Rebuilding the American Dream

When Gil de Ferran beat a full 26-car field to win the CART IndyCar World Series finale at Laguna Seca on 9 October 1995, no-one could have imagined that twelve-and-a-half years would elapse before all of America's open-wheel elite next shared a grid.

Back then the nascent breakaway Indy Racing League, created by Indianapolis Motor Speedway president Tony George due to his discontent with CART's structure and direction, lacked quality venues, teams and drivers, and few believed it would last beyond 1996.

But they had underestimated George's determination and the magnetism of the Indianapolis 500. There would be no quick victory for either side in what soon turned into a long, bitter and deeply damaging civil war finally ended by last week's historic merger announcement.

1994-1995: Philosophical Differences

The relationship between CART (Championship Auto Racing Teams) and IMS had always been awkward. The Indy 500 was the CART series' prestigious centrepiece, yet also something of an anomaly - with its unique format and month-long build-up - and was still officiated by the United States Auto Club, the organisation that the CART owners had rebelled against when founding their series in 1979.

This uneasy alliance became a lot more uncomfortable on the eve of the 1994 CART season-opener. Frustrated by the team owners' stranglehold on the CART board (which he had recently resigned from), George revealed plans for a breakaway series based around the Indy 500.

He was highly critical of CART's departure from its American oval roots. The 16-round 1994 calendar featured ten road/street courses, and having successfully expanded into Canada and Australia, CART now had an eye on future events in Europe and Japan. The field was also becoming more international, with 16 'foreign' drivers among the 31-strong entry for round one.

"I have some strong feelings that I would like one last chance to try and impress upon the CART organisation to see if we can't go forward together," said George. "But in the event that's not possible then maybe an entirely new series with more of an American flavour would be the result.

"Oval racing is considered Americana, and that's what we should - in my opinion - be trying to perfect, and then export."

George seemed to have the upper hand. Although Nigel Mansell's arrival had thrust IndyCar into the international spotlight, there were concerns about the series' domestic profile, especially with NASCAR rising fast, and increasing costs - which seemed to be excluding young American drivers in particular.

Jeff Gordon had just emerged as NASCAR's new superstar, yet he had only turned to stock cars after being spurned by CART teams. Pundits also suspected that George's fellow race organisers would be glad to see the back of CART.

"Most other IndyCar promoters are deeply dissatisfied with IndyCar (CART) and the betting in the US is that most of them will be happy to join George, as will the drivers," wrote Autosport's US correspondent Gordon Kirby.

But ironically while George formulated his rebel series, CART blossomed and secured long-term deals with all bar three tracks. Its 1994 season was marked by Mansell's premature departure and crushing dominance by the Penske team, yet crowd and television figures rose unabated.

And they continued to do so during the far more open and exciting 1995 series, which featured 18 regular, mostly well-funded, teams and a Formula One-bound champion in Jacques Villeneuve.

"The sport is probably enjoying the best times in its history," reckoned Mario Andretti. "There's a lot of depth in the field and I think the future's bright and very strong. I just wish Tony George would understand that."

At first George and CART chairman Andrew Craig insisted that a split was a last resort. There were encouraging signs in summer 1994 when IMS floated engine regulations broadly congruent with the CART manufacturers' recommendations for their own series' future, but the cordiality was short-lived.

Keen to reduce escalating speeds, CART announced new aerodynamic rules for 1996 - only for George to declare that his events would retain 1995 regulations.

That inconvenience paled in comparison to his next shock revelation: the "25 and eight" rule guaranteed 25 of the 33 Indy 500 grid slots to drivers who contested the IRL's two pre-Indy rounds, provided they lapped within a given percentage of pole.

This inflammatory decision, and CART's aggressive response, was to be the split's major flash point.

With the Phoenix IRL race clashing with CART's new Rio event, parallel programmes were all but impossible. George rightly highlighted that his dates had been revealed first, but nevertheless he had given the 25-30 CART regulars an impossible choice of abandoning their thriving series for his fledgling concept, or squabbling over just eight spots in the Indy field.

CART brusquely retaliated by scheduling its own US 500 at Michigan on the same day as Indy 1996. The battle lines had been drawn: George believed his event's profile eclipsed CART's star names, and CART was equally adamant that it could thrive without Indianapolis.

"It is our teams that have made this sport what it is today," Craig declared. "We're absolutely not about to back away from that and frankly return the sport to the very narrow world in which it used to exist years back."

"CART's action underscores the need for our new league," George responded. "Our intent was that the IRL could co-exist with CART's current series of races. Whether by its own rules changes or scheduling conflicts, CART has created an unhealthy all-or-nothing choice for the racing community."

1996-1998: Mickey Mouse Versus World Class

'Rookie success hints at IRL talent vacuum'. Autosport's headline summed up the generally disparaging verdict on the inaugural IRL race at a new oval within Disney World in January 1996.

CART had retained all its teams bar the midfield Simon and Foyt squads, who were joined at Orlando by a variety of previously Indy-only operations persuaded to expand their programmes.

Ironically, the CART teams made this possible: convinced that the new league was no threat, they readily sold their 1995 machines to the IRL, preventing what could have been a crippling shortage of equipment.

The field comprised a smattering of CART veterans (but just three race winners: Arie Luyendyk, Roberto Guerrero and John Paul Jr), a few promising new American faces, retired Formula One driver Michele Alboreto, and a host of unknowns.

Despite rookie Butch Brickell and CART convert Eliseo Salazar both being injured in practice crashes, and a wayward safety truck nearly eliminating the leaders during a late yellow, the inaugural race went better than expected, with Indy Lights graduate Buzz Calkins beating then unknown sprint car ace Tony Stewart to victory by 0.9 seconds.

While Calkins's career faded after Orlando, Stewart soon became the IRL's poster boy.

"We were lucky to catch him," admitted IRL vice-president Cary Agajanian. "If the IRL had started a couple of years ago, we would have caught Jeff Gordon. And there are a lot more drivers out there to catch."

Meanwhile CART's opening rounds drew 26-28-car fields, with rising American Jimmy Vasser establishing an early championship lead while two sensational rookies - F1 refugee Alex Zanardi and runaway Lights champion Greg Moore - provided most of the excitement.

Also boasting legends Michael Andretti, Al Unser Jr, Bobby Rahal and Emerson Fittipaldi in its pack, CART's swagger looked justified as the two series headed for their Memorial Day showdown.

Already rocked by tragedy after pole-sitter Scott Brayton was killed in a practice accident, the first IRL Indy 500 was a muted affair. Once early pacesetters Stewart and Luyendyk had retired, former CART midfielder Buddy Lazier overcame Davy Jones to take the victory.

Lazier's win was certainly heroic: despite agony from back injuries sustained at Phoenix, he swept around the outside of Jones with seven laps to go then held on to win by just 0.6 seconds.

The US 500 was a far more competitive contest, at least until attrition allowed Vasser to make a late break, but was overshadowed by a humiliating ten-car pile-up on the parade lap, triggered by the front row trio touching wheels.

"For the world's greatest professional drivers, they sure have made a lot of mistakes..." chuckled AJ Foyt.

Neither side could claim victory, but in retrospect there was already an ominous trend for CART. While Indy's crowd and TV audience figures (approximately 350,000 and a 6.8 Nielsen rating) were down on the pre-IRL days, they still dwarfed the US 500's scores of 110,000 and 2.8.

The split had harmed Indianapolis, but it remained far more relevant to America than CART's races, regardless of the quality of the field. Tellingly, CART never scheduled a direct clash with the Indy 500 again.

But CART's occasional blips aside, the IRL had little to cheer about in its early years. Calkins and Scott Sharp had to share the inaugural title after USAC failed to include a tie-break provision in its unwieldy scoring system. The talismanic Stewart soon departed for NASCAR, and despite his Indy success, Lazier made repeated attempts to break into CART.

Crowds were abysmal at many venues, and the races were often chaotic - with George dismissing USAC and creating his own officiating team following a series of gaffes.

The nadir was reached in Texas in June 1997, when George himself broke up an unseemly pitlane brawl between Luyendyk and Foyt. The latter's driver Billy Boat had been erroneously awarded a win that USAC later gave to Luyendyk.

A new low-cost technical package was introduced for 1997, but the normally-aspirated Oldsmobile and Nissan engines proved woefully unreliable at first, causing tests to be cancelled and requiring conservative rev-limits.

Worse still, the chassis' safety provisions were also inadequate, with the heavy gearboxes being blamed for both destabilising the cars and offering little protection in accidents. Over a dozen drivers suffered head or back injuries before changes were made in 1998.

The series was then rocked by a lengthy cheating row between top teams Foyt, Menard and Kelley, with the latter pair threatening to "race elsewhere". IRL director Leo Mehl dismissed them as "all full of shit" and the exodus never occurred.

Amid the hiccups, the 1997 Phoenix race was hailed as a vindication of the IRL philosophy. Unknown 35-year-old oval racer Jim Guthrie beat Stewart to victory in a self-run car funded by a remortgaged house and supported by an entirely volunteer crew.

Although that would be the sole podium of Guthrie's short IRL career, he had at least tasted glory despite his shoestring budget - something that would never have been possible in CART, where expenditure continued to rocket. However, Craig saw this as a strength.

"The financing of a modern-day CART team has nothing to do with 'affordability,'" he said. "CART is entirely driven by sponsorship. If providing the marketing value delivered to sponsors exceeds the cost of going racing, then CART will continue to grow.

"If the opposite occurs, then we're out of business."

Prophetic words...

1999-2000: The Tipping Point

While the IRL continued to flounder, CART appeared unstoppable: its races remained thrilling, its fields got stronger by the year and it successfully floated on the stock market. Poor TV ratings, a lack of domestic media attention and a steady trickle of departing sponsors were enough to cause some discomfort, however.

Confusion over the split was blamed. With IMS having laid sole claim to the Indycar trademark, CART was now using the Champ Car moniker - ironically reviving USAC's pre-1979 title - but it took time to catch on, while George had to wait until his original agreement with CART elapsed in 2002 before he could adopt Indycar for his series.

By now drivers and teams were pining for Indianapolis. Although the IRL wasn't growing, there was no sign of it going away either. So for the first time relations began to thaw between the two sides.

"Do I want to be at Indy? I think of lot of drivers want to be there," said Robby Gordon after announcing a dual CART and Indy 500 programme. "We need to start working together to get the fan interest and both series built up for everyone's benefit. Rising water lifts all the ships."

Led by Roger Penske and the four CART engine manufacturers, with NASCAR's Bill France Jr mediating, a series of unification talks began. A 28-race calendar was proposed, with an equivalency formula planned for 2000 prior to the introduction of a brand new technical package - the manufacturers favouring a higher-tech version of the IRL engines.

Notwithstanding initial reluctance from IRL supplier General Motors, which feared a massive rise in costs, the process appeared to gain momentum until George abruptly halted talks in September 1999.

"Despite much discussion back and forth, there remain differences of philosophy between us that cannot be papered over, nor resolved in the short run," he said. "I believe it is in the best interests of open-wheel racing for us to continue on our separate courses."

However the prospect of unification had reawakened team and manufacturer interest in Indianapolis, and with George suggesting that CART squads would be more than welcome to compete at the Indy 500 with IRL equipment (the 25 and eight rule having been quietly binned in 1997), CART left an appropriate gap in its 2000 calendar.

Only the Ganassi and Walker teams (the latter already running a parallel IRL squad) took up the Indy option, but other teams seconded personnel to IRL outfits as a learning exercise.

When Ganassi driver Juan Montoya dominated the race, it was hailed as a victory for CART over the IRL. But the attention Montoya received for his Indy win made CART's triumph a Pyrrhic one - emphasising that the Indy 500 still had a higher profile than the CART series, which Montoya had conquered at the first attempt in 1999.

Ganassi's influential CART engine supplier Toyota also had to watch a driver and team it had invested heavily in taking a well-publicised Indy win with Oldsmobile power.

While fans wondered if Indy might become a utopian racing 'superbowl' in which the best CART and IRL teams annually went head-to-head, the CART manufacturers began to ponder the cost of their absence from Indianapolis...

2001-2003: CART Crumbles

A remarkable turnaround took place during 2000-2001.

Even by CART's recent standards, the 2000 season had been exceptionally competitive, with an astonishing nine drivers in title contention at the penultimate round.

Yet by the end of 2001 CART was in turmoil - exemplified by long-time broadcast partner ABC/ESPN's decision to drop it because "the IRL offered better long-term growth potential".

This inversion was almost entirely due to a series of failings by CART. While it imploded, all the IRL had to do was stay afloat, avoid embarrassments, and continue welcoming CART teams to Indianapolis.

The first blow to CART's credibility had come in 1999, when its proposed winter 'Superprix' in Hawaii was cancelled at three weeks' notice - the promoter having failed to secure the staggering $10 million (USD) prize fund promised.

Other farces followed. Curious scheduling contributed to the 2000 Nazareth race being snowed off, while the 2001 Rio race was repeatedly postponed and finally abandoned due to a dispute with the city authorities, and CART's British debut at Rockingham was disrupted by water seeping through the track surface.

A combination of falling crowd figures and CART's perceived heavy-handedness led to a string of once-popular circuits being axed from the calendar during 2000-2002, with the IRL gladly snapping up the Homestead, Nazareth, Michigan and Gateway dates as CART's interest in ovals faded.

There was huge excitement over Sylvester Stallone's decision to base his movie Driven on CART - but this turned to derision when the wildly far-fetched film was panned by both critics and motorsport fans.

These blows came amid a background of falling TV audiences, sponsor departures, a decline in the quality of racing due to increasingly complicated aerodynamics, harder tyres and the return of traction control, and continued complaints within the paddock about CART's inability to promote its series to a wider audience or reunite with Indianapolis.

Craig became the first casualty of this tumultuous era when he was deposed in June 2000. Rahal took charge as a stop-gap measure before the appointment of former TV executive Joe Heitzler, who would preside over the biggest disasters yet.

First came the humiliating cancellation of CART's debut at Texas Motor Speedway just hours before the scheduled start. There had been concerns about speeds and safety at the high-banked track ever since a CART date was mooted, and these were borne out when the extraordinary g-loadings left drivers dizzy and disorientated, leading to massive practice crashes.

Cancellation was the only option given the overwhelming medical evidence, but CART's desultory preparation for the race was widely castigated.

While Texas was an embarrassment, it was CART's mishandling of the manufacturers that triggered its demise. Mercedes had already pulled out in late 2000, citing both its own poor performance and CART's poor promotion.

Then at Detroit in 2001 CART suddenly introduced a revised pop-off valve after Toyota had suggested that Honda and Ford were circumventing the rules. The latter companies were furious - especially as Toyota seemed to have been given more notice.

CART's subsequent u-turn on appeal antagonised Toyota too. The three manufacturers ultimately agreed a solution independently, further damaging CART's credibility.

Lured by Indianapolis and disillusioned with CART, Toyota had already announced that it would build IRL engines from 2003, and urged CART to adopt similar regulations if it wished to keep the company on-side.

CART did just that, but to no avail. It initially announced an 'IRL-plus' formula with fewer restrictions, before deciding to adopt identical engines to its rival, and then decreeing that IRL chassis rules would also apply after 2002.

Disgusted by the lack of direction and the short notice changes, Honda announced its departure ("we have lost our confidence and trust in CART"), with Ford strongly hinting it would follow suit.

To add further insult, Toyota suggested that if it did make engines available to CART, it would only be an afterthought to its "primary focus" in the IRL and on a low-key customer basis.

Further vacillation ensued. Ford's engine builder Cosworth suggested it could provide an IRL-style engine for 2003 and fellow specialist firm Judd agreed, the latter even attracting MG badging for the project.

But CART's latest CEO Chris Pook - who supplanted the unpopular Heitzler in late 2001 as the crisis deepened - preferred to abandon the IRL-rules plan and take up Ford's offer to supply the entire field with its current turbocharged engines, leaving John Judd to complain that his company had "been led up the garden path".

Despite initially suggesting that it would quit American racing altogether, Honda was successfully wooed by the IRL and decided to join Toyota in George's series from 2003. With the Japanese giants contributing to so many CART teams' funding, an exodus was inevitable.

Penske were first to jump ship. They had won the 2001 Indy 500 on a one-off appearance but been frustrated that US tobacco advertising rules meant primary sponsor Marlboro's logos could only be carried in one series. That problem was neatly solved by a wholesale switch to the IRL for 2002.

Ganassi added a toe-in-the-water IRL programme that year before following Penske's example. Only last minute crisis talks between CART and sponsor KOOL had kept Team Green in the fold for 2002, but later that season Michael Andretti bought the squad, switched allegiance to the IRL and publicly denounced CART's prospects.

Mo Nunn Racing followed, while Fernandez and Rahal hedged their bets by running split programmes.

Pook tried desperately to keep CART alive until new owners or manufacturers appeared. He dug deep into the series' financial reserves and managed to entice enough new teams to create a 19-car field for 2003. Hoping to align CART more closely with F1 and perhaps encourage Bernie Ecclestone to invest, Pook floated the idea of a V10 engine formula from 2005.

But the CART organisation did not last that long. Having spent an estimated $80 million supporting teams and races, it filed for bankruptcy in late 2003.

2004-2008: The War of Attrition

George saw this as an opportunity to end the split and confirm the IRL's victory. He attempted to buy CART's Cosworth engine supply and other key assets to prevent the series from continuing, but while he suggested that a few Champ Car circuits could eventually be incorporated into the IRL, he admitted that this would not be possible for 2004.

Predicting that huge lawsuits would result from cancelled races and broken contracts in this circumstance, the judge instead approved a buy-out by team owners Gerry Forsythe, Kevin Kalkhoven and Paul Gentilozzi.

There was initially huge optimism about the new regime. Despite Rahal and Fernandez quitting for the IRL (and three other teams closing during the uncertain winter), the owners managed to rustle up the required 18-car field in time for Long Beach, and later safeguarded a future engine supply by acquiring Cosworth from Ford.

But the honeymoon was brief.

The championship lacked direction: its focus wandering from city street races, to expansion into Asia, and finally to Europe - despite Kalkhoven having previously suggested that venturing into F1's backyard "would not be the smartest thing we could do."

These vacillations weren't helped by an often farcical calendar. Every year at least one race was cancelled mid-season. Champ Car's three successive failures to hold its planned Korean round became a running joke, and a subsequent attempt to run in China was prevented by a dispute with the FIA over dates.

As crowds and TV audiences dwindled further, the well-attended street circuits remained Champ Car's main strength, but were hard to sustain.

Tracks in Miami, St Petersburg, Denver, San Jose and Las Vegas all proved to be short-lived, while a planned return to Phoenix fell victim to yet another cancellation. The provisional 2008 calendar featured just four street venues, and the ovals had all been dropped by 2007.

Driver continuity was another problem. With precious few sponsors in the series, Champ Car became over-reliant on funded racers and had to constantly shuffle its line-ups.

Of the nine rookies who started the 2003 series, only Sebastien Bourdais and Ryan Hunter-Reay remained two years later. America was reduced to a token presence on the grid, and many European drivers who displayed great promise, such as Timo Glock and Ronnie Bremer, were unable to stay around long enough to become the stars they might have been in CART's heyday.

Champ Car hoped that the introduction of an extremely cost-effective new car - the Panoz DP01 - in 2007 would revitalise the series. But teams could not even raise the massively reduced budgets required for the DP01 era, and once again a 'full' 17-car field was only achieved after an eleventh hour scramble.

There was little prospect of that changing in 2008, and stalwart owners Carl Haas and Derrick Walker suggested that they would be heading for the IRL before long.

So with Champ Car seemingly on its last legs, why did George negotiate a dignified unification rather waiting for his rival to die and then scavenging his preferred teams and venues, as he had planned in 2004?

The truth was that Champ Car's myriad problems deflected attention from the less serious but still worrying issues affecting the IndyCar Series.

After an initial surge following the mass CART defections, the IRL too had suffered from small audiences (at the track and on TV) and waning sponsor interest.

The transfer of the bitter Honda/Toyota war inevitability saw an increase in IndyCar costs - one that George embraced at first.

"Our teams are going to have to step up their game," he declared. "If any team relies on prize money from Indy to fund its competition for the rest of the season, they don't have any business being in the IRL."

The days of Jim Guthrie were clearly long gone. No fewer than nine IRL outfits were squeezed out by the arrival of the CART squads in 2003, and more would follow.

By 2004, Honda had assumed a dominant position. Toyota had hinted that its IRL venture was only a stop-gap before it joined NASCAR, and its inability to beat Honda hastened its exit, the company pulling the plug on its US open-wheel programme at the end of 2005. Chevrolet quit at the same time, leaving Honda to supply the whole field.

Sponsor apathy caused CART converts and IRL veterans alike to drop out, and the car count shrank further during the winter of 2007.

IRL Indycar and mid-1990s CART began to blur into one. Road and street courses were added to the IRL calendar from 2005, and CART stalwarts Andretti-Green, Penske and Ganassi monopolised the race wins.

Fans were dismayed at both the loss of traditional venues such as Phoenix and Michigan, and an exodus of drivers towards NASCAR - including IndyCar's 2006/7 champions Sam Hornish Jr and Dario Franchitti.

But with NASCAR having assumed a position of utter pre-eminence in American motorsport, thanks in part to the open-wheel war, the drivers could not be blamed.

Meanwhile, for all its obvious problems, Champ Car still possessed a nucleus of very strong venues and a core of talented, marketable drivers and very capable teams. Not enough to create a sustainable series of its own, but perfect for filling in the IRL's gaps.

Urged by luminaries like Penske, Mario Andretti and Honda's Robert Clarke, merger talks had regularly occurred between 2004 and 2006. 'Philosophical differences' intervened each time - to the consternation of teams, drivers, fans and promoters on both sides, who were now virtually united in their desire for a merger.

By 2008 it was clear even to George and Kalkhoven that if they didn't unite soon, they would have nothing left to fight over. Finally, a breakthrough was achieved as they concluded that a negotiated merger offered so much more potential than the collapse of one series, especially now Champ Car owners had controlling interests in many of the races the IRL craved.

"There are two ways to get back to a single series. One is to let Champ Car die," RuSPORT boss Carl Russo had said back in 2004. "The other is to strengthen Champ Car, then figure out a way to bring it and the IRL back together. Keep the best shows from both and you've got something so much more powerful."

It hasn't quite worked out as Russo hoped - Champ Car was far from "strong" in its final days - but he was right that the rival series needed to appreciate each other's assets and combine them.

And while it appears the short-notice 2008 amalgam will be something of a compromise, the potential now exists for Indycar racing to be a true alliance of Champ Car and the IRL's strengths from 2009 onwards.

After 12 years of introspective and highly destructive angst, the American open wheel racing fraternity can finally look forward.

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