The 2006 Technical Review (part I)

The 2006 season was largely shaped by the relative competitiveness of the two tyre manufacturers. The change to V8 engines did very little to upset the apple cart and overall reliability from the all new engines was good.

Again there was a distinct convergence in aerodynamic design, with the only notable difference between teams being their keel layout and placement of bargeboards, which still falls into two camps.

There was also a lot of technical controversy along the way this year, with flexing wings, tower wings, wheel fairings and mass dampers all being disputed.

Personnel-wise, the year also was notable for the departure of two key technical directors mid-season - almost unheard of in Formula One. Additionally, the movement of key staff between the teams has been greater this year than is usually the case.

Tyres

After an exploratory trial of no tyre changes in 2005, the FIA relented and allowed mid-race tyre changes to return in 2006.

he 2005 single tyre rule went in favour of Michelin, whose tyres wore better through the race. This year, the pendulum was expected to swing back towards Bridgestone, but at first this was clearly not the case.

Bridgestone-shod teams struggled in the first few races, especially in qualifying. Not withstanding, all teams suffered to a certain extent with managing tyre temperatures.

Each driver had a choice of two tyre compounds for each race, the prime and the option tyre. Each tyre was suited to a different track temperature; many teams found the better tyre in practice would run below its optimum working range in the race, if the weather differed.

This left the drivers with a lack of grip and consequently other related issues such as graining, where the tyre scrubs across the track due to its lack of grip and the edges of the grooves break up, sending balls of rubber over the tread and further reducing grip.

Teams learned to manage the new breed of temperature-sensitive tyres partly through set-up and driving style, but also by ensuring the tyre was kept warm in it blankets right up until the last moment before being fitted at a pitstop.

Safety car periods were a bigger worry, with drivers vigorously swerving around to keep heat in to the tyre.

In the early part of the season, Michelin's advantage was a better balance between one lap pace and the race pace from the tyres, whereas Bridgestone were skewed in favour of race performance.

By mid-season, Ferrari and Bridgestone had worked out a response. New tyres and a revised Ferrari set-up gave them a slightly different balance, trading some race performance for a better one-lap pace. This regularly put Ferrari on pole - an advantage bolstered by the tyres' better pace over the opening laps.

Ferrari often then suffered a drop-off while the tyres settled in, the drivers having to be careful to prevent graining, but thereafter the tyres remained durable for the whole stint. Michelin, on the other hand, never fully responded to the new Bridgestones, although by the season-end Renault were close to Ferrari's race pace.

There were two wet races and in each the comparative performance of the tyres was in stark contrast. Both Hungary and China started out as damp races, demanding intermediate tyres. Both these events are normally hot and dry, so the unseasonably wet weather was only a temporary feature.

In the early part of each race, the damp track favoured Michelin's intermediate tyre to the tune of over a second per lap. But as the conditions dried, the track reached a crossover point, where the now much worn Bridgestone intermediates were faster, again to the order of over a second per lap.

This crossover point came mid-way in the stint, and as a result the lead made up by Michelin teams was overturned by the Bridgestone shod teams. In fact, the worn Bridgestone Intermediate tyres would prove so competitive that some teams opted not to change their tyres at scheduled pitstops when the weather was not dry enough for grooves.

Then there came another crossover point, where the track was dry enough to consider dry weather tyres. This was another Bridgestone advantage, as their intermediate tyres could go faster on the near-dry track and their dry tyres were better on the cooler dry track.

Michelin teams needed a much drier and warmer track before their grooved tyres would get a grip. Thus, any Michelin shod driver gambling on an early switch to dry tyres was exposed, and in many case the driver had to re-pit for intermediates.

We never had the opposite situation, though, where damp track got wetter, but the belief is that the Michelin intermediate was closer to the full-wet tyre, and the crossover point would have given Michelin the same kind of advantage that Bridgestone had in the drying conditions.

V8 Engines

Having had V10 engines in the Formula since Renault returned to the sport in 1989, the FIA introduced new engine regulations to mandate several key dimensions and technologies within the engine.

Principal amongst these was the specification of a V8 engine of 2.4 litres. Put simply, the new engines were the old V10s with two cylinders removed. However, as the FIA specified engine dimensions, weight and materials, in practice the engines were all new.

Despite the restrictive rules, the new engines were not a major hurdle for the engineers as the cylinder sizes were consistent, and the inherent vibrations in a 90-degree V8 created a similar problem to other types of vibrations in the smoother V10s.

The smaller engines had to work harder to keep lap times respectable, so the V8 engines had what is known as a greater duty cycle - more revs more of the time. As a result, the engine suffered a power drop of less than the 20% drop in capacity. However, the fuel consumption and cooling gains were not great due to the harder duty cycle.

Before the season, most teams predicted power outputs of around 760 to 780hp for their engines, and it is believed almost all teams ended up around the higher figure. As the peak power output was predicted accurately, most teams ended up with engines of very closely comparable outputs.

But the more influential power delivery was the larger differentiating factor between teams. The aim for more horsepower under the power curve was hindered by the FIA ban on movable inlet trumpets as part of the V8 restrictions. This left all engine suppliers bar Cosworth (who had never run variable inlets) with lessons to learn on how fixed length inlets can be made to provide a wider power band.

The other critical decider between engines was reliability. The new engines still had a two-race reliability cycle, and so the teams had to manage how much of the engine performance could be used through qualifying and the race.

Careful control of rev limits and engine mapping was carried out throughout the weekend by the driver under instructions from his engine suppliers. Each engine had a finite number of laps to maintain reliability, and these laps were balanced between full power and more economical settings.

In the end, reliability was overall very impressive for a full field of new engines, however the late season announcement of the engine spec freeze for 2007 pushed the engine suppliers in a race to develop the best possible units for the end of the season, which in turn strained reliability. The rare failures suffered by both Ferrari and Renault may well have been as a result of this push.

While ten teams on the grid raced the new V8 engines, Scuderia Toro Rosso were able to run the restricted V10 Cosworth engine. This produced several outcries before the season that the engine would have a major advantage over the V8 - particularly a concern among the back-of-the-grid teams.

However, this never transpired. Such was the pace of development of the V8 that the old V10 was soon outshone. Restricted by both a rev limit and a fixed diameter inlet restrictor, the unit was merely remapped from the 2005 Red Bull end-of-season spec. No development was funded through the year, and in fact the FIA relented and allowed a small rev increase mid season to allow the cars to remain competitive.

Renault

Having finally won the world championship in 2005 as a constructor (and not solely an engine supplier), Renault were well prepared going into 2006. They already had a car that worked its tyres well and had effective aerodynamics.

In order to focus on developing the new V8 engine for as long as possible, no interim engine was created and no interim car was therefore needed either. This strategy was at odds with the rest of the teams. And when Renault finally ran a V8 on track, it was with the new R26 chassis and RS26 engine.

This plan worked well for the team, as both chassis and engine were working well from the outset in testing. This carried into the first few races, with the team getting the car working straight away and setting the pace. In fact, the car's ability to turn up at a track and immediately find its pace was a strong point of Renault, both 2005 and 2006.

Outwardly, the R26 was a clear derivative of the R25. Notably, the large amount of cooling louvers was removed - both in response to the reduced cooling requirement of the new engine and to reduce drag, due its lower power output.

From having the narrowest of noses in 2005, the team also switched to a wider-tipped nose cone. Unbeknown to the pundits at the time, the car was already equipped with tuned mass dampers, a Renault development from late 2005. The dampers were fitted inside a carbon case within the nose cone and above the clutch in a recess in the gearbox casting.

Otherwise, the R26 appeared like the recent line of Renaults, with its titanium gearbox casting running a conventional gearshift and locating Renault's usual arrangement of three linear dampers. Even at the front the damper arrangement was unchanged, with the third damper slung underneath the rockers.

Also unseen by the outsiders were Renault's electronics, which still provide the best starts off the grid, but now no longer attributable to any weight bias due the standardised weight and centre of gravity of the V8 engines.

However, the engine's power characteristics do have a first order effect on start-line performance - particularly at the low-end torque, from around 6,000-12,000rpm. It's not just the amount of torque, but also the shape of the power curve that affects launches.

With this in mind, and noting that the V8 engines were very close on peak power, Renault's V8 was certainly one of the best in the pitlane, again showing the advantages of a good power curve, reliability, low fuel consumption, and low cooling requirements.

Not withstanding the engine's good thermal qualities, the teams were marginal on cooling capacity on the car, with several races seeing Renault manage the engine to keep temperatures under control (although this was probably more an issue in the cooling outlets chosen for the race prior to parc ferme than an engine problem).

Throughout the early part of the season, the R26 set the pace, but then the ban on mass dampers came in at short notice and Renault coincidentally struggled in Germany. Regardless of any ban, Renault's typical push towards the end of the season brought them back to the level of pace shown by rivals Ferrari.

Visual developments were subtle to the Renault again this year, but there was a lot of focus on the front wing - and in particular the endplates and the aerofoils added to the car.

The team started with the usual cascades added to the endplate, but these were later replaced with the curvy biplane element and discarded completely for the low drag races, such as Monza. Bargeboards followed the R25's design initially, with larger rear placed board complete with axe heads being supplemented by complex board between the front wheels. These were simplified mid-season with a U-shaped front board.

Again the rear wing was a development of the unique merged flap/endplate design, supplemented by slots in the endplate. The flap shape altered most in 2006, with the unusual format of steeper angles on the outer tips and a much flatter middle span.

McLaren-Mercedes

Having mounted a season-long challenge on the championship title in 2005, McLaren tested their V8 engine early and winter testing pace suggested they would be a true contender again in 2006. The new MP4-21 car was again a derivative of the 2005 car, designed under Adrian Newey and lead by McLaren's large group of engineers.

Newey's early season departure from the team did not outwardly affect the team throughout the year, and the breadth of skills and effective management structure kept the team going. However, McLaren did lose many other key technical staff in 2006, and this will surely have had some effect on continuity at some point next season.

The MP4-21 was the chance for McLaren to rationalise a lot of the design that had been added to the MP4-20 at short notice last year. The late decision to return the tyre changes did affect McLaren, whose car had become overly easy on its tyres in 2005. Retaining the keel-less front end, needle-nose and carbon gearbox, again the car was playing on the strengths of the older car.

The new Mercedes V8 was at least as good as the other V8 engines, with just two race failures. Not directly attributed to the engine, but another McLaren trademark was the tight packaging around the rear-end of the car.

In hot races, the team still had to open up the sidepods more than initially designed, plus the sight of the mechanics always greeting the car into the pitlane with a precautionary fire extinguisher in case of overheating bodywork showed how close McLaren were running for aerodynamic advantage.

Yet the team still struggled for pace, and this appeared to be down to two reasons: tyre usage, and high-speed corners.

The carry-over from 2005 was the fact that the car didn't work its Michelin tyres hard enough. This made qualifying a struggle on under-heated tyres, as well as graining in the races when the pace or track wasn't hot enough for the compounds. As for the high speed corner issues, McLaren were open to admit the problem was not fully identified as either aerodynamic or mechanical.

Through the year, the team followed their usual practice of small - almost imperceptible - changes to the car's aerodynamics. Only the new front wing package was easily spotted and typified the problems at McLaren, as it was run by one driver and not the other at the same circuit.

The newer wing appeared more aggressive, with sharper changes in its profile and stepped endplates. Kimi Raikkonen tended to stay with the smoother shaped old wing, with its vertical endplates. Thus, wing choice may be more dow to driver preference, rather than the engineer's theoretical ideal.

A bargeboard update at turkey, complete with the narrow fin, completed the visible upgrades this year.

Toyota

Toyota resources and the single-mindedness of their technical director pushed chassis development hard in 2005 - so much so that before the end of 2005, the team had a B-version of the TF105 and with it the basis for the 2006 car.

Thus, the new car revealed early in winter testing was largely the TF105B adapted for the V8 engine, with the plan to release a second update for Monaco. However, by the time the B-spec TF106 was ready, technical director Mike Gascoyne had departed the team with Pascal Vasselon promoted into his role.

Changes to the TF106 were conventional. Toyota retained the TF105B hybrid monocoque with a keel-less mounting for the suspension despite the retention of the actual keel, now redundantly hanging underneath the nose.

At the rear, the gearbox casting and rear suspension were new. The team eschewed the rotary Sachs dampers for linear Penske units, in an attempt to improve the car's poise over bumps. When the B-spec made its debut, the car had a new monocoque that no longer carried the single keel, requiring a new pedal arrangement, which used to mount inside the hollow of the keel.

Aerodynamically, the TF106 carried a lot the 2005 car's design, with shoulder wings, large chimneys, and small bargeboards. From Bahrain, the front wing still used the abruptly shaped profile, with small winglets appended to the wing's upper surface, in an alternative to the cascaded endplates favored by Renault, for example. This wing was changed mid-season for a much smoother design, albeit still with the small winglets.

Other aero updates abounded, largely revolving around the bargeboards, as the initial set-up ran no vanes around the sidepods but then came small vanes mounted to the floor fin in front of the sidepods and latterly much larger ones. The detail of the shoulder wing also varied through the year.

Having enjoyed solid reliability with their V10s, the new V8 did drop by Toyota's standards; however, there were more retirements due to ancillary systems than actual engine failures.

Williams-Cosworth V8

Having lost BMW both as an engine supplier and as a chassis partner, Williams had a lot of work to do to prepare for 2006. Even the late announcement of the Cosworth deal compressed their timescales for 2006.

When the car was unveiled, it was clear the car was a major development for the team, adopting a low front bulkhead and a keel-less front suspension. In the middle, more conventional tall sidepods were installed, and the rear sported a seamless shift gearbox.

In early testing, the team's pace was a surprise. The Cosworth engine was quick out of the box and already revving to 20,000rpm. But this advantage was short lived, and by the time the season was under way, it was clear the car was lacking aerodynamically. In a nutshell, Williams could produce enough downforce, but it came with too much drag.

Thus, Williams again embarked on a season-long catch-up programme in their wind tunnels. Updates were introduced at most races - some were minor parts and others more far-reaching, like the several variations of bargeboard.

If the aerodynamics were lacking, the mechanical packages certainly didn't. At slower races where the car's mechanical grip was more important, the team excelled. Monaco was a classic example, with the team on the pace of the leaders. However, the rushed sidepod update caused fires damaging electrics in practice and breaking exhausts in the race.

Also, mechanical reliability was suspect throughout the season, with hydraulic and gearbox related failures outnumbering the sole race engine failure.

Toro Rosso-Cosworth V10

From a technical perspective, it was hard to remember this was the old Minardi team. Running a copy of the 2005 RB1, complete with its old Cosworth V10 engine in restricted form, Toro Rosso eclipsed the pace shown by the team's previous incarnation.

With a developed and well documented car, which already had a season of racing behind it, the team prospered early in the season. But without the intention to develop the V10 engine, the team were always going to go backwards at the same rate as the V8s developed. A mid-season FIA dispensation to up the revs on the engine provided some needed power.

As with engine development, progress on the chassis went almost unseen. The few visible changes were front wing endplates featuring cascades, and rear wheel fairings.

On the positive side, the race-proven package and under-stressed engine did produce reliability, with only three mechanical retirements - of which only one was from the engine.

• Don't miss next week, in part II of the 2006 Technical Review: aero developments, controversies, Ferrari, Red Bull, Honda, MF1, and Super Aguri.

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