The Weekly Grapevine

The Japanese Warriors

In so many ways they are utterly similar; in others they could not be more different even if they were so directed by Formula One's power brokers and administrators.

Both teams are Japanese, both made their present appearances in the paddock at around the same time, both have run in red and white of their fatherland, both employ a driver with one Grand Prix victory to his name, both have been highly successful in other motorsport categories, and both suffered torrid years immediately after switching tyre suppliers and commissioning second wind tunnels.

The similarities do not stop there, either: both are owned by industry leaders, who are the only mainstream producers of hybrid vehicles; both teams stayed out of the bitter FIA/GPWC shenanigans until matters calmed down, and, in fact, both are fundamentally apolitical.

Then, both own Grand Prix circuits in Japan, with the honour of hosting their country's Grand Prix soon to be rotated between the two venues, and both supply customer teams with engines - with a Japanese driver seemingly being part of the deal.

Jenson Button and Jarno Trulli battle at the Nurburgring © XPB/LAT

The teams are headed by 'suits' with little overall racing experience; men, though, who have glittering careers in blue-chip car companies behind them, and have brought such internal and administrative processes as are commonplace in corporations to bear on the Formula One operations they now head.

Even their job titles, whilst different, are common in that they are corporate-speak: team principal has given way to chief executive officer, president, or chairman - although 'team principal' is applied in conjunction with corporate title when the need arises ...

Both suffered acrimonious splits with (Western) technical directors over policy matters, doing so in the wake of their most successful seasons, both teams were in the past convicted by the FIA of circumventing the technical regulations somewhat creatively, and finding themselves banned and publicly shamed for their efforts.

Finally, both their motorsport operations have their roots in teams founded by entrepreneurs with links to the respective companies, who then later acquired these and grew them unto their own image. But, that is where the similarities come to a full stop, and from here on in the Japanese giants could hardly be more different.

One team is resplendent in corporate colours (tellingly, those of its national flag), broken only to show allegiance to a host of financial and technical partners; the other (now) shows not a sticker bar those required by the regulations in order to pay homage to Mother Earth.

One has consistently been amongst the first teams to unveil its new cars, whilst its nemesis is traditionally one of the last - certainly as regards the majors - and even their approach to launches could not be more different: the former's have a corporate feel to them, whilst the latter's, certainly in its tobacco days, were fuelled by razzmatazz, and are now more down-to-earth (pun incidental).

Where one has a 'rookie' in its second cockpit, the other's is filled by a driver likely to soon be the most experienced in the sport's history; where this team is relying upon the development skills of arguably the most experienced tester ever - with tenures in the only three British teams to have won world championships in the last quarter century - the former has a junior development driver.

Then, where one is the only team to manufacture a complete car under one roof - which not even Ferrari manages - and funds its F1 activities from a marketing budget, the other sources engines from Japan and expects its Research and Development division to pay at least half the costs of its entire programme.

One was founded by a loom-making family and has grown into the world's largest car company; the other has its roots in racing and is the most prolific producer of internal combustion engines on the planet. The differences are plain to see; the teams referred to being, of course, (alphabetically), Honda and Toyota.

Jos Verstappen tests the Honda at Jerez in 1999 © Reuters

When first-named (re) entered the sport in 2000, it did so as engine supplier to British American Racing, set up by driver manager Craig Pollock with heaps of British American Tobacco money in order to provide a vehicle for his charge, 1997 world champion Jacques Villeneuve.

The company had previously pulled the plug on its nascent in-house effort - headed by ex-Tyrrell and Ferrari heavyweight Harvey Postlethwaite - for unknown reasons, and had a powerful V10 engine design going begging.

Quite why Honda, with a string of victories to its name in its own right and a host of world championships won with Williams and McLaren, chose to return to the sport with a team with no pedigree and no points to its name after just one season in the formula remains a mystery.

But it did, and that partnership laid the foundation for the current effort, although at end of 2001 Pollock gave way to David Richards, who came in at the behest of paymasters BAT.

The Welshman in turn gave way to present-day CEO Nick Fry, with Honda taking total control of the team in 2005 as BAT prepared to depart the sport as the EU-wide ban on tobacco livery gained currency.

As BAT wound down its interest, so Honda ramped up its involvement: Japanese suspension, electronics, hydraulics and transmission engineers were increasingly seen in the palace Pollock built in Brackley, a few miles from Silverstone and former site of Reynard, which supplied BAR's early chassis.

Results improved as Honda's influence increased, and by 2004 BAR-Honda finished second in the Constructors' Championship, and Jenson Button - around whom the team would be increasingly built - placed third in his category.

The next season saw a slump, compounded by a ban following conviction for a 'supplementary fuel system', but in 2006 Button bounced back to win a wet Hungarian race.

True, it was a slightly more fortuitous than fought-for victory - but, credit where it is due: the Brit's silky smooth style overcame the streaming weather.

But from then on it was basically downhill all the way, a situation no doubt influenced by the departure of technical director Geoff Willis, the different characteristics of Bridgestone tyres (compared to Michelin's behaviour), and a second wind tunnel which differed in calibration from the first.

Last year was, bluntly, a disaster, with Button scoring but two eighth places and a fifth place (in China's wet), and Rubens Barrichello, despite having 250-odd starts on his CV, scoring zero.

The 2008 Honda RA108 © LAT

Having last year decided to go 'green', sponsor decals were banished to trucks, support kit and driver and team uniforms, and, of course, jokes such as 'go green, go slow' unfairly did the rounds, for the two are hardly mutually inclusive.

There was even talk that Honda, the first company to commercially introduce both hybrid and hydrogen fuel cell-powered cars, would drop its My Earth Dream theme and revert to commercial livery, but as Tuesday's launch proved, the environment is still very much at the forefront of its marketing thrust.

If anything, it has been expanded, what with driver uniforms now sporting green Herbie-style 'racing stripes' and the colour being very much in evidence all day long. But, if its livery has a common thread running through it, its management structure has certainly changed, this being the biggest differentiator between Honda and its arch-rival - in competition and market terms - Toyota.

As is well-known, Ross Brawn has joined Honda, fresh from a year's sabbatical after leading Ferrari's race operation to record after record over the past decade. The team proudly introduced him at the launch, having previously made much about his arrival. Such fanfare about an individual is unusual in Japanese companies, and indicates that Honda is pinning its future hopes on him.

Brawn's title is, tellingly, team principal (although few doubt he is de facto technical director and team principal rolled in one), and despite Nick Fry's role as overseer of the entire operation as CEO, it was clear that Brawn is in charge of racing at Honda Racing F1 Team, with Fry being the corporate face.

Although the Brit is too wily to make predictions, there is talk within the team that 2008 is for taking stock and regular points hauls, podiums are targeted for next year, with victories on merit in 2010 and the title the following season. There were very few present in Brackley who argue with the schedule ...

Toyota, though, chose to go a different route. Having gradually taken over the Team Toyota Europe operation established by the now-retired Ove Andersson as a rally operation, Toyota expanded its Cologne base in order to mount massively successful world rally championship assaults under the Swede, plus forays to Le Mans - with success in the 1999 24 Hour only being scuppered in the closing hours by a burst tyre.

In 1999 the decision was taken by Toyota Motorsport GmbH to enter F1, and in 2001 the operation became a regular presence in the paddock in preparation for entry the following year. The team's first race saw a point scored - which BAR failed to do for a year - but thereafter a revolving door policy saw management and drivers changed until Jarno Trulli and Ralf Schumacher arrived in 2005, with the latter now making way for Timo Glock.

John Howett and Tadashi Yamashina at the Toyota launch © XPB/LAT

The team's success rate picked up, and the team finished fourth in the championship. Things then went awry: Technical Director Mike Gascoyne departed in early 2006, the team had switched to Bridgestones for commercial reasons (and battled to adapt), and the second tunnel played tricks.

In the subsequent restructure the team more fully adopted the Toyota Way philosophy - which preaches continuous improvement through team work - from its automobile operations. Teamwork is vital in what is, after all, a team sport (even if the driver gets the accolades) and all F1 operations are, of course, 'teams'.

But, where Toyota's philosophy differs from those of the other teams is in the company's decision to 'no longer having a system controlled by a single person' by splitting its technical operations under two senior managers, with their activities therefore 'not being restricted to the expertise of a single leader'. (Quotations taken from Toyota's 2007 Motorsport Report).

Thus no technical director was appointed to replace Gascoyne, and two senior general managers now oversee technical operations, split into chassis and engine, reporting to the team's president John Howett, a career 'suit' with decades of Toyota service, mainly in sales and the aftermarket . Operations are run along committee lines, and agreement is more by consensus than individual leadership.

The company believes this will become the trend, and is pinning its hopes for future success on the Toyota Way, as opposed to the leadership and vision of one proven racing personality. Again, regular points are being targeted this year, podiums the next and race victories the year thereafter.

So, in 2008 two Japanese companies will go F1 racing, one led by a proven racer, the other by a proven corporate philosophy. Both have superb facilities and funding, both have top-drawer drivers with little to chose between them, both have control tyres and electronics - and both are fighting for market share, within their domestic market and internationally.

They could not be more alike in so many ways, yet so different in so many others. Their fight will surely be one of the highlights of 2008, and will not be solely about championship points and positions by season's end. Oh no, that would be too simple. This battle is about the Toyota Way versus the F1 Way, and the corporate stakes could not be higher.