The Race of Champions

There was no question as to the main talking point in the paddock after the San Marino Grand Prix - it wasn't so much the way Ferrari won, but the way Renault lost, that captured the attention.

No one paying any heed to how the respective strategies appeared to be unfolding could quite understand when Fernando Alonso peeled into the pits on lap 41, when it seemed all he had to do was to be a little patient and victory would come his way. Instead, within a lap, Michael Schumacher, who appeared to have no chance, made his second and final stop. He managed to emerge still safely in the lead.

So how could a team so renowned for their strategic approach make a call that apparently handed the race to the opposition? The reaction of McLaren's Martin Whitmarsh, who has so often had to defend a slip by his own team, was typical.

"It was their race, Alonso could have and should have won this race," he said. "But they made a fairly fundamental mistake in strategy. It surprised everyone, I think. They made a howling mistake, and none of us are impervious to doing it, so I'm not crowing over it. I'm just observing that they did make a mistake, and we're all capable of doing that.

"It's good for Ferrari, and congratulations to them, but no one's going to leave here with any other impression than it should have been Alonso's race. We don't often cheer a Ferrari win, but if we weren't going to win, then Michael's win was better for us than Alonso..."

Almost immediately, Renault embarked on damage limitation and face saving, suggesting that stopping early wasn't as bad an error as it might have seemed from the outside, and that there were sound reasons behind what seemed like an oddball decision.

Nevertheless, it seems that in the heat of a tremendous battle between the two camps - headed respectively by Pat Symonds and Ross Brawn, the cleverest strategy guys in the business - Renault had made a bad call. So how did it happen, and why?

How qualifying unfolded

Like Monaco and Hungary, Imola is a track notorious for its lack of overtaking opportunities - Alonso's 2005 win proved that - so everything comes down to the grid and the pitstops.

Renault were tipped off by the previous week's Barcelona test that Ferrari and Bridgestone had made serious progress, and there were strong suggestions from the camp that the Scuderia would be the main opposition.

But what might have come as a surprise was the speed over one lap, which was evident on Friday when Schumacher popped out of the pits and instantly went top of the times ahead of guys who'd been piling up the laps. It was just like the good old days.

Alonso still finished the Friday afternoon session on top, 0.328 seconds ahead of Schumacher, but afterwards he admitted that Ferrari were going to be the team to beat.

"For sure tomorrow we'll have more drivers and more teams fighting for the pole position," said the world champion. "It's still Honda, Ferrari, McLaren and Renault able to be on pole tomorrow, and this is what we have to look at.

"Ferrari are quick again here. The Bridgestone tyre works here, and they worked in Bahrain. They will be ready to fight. But now it's up to us to do a better qualifying than them tomorrow, a better strategy, a better race, and if we can do that, then we'll beat them.

"If we cannot do that, they can win the race. The important thing is that when the Bridgestone tyres are better, to be ready to fight with them; and when the Michelin tyres are better, to beat them easy. It's what we have to do."

On Saturday morning, Schumacher was on top, ahead of Alonso, and there had been no sign yet of any real pressure from Honda. As they worked on qualifying strategy through Saturday lunchtime, Renault probably thought that Alonso and Schumacher would in all likelihood share the front row, and that the laps of fuel each had on board would be the deciding factor.

Taking into account the fact that the Bridgestone chosen by Ferrari appeared to have an edge over one lap, the team decided to err on the heavy side, assuming that Schumacher would do the opposite to guarantee pole.

The hope was to follow the German to the first stop and jump in front, but even from second there was also a chance to get into the lead on the long drag to Turn 1. Third wouldn't be a disaster either, because the way the track curves off the start line means that it is often a better place to be in than second.

With the current qualifying format, teams generally make a Plan A before the session starts, and then if they have to, they can respond in the short break between sessions two and three, when they have to make the final decision on fuel.

The times in session two are a useful guide to the ultimate pace, because of course no one can afford to hang around and miss the top 10, but it has always to be borne in mind that all you have to do is get through, so some guys may yet have something in reserve.

Things went to plan in that Michael was quickest by miles on 1:22.579, while Kimi Raikkonen popped up a surprise second. Further back it was incredibly close. Fernando was eighth, but his teammate Giancarlo Fisichella was bounced out in 11th, even though he was only 0.028 seconds slower.

Fisichella was adamant afterwards that he'd made a mistake by going too early. I criticised Renault after Malaysia for going out too late in session two and giving thus leaving themselves a small gap for the refuelling process, and very little margin for error.

That was proved at Sepang when a panic ensued, and Fernando was over-fuelled. The cars went out earlier in Australia and Imola, and last weekend Fisichella seemingly paid the price - and Fernando very nearly did - for so doing. It just goes to show that these things are very easy to judge from the outside...

The real point is that in examining these Q2 times Renault could take the going-too-early element into account, and thus still bank on Alonso going quick enough to hopefully end up second, behind Schumacher.

Some 20 minutes later, they had the answers. The Ferrari driver was indeed on pole, but he was followed by Honda's Button and Rubens Barrichello, with teammate Felipe Massa in fourth. Alonso, who afterwards admitted that his lap was as good as it could have been, was only fifth.

He'd done his bit, but you're at the mercy of the opposition, and the Renault plan clearly didn't allow for as many as three cars sneaking into the gap between Alonso and Schumacher. The team still thought that Alonso would be pitting considerably later than the Ferrari, but clearly the cars in between - and especially that of Massa - could slow him down.

The race

Alonso was at least on the favourable inside of the grid, and there was always a chance of gaining a place or two. But he got blocked off the line by Massa, and lost all his momentum. He did at least get past Barrichello but still had Button and, crucially, Massa between himself and Schumacher. In effect, all he could do was run at the Brazilian's pace until the second Ferrari stopped, so he hung back a little to save tyres and keep temperatures down.

The fascinating thing was the gap between Schumacher and Massa in third:

Lap  5: 2.949
Lap 10: 4.725

That looks pretty normal, but then it gets interesting:

Lap 11:  5.246
Lap 12:  5.223
Lap 13:  6.117
Lap 14:  7.146
Lap 15:  7.722 (Button pits; Massa goes second)
Lap 16:  8.298
Lap 17: 10.206 (Alonso closes right up on Massa)
Lap 18: 11.847
Lap 19: Massa pits, Alonso 13.576 behind Schumacher
Lap 20: Schumacher pits

The growth of the gap after lap 13 reflects Schumacher cutting his times as his fuel load dipped and he approached his critical first stop, but there was also a contribution from Massa slowing down, especially on the last couple of laps before he came in. Was he under direct orders to make life as difficult as possible for Alonso? Who knows, but it's a legitimate strategy to use your second car in that way...

The frustrated Alonso had seen Schumacher's advantage dramatically extended, and there was nothing he could do except wait for Massa to give him a clear track.

Both Ferraris ultimately stayed out a little longer than most people had anticipated, and it was obvious that once the red cars were out of the way, Alonso didn't have enough laps with which to take the lead. All the focus now was on how to sort things out at the second stop, and therefore how much fuel to put in the car at the first.

In fact the team had five laps to do their sums, for Alonso came in on lap 25, five laps after Schumacher. Those fuel calculations would have reflected many factors, including how much the Ferrari driver had put in the car at his stop, and how fast he was going after it.

Gap Alonso to Schumacher

Lap 20: Schumacher pits
Lap 21: 7.301
Lap 22: 7.306
Lap 23: 8.014
Lap 24: 8.726
Lap 25: Alonso pits

Renault certainly would have expected to have done a little better than the above bearing in mind Fernando was running down to empty, but again it reflected the new Bridgestone performance (and Schumacher had taken on brand new tyres after using a three-lap qualifying set at the start). Clearly the pressure was on, and Renault had to get that fuel calculation right.

So let's take a look at the first stops. According to the TV timing, Schumacher's stop took 8.3 seconds while Alonso's was 9.1. The obvious conclusion was that, having made his first stop five laps later, Fernando had taken on more fuel, and thus his second would come at least five laps after Schumacher's as well.

However, things are not quite that simple, because the TV timing reflects how long the car has been at rest, and not how long the fuel has been going in. When Barrichello had a fuelling delay at Imola, the TV data claimed he had taken on enough to run 43 laps!

Teams always monitor - by hand timing - what they call the 'nozzle time' of rival cars, which gives a more accurate picture of what actually goes into the car. In Schumacher's case it was approximately 7.2 seconds, and for Alonso it was 6.8. In other words, the Spaniard actually took on a little less fuel, albeit not by much, even though Ferrari had a quicker overall stop time.

So when would the second stops be coming? Using the fuelling rate of 12-litres per second, and the accepted consumption at Imola of 3.6-litres or 2.7kgs per lap, we get the following result:

Schumacher: Lap 20 + 23.6 laps = lap 43-44
Alonso:     Lap 25 + 22.3 laps = lap 47

Using those figures, Fernando could run around three or four laps longer than the Ferrari. But to make use of his advantage he had to be right with Michael when the Ferrari made its second stop. At the time, that looked like it would be very difficult - even given the fact that Massa (and Button) were out of the way and he had a clear run.

But then a strange thing happened; Schumacher ran into unexpected tyre problems, and his lap times faded dramatically. At one point he was as much as 4.2 seconds off his best time from the end of the first stint, although that was an extreme example.

"When we had problems in the second stint, I didn't understand what was going on,' Ferrari's technical director Ross Brawn recalled after the race. "The car was quick initially in the beginning of the stint, but then we got a lot of understeer, and we lost the gap to Alonso.

"We would have been in trouble then, because we knew that they were going to go a little bit longer, and we were going to be caught at the pitstop. We got a lot of graining on the front, and it wouldn't clean up."

"The middle stint was really difficult for them," said Pat Symonds. "I was surprised how quickly we caught them in the first laps. We could see that we could catch them very easily, but we weren't convinced that we knew a way of getting past."

Fernando threw caution to the wind in his efforts to catch up, and he was certainly not sparing any fuel or revs in so doing (this was of course the second race for his engine).

Gap Schumacher to Alonso

Lap 25: Alonso stops, Schumacher's tyres are five laps old
Lap 26: 11.272
Lap 27:  9.872
Lap 28:  8.537
Lap 29:  7.241
Lap 30:  5.784
Lap 31:  4.665
Lap 32:  3.161
Lap 33:  2.417
Lap 34:  0.422
Lap 35:  0.376

So within 10 laps of his first stop, and around 11-12 laps before his second stop was due, Fernando was right there, all over Michael. But there was nothing he could do to get past.

Schumacher's pace had slowed because he had the tyre problem, but crucially once he had Alonso on his gearbox, the German slowed further because he had to close all the doors, brake early, and generally mess with Fernando's head. All legitimate defensive stuff, of course, as employed by the Spaniard himself last year. Michael was also mindful of keeping the tyres alive, as best he could, until the very end of the stint. Lapping off the pace, he was also saving fuel.

The point is, the lap times he was doing - and therefore he was forcing Alonso to do as well - were slower than those he could have achieved, even allowing for the tyre issue. In other words he had something in reserve, and Renault didn't know quite how much...

Fernando stayed right behind Michael from lap 35 onwards, and the world assumed that all he had to do was sit there, put in his three or four quick laps when Michael pitted, and cruise out of the pits in front. The prancing horse was a sitting duck.

And that's when Renault surprised us by bringing Alonso in on lap 41, what appeared to be at least five or six laps before we (and the opposition) expected him. In fact he nearly came in even earlier, for there was a phantom stop when the Renault crew stepped out in to the pitlane, causing Ferrari to do the same - all of which was missed by the TV director. But Alonso, invited by the team to stop, was still considering his options.

Interestingly, on his last couple of laps before Alonso's stop, Michael's times suddenly improved, so clearly Ferrari told him what had been going on in the Renault pit. Renault's radio traffic must also have alerted Ferrari to the clear possibility of an early stop.

Why did Renault bring Alonso in early?

Usually it's a no-brainer to stay out as long as your fuel load permits, wait for the other guy to pit, and then stroll into the lead. We assumed that he was going to lap 46/47, and Schumacher only to 43/44. So what on earth was the team up to?

After the race Symonds insisted that the true situation was much more marginal than everyone else thought. He claimed that Renault's real concern was that they were possibly destined to pit on the same lap as Michael, and thus there was a risk that Fernando would follow Michael in and, since the Ferrari garage was further down the pit lane, would inevitably follow him out.

It was the fear of that scenario - which no one else's calculations anticipated - that Symonds says drove his guys to try something different.

"We had fuel to go a little bit further," he said, "But of course we couldn't tell if it was necessarily much further than them, and in fact our nozzle timings indicated it wasn't.

"They indicated that ourselves and Ferrari were either going to come in on the same lap, or maybe we were going to be one lap later - we can't be confident in nozzle timings that accurately. It was certainly not what the TV said - a lot of people said that they'd timed us being four laps longer or something, which I wish to God we had been.

"What I didn't want to do was just follow him into the pits. So we just said, well, follow him into the pits, we're going to follow him out of the pits, let's just have a go. We just thought the best thing to do was to try and get out of his slipstream. We had nothing to lose, but maybe a small chance to gain, so we took it."

There was one further consideration to justify Renault's nervousness at this stage of the race. In third and fourth, Massa and McLaren's Juan Pablo Montoya were getting closer and closer. They were no immediate threat, but when you're being delayed by a couple of seconds a lap, it doesn't take long for those behind to catch up - and it was clear that once Massa had pitted and got out of his way, Montoya would be able to go even quicker.

I had also thought that Renault feared that once Michael pitted and went to new tyres (and the team would usually have known that Ferrari had one brand new set left), the former champ might be able to bang in some dangerously quick laps, even with a heavy fuel load. Much better therefore to take advantage of his current struggles with what appeared to be a worn out, duff set.

In fact after the race Symonds admitted that he hadn't realised that Michael had saved his last new set for the end, so in fact that concern was not part of Renault's thinking.

The Ferrari instant response

Renault must have known that Ferrari would come straight in by way of response, so they realised that Alonso actually had very little leeway. His main problem was that his in-lap speed was determined by Schumacher's, up ahead, and only at the last second could he duck out of the Ferrari's slipstream and head down the pit lane.

So the only thing Alonso had to play with was his time at rest, his speed in and out the pitlane, and his speed over that first flying lap out of the pits.

"I guess that they were hoping Fernando would be quick enough on his out-lap to do us," said Brawn. "I think he had some traffic and other bits, so it was a risky strategy."

In fact, Ferrari could barely believe that the pursuing car had pulled into the pits, but they had other things to think about as Massa was coming straight in for his second scheduled stop, and he was having his own fight with the McLarens.

Indeed, if the team had, at the last second, realised what Alonso was up to, they could not have brought Michael straight in because everything was ready for Massa. A late shuffle of tyres and fuel hoses would have been disastrous for both men. And Symonds confirmed that had Michael come in on that lap, they would have in turn tried to keep Fernando out, although that would have been a close call...

Schumacher knew as he exited the final corner of the lap that the Renault had gone in, and he now had everything to play for. The only logical thing to do was come straight in after one more lap rather than waste any more time on that dodgy second set of tyres.

No need for defensive driving, no need to save the tyres for a few more laps, or indeed save fuel. He drove what must have been one of the most impressive laps of even his long career.

Alonso's in-lap, which in effect mirrored Michael's pace (which, as noted, had actually picked up), was one minute and 27.375 seconds; Michael's was 1:25.734. It was the second fastest in-lap by any driver all race - the fastest being the one before his own first stop! Schumacher had found speed that Renault did not expect him to find.

In part because he needed to take on more fuel, Michael spent longer in the pit lane - 23.936 as opposed to the 23.310 of Fernando - but that still wasn't enough to tip the balance in favour of the Renault.

According to the TV timing Alonso spent less time at rest - 6.7 rather than the 7.1 of Michael a lap later - which again reflects the fact that he had fuel in the car that hadn't been used. I don't have the more accurate nozzle times to hand for these second stops, but I suspect as at the first, the Ferrari guys simply did a more efficient job, and the gap of four tenths of a second would actually have been larger if only refuelling was considered.

Alonso had a quick out-lap; the quickest by any driver all race, but since the time includes the pit stop, that again in part reflects the fact that relatively little fuel had to go in. Nevertheless, when Michael stormed out of the pitlane, he was still in front. Game over.

"It didn't work, but we didn't lose anything," insisted Symonds after the race. "The main reason it didn't work was that Michael's lap into the pits was 1.5 seconds faster than anything he'd done in that stint, and I just hadn't expected that at all.

"If he hadn't managed that fantastic lap into the pits - and to be honest the lap before was pretty good too, about 0.6 seconds faster than most of his laps - we would have had him, because we were only 0.7 seconds behind him when he came out of the pits. So it was close, and we had to try something. I wasn't going to just sit there and drive round behind him all bloody day."

Was it really that wrong?

Renault's concern was that Alonso would have to pit on the same lap as Schumacher and follow him in and out of the pits, and that's why they tried something different. But as events proved, the fear was unjustified.

Immediately after the flag, before he had time to realise that it would be more fun to keep us guessing, Brawn admitted that Michael "had another one or two laps of fuel." That would have taken the German to lap 43/44, exactly as our earlier calculations suggested. Massa's stop was also 0.7 seconds longer than Schumacher's a lap later, and that sort of difference confirms yet again that Michael was originally headed to lap 43-44.

It's worth noting that Massa, who like Fernando also stopped on lap 41, was at rest for 7.8 seconds. He thus needed an extra 1.1 seconds compared to Alonso to take on enough fuel for the remaining 22 laps, and that equates to around four laps (although if our theory about the Ferrari stops being more efficient is correct, it could have been more). If Alonso had at least four laps left in the tank when he stopped, that would have taken him to lap 45.

Intriguingly, in the post-race press conference Alonso said he had stopped "much earlier" than planned, and yet in a press release issued by Renault on Monday, Symonds was quoted as saying that Alonso had pitted only "two laps earlier." That would have taken him only to lap 43, which just doesn't seem to add up.

As it happens, the above pitstop timings do indicate that it might have been tighter than most of us thought at the time, and maybe Michael's slow lappery had indeed saved him a lap and brought the pair's second stops closer together - but whichever way you look at it, Alonso was still going to stop later than Michael.

It doesn't matter how you do the sums, nobody else seems to agree with Renault that Alonso was likely to follow Michael in and out of the pits. It seems to me that, in the worst-case scenario for Renault, Michael might have stopped only a couple of laps earlier than Fernando, rather than the three or four that others expected. But that would still have been plenty enough to allow the world champion to cruise into the lead.

Far from being a 'nothing to lose' strategy, stopping first appears to be an unnecessary gamble that did not pay off. Even allowing that the team's own calculations showed the same lap stop to be a genuine possibility, a possibility is surely all it was, and the lesser risk would have been to carry on as planned.

Could it be that there was a little bravado, maybe a touch of over confidence, on the part of team and driver at play here? Convinced that Michael Schumacher couldn't go any quicker with the tyres he had, and with Fernando Alonso growing impatient while stuck behind him, Renault had in mind to do something unexpected and spectacular to really stick it to Ferrari on home ground. When Michael "woke up" and showed what he had in reserve, it was too late.

Alonso was strangely muted about the whole thing afterwards. Since he was given the option on whether to come in or not, he cannot divorce himself from the decision process. But he was relying on the information he was given at the time, and having looked further into things, might well come to the conclusion that stopping on lap 41 was not the most obvious course of action.

In conversation with his national media he's been fairly critical of team decisions of late, although he's been rather more circumspect when speaking English. Imola is not likely to do much for his peace of mind.

You win some, you lose some, and few have a better grasp of strategy than Pat Symonds. The bottom line is that it's tough out there at the moment, and even the best don't always get it right. And in Renault's defence, it has to be said that there's a long list of teams that would love to be able to take a close second even on a bad day...

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- The Autosport.com Team

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