference between life and death for many independents. And therefore the livelihoods of upwards of 500 families were on the line when suppliers and vendors are factored into the equation.

While most F1 folk stonily state "that's racing" or "welcome to the Piranha Club", these simplifications overlook that F1's prevailing results-based revenues structure was devised at a time when mechanical retirements were commonplace; well before drivers faced penalty points and race suspensions every time a risky move failed to come off; well before safety cars circulated 10 laps for every drop of rain that fell.

These factors mean that not only do cars line up two-by-two, but regularly finish in that order - a sight only Noah could be proud of - with independents battling to break into the top 10 and therefore the points, let alone bagging podiums or victories.

The chances for the current crop of underdogs to emulate Olivier Panis (Ligier, 1996 Monaco) or Johnny Herbert (Stewart, 1999 Nurburgring) in taking shock wins are fundamentally the square root of zero. Any dreams of emulating Aguri Suzuki's 1990 third place at Suzuka for Larrousse are just that. Still, though, the independents scrape (and scrap) on, hoping fervently.

After long-life engines/gearboxes were introduced a decade ago - causing a failure such as experienced by Mercedes in Malaysia to be viewed most suspiciously - and five major teams (10 cars) started receiving significant premium payments in a championship in which money equals performance, the chances of independents regularly finishing in one of the 10 points-paying places are well under 30%.

Given the governance and revenue structures, the chances of a team now fighting itself up to championship-winning status within six years, as Red Bull did after purchasing the underachieving Jaguar outfit, are about as remote as Audi entering F1. And F1 needs to look internally if it wishes to address both those issues.

When a team such as Force India rises well above itself to finish fourth behind Ferrari on a budget one-seventh the size (and two slots ahead of McLaren, on half the spend) through sheer painstaking effort over many years, does it qualify for premium payments or the right to nominate directors to the F1 company board, as may the majors? Ferrari is even entitled to have input into the choice of F1's CEO.

No. Instead, Force India's only sop is a seat on the Strategy Group, where its motions are regularly blocked as they seldom fit the agendas of major teams. The most recent Strategy Group meet featured two such instances, with these blocks stopping crucial issues from reaching the F1 Commission, where they could be properly debated by F1's stakeholders, including all teams, sponsors, technical partners and promoters.

Both proposals have been seen by Autosport, and both make sense. In the first instance, Force India proposed that the permitted hours/teraflops ratio between windtunnel and CFD usage be scaled to incentivise teams to switch to the latter - a 'greener', cheaper tool than the archaic method of blowing air across scale models, and more in keeping with F1's high-tech image.

Despite being framed in conjunction with the FIA to ensure that all "I's and T's were crossed" - and being up for review for 2018 in any event - the concept was (twice) bombed by the Strategy Group. That all five permanent members of the group previously invested in windtunnels, may, of course, have something to do with their votes...

The matter is comparable to Uber. The concept of ride sharing via apps is growing, whether black cabbers and Hackneys approve, or not; whether it disrupts their business models, or not. Now imagine Addison Lee and suchlike controlling London Transport and municipal regulations.

The second proposal was tabled by Manor, which currently rents windtunnel time in a 50% facility from Mercedes. The champion team found itself with redundant tunnel capacity after restrictions were introduced, and up-scaled to 60% models in the interests of accuracy.

Clearly, then, the independent team is penalised on accuracy, yet its only option would be to a) travel overseas in search of a larger tunnel (as Force India did, signing up with Toyota), or b) find a UK-based team willing to share tunnel time on a structured basis (an unlikely solution, given that major teams are averse to the disruption).

So Manor proposed a tunnel share concept. It would incentivise major teams to share, failing which it be granted 10% increases in allowable time and in the number of runs - reasonable given that the differences in accuracy and costs are substantially above 20%.

Both proposals were turned down by Strategy Group members.

Asked in Abu Dhabi whether the Strategy Group best serves F1's interests, Mercedes F1 team boss (and charter member of the group) Toto Wolff was unequivocal in his answer that it plays to the majors:

"The difficulty is that every team has got to have an opinion and it is very much focused of course on your own performance, but then we are responsible enough, within the group, to take into consideration what's good for [F1], and most recently I've seen a development that even within the very big rivals on the strategy group and in the F1 Commission there is consensus, and we're trying to seek consensus."

Note the second part of Wolff's answer (italicised)...

Then, added Wolff: "Some of the things are not being accepted, or not voted on." Possibly he forgot to add "Because we can", or would that be too obvious?

As for Toto's reference to the F1 Commission, although that is the next regulatory step, the body itself has mutated into a proxy organisation relying more on e-votes than debate, which further stifles the independents. Not only is voting possible only on hand-me-up items escalated by the Strategy Group, but they are unable to express on their opinions on those matters save for placing a X in a box...

F1 operates as a franchise, and as any student of the concept knows, franchises are only as strong as their weakest links. Yet F1 is geared around the majors, and not only commercially and politically. How often has F1 tsar Bernie Ecclestone, for example, spoken of the need for Ferrari and Red Bull to get on terms with Mercedes; why does he methodically eliminate the likes of Force India and Williams from this scenario?

Ironically, the independents are in for the long haul, for that is their only business. For the likes of Mercedes, Red Bull and, now that Ferrari is a listed entity, the Scuderia too, F1 is a marketing sideshow. McLaren sits uncomfortably between those two stools - and it shows in its results and corporate structure.

In order to flourish, F1 needs to nurture fledgling teams, not systematically knock them at every turn. Only then could it enjoy rich - in sporting and commercial terms - grids; only then could fans enjoy action all the way down the field. Only then could Manor (and its ilk) have streams of investors lining up; only then do the values of teams increase - and, commensurately, the value of F1.

Having bought into F1 - and soon to own the controlling slice (if all pans out) - Liberty Media intends restructuring the series to increase its spectacle and sustainability. Forget expanding the calendar in the USA and introducing new-fangled, acronymic technologies such as VoD, VR, AR and 4K... axing the SG would eliminate 50% of F1's ills in a single swoop.