One Year Ago in Formula One

The United States Grand Prix was nothing special for us technically. The 2005 rules said that we needed to reinforce the construction of the tyre so it lasts the entire race, and we had several constructions made for 2005. One of them was used for the Spanish Grand Prix in Barcelona, in May, and this construction was strong, because Barcelona is a very demanding circuit; it's hard on tyres. So we had a good experience on that, and we came to Indianapolis very confident.

On Friday, in both practice sessions, we had two incidents with Toyota - one with Ralf Schumacher, at Turn 13, and one with Ricardo Zonta. At this point, we didn't quite know what happened. It is not uncommon that you have some trouble with a particular car - for example, in Turkey a couple of months later, Williams had trouble with the rear right tyre, and we found out after investigation that there was a contact, in certain circumstances, between the tyre and the body of the car.

OK, so in Indy, on Friday, we began our normal investigations on three sides: one, checking the track itself, to see if there is anything there causing the failures. For example, you may remember in Spa [in 2004] we had several failures, and we found something on one of the kerbs that contributed to tyre failures.

The second aspect we check is the car - is there anything on the car? And, three, is it particularly with the tyres?

We found out on Friday that the load on the rear left tyres in Indy was significantly higher than the maximum load we recommend for that tyre. The actual load measured on Friday on several cars was very significant, but you know, this we can always solve with internal pressure. That alone was not important. However, the speed was faster than expected as well.

Toyota had the failures, but they were not using pressure less than what we recommended, and when we checked the tyres themselves, the broken tyres, we found something we didn't like. At that point, we checked other tyres from other cars, and we found out that these were also already damaged.

So we reached the conclusion that this was not down to a problem on some specific car - even if the Toyota was a little bit harder than others - but was down to a combination of tyres and the circuit.

And so, on Friday afternoon, we reached the conclusion that the tyres we had on the premises were not capable of doing the job.

We investigated if the tyres we brought are faulty, and at the same time, so as not to waste time, we called the factory in Clermont Ferrand and told them to fly the tyres left from Barcelona, to make sure that if we found something faulty on the tyres we had, then we'd have a solution to race.

In fact, the Barcelona tyres were no longer in Clermont Ferrand - they were on a truck travelling to Spain, in preparation for the testing that was to be held there the week after. We found them somewhere in Valencia.

But it has to be said: this solution was already dependent on the FIA's approval, because it's illegal to have tyres suddenly coming in the middle of the weekend. So we just put everything together to make sure that we do everything possible for the race to happen, knowing that the final decision is the FIA's.

We obviously explained the situation to our partners, and we gathered the engineers from all our teams for two reasons: one, for them to be aware of what we found; and two, because they are smart people, so they may have an idea on how to solve this.

We had a big room at the Michelin hospitality area, in the paddock, and on Friday night we brought every one in and told them, this is what's going on. At this point, we were investigating; we did not have, at that time, the results of our technical investigation. We did not know for sure on Friday night that the tyres we had on the premises were not capable of doing the job. We just gathered all possible elements to make sure that we were in control of every possible thing.

So overnight, on Friday, we initiated all kinds of investigations, for us to know what's going on: are the tyres not conforming with what we expected of them? Or is there any other factor that could influence the incident? We had a tyre failure in Indianapolis, and we had to find out why.

What we initiated were internal tests in France around the clock - we built a team in France to make sure that those guys work 24 hours, to redo all the internal machine testing, to make sure that we know exactly how safe are the tyres that were in Indianapolis.

Second thing, since the construction is the same as the tyres from Barcelona, we ran comparison tests between those two tyres. At the same time, we shipped tyres from Indianapolis to Michelin facilities in the US to test the tyre.

At this point, there was absolutely no talk or thought that we won't be racing or anything like that. We thought, we have a technical failure and we will find a solution.

Some time on Saturday morning, we received the first results of our tests, which told us that the tyres we had in Indy are identical to the Barcelona tyres. So we knew that we had no solution.

We wanted to confirm that the pressure should bring something safer, and we did that on Saturday in practice and for qualification. So we increased significantly the pressure at a value that we were sure in normal circumstances that if the trouble was coming from overload, then the situation will be safe. We asked our partners to run a short number of laps and on higher pressure. We didn't want to take any chance.

After qualifying, we opened the tyres that have run on Saturday morning and qualifying, and we found the beginning of a damage in the tyres. So our conclusion on Saturday afternoon was, yes, our tyres are conformed to what we are looking for; yes, they are absolutely comparable to the tyres that ran in Barcelona. But, in conclusion, with the tyres we have for this circuit, we have no tyre solution to run safely on the Indianapolis track.

We began looking at the track itself - what makes it different to other places that we race on in the championship? And it was absolutely obvious that the speeds through turns 12 and 13 are extraordinary. It was the only constraint that made it different. And by that point, we knew that if we modify the speed, which is the major factor of resistance for tyres, if you modify the speed in this part of the circuit, then we will have no problem to race.

We sat down with all our technical partners, and as soon as we agreed that the tyres we had cannot race under the existing circumstances, the solution that we all agreed on was to make a chicane. I don't remember who said it first, but it was a common understanding among all of us.

We wrote a letter to the FIA on Saturday night and delivered it personally to Charlie Whiting. The letter explained to the FIA officially that technical circumstances were such that our tyres were not capable of running the race in the existing circumstances.

The solution for us was to limit the speed in turns 12 and 13 - although in the letter we didn't mention how the speed should be limited, we did not mention a chicane in the letter, only that we'd need to limit the speed. And we went to sleep for two or three hours.

On Sunday morning, I decide I had better talk to Bernie Ecclestone, to see how he evaluates the situation, since we didn't hear anything from the FIA. They didn't answer our letter.

I went to Pasquale Lattuneddu (Ecclestone's right-hand man) and said, 'where is Bernie?' He said, 'follow me'. He drove me to a room close to the track where I found everyone there: all our partners, Minardi and Jordan were there, as well as Tony George. Only Ferrari were missing. And when I went into the room, Bernie said, 'we are in shit' and I said, 'yes, sir. We have to do something'.

Flavio Briatore talked and said, 'Michelin screwed up with the tyres, fine, but that has happened, we cannot undo the past. Now what do we do about the race?'

Somebody turned to Tony George and asked, 'can you make a chicane?' and he said 'yes, of course'. He said he already asked his guys and they were ready to do it.

Somebody said 'but we need Charlie'. So Bernie sent somebody to bring Charlie in. Charlie came in and listened for 30 seconds and then said, 'I'm sorry, but I have nothing to do here - no compromise is possible'. And he left the room.

Somebody said, 'we have to talk to (FIA president) Max Mosley'. So Bernie rang Max on the phone and explained the situation to him. We understand that Max was in total disagreement.

Bernie passed the phone to Briatore, who talked to Max, saying, 'Max, look, don't think about anything - we are in a situation where we have to do something; the race has to happen'. And all we could hear was 'no, no, no' and 'no' on the other side.

Then he passed the phone to Ron Dennis who said, 'Max, we disagree on many things, but today is different. We have to agree on a solution'. We could understand that Max was adamant.

Tony George got up and left - actually, maybe naively, we thought he was going to just tell his men, go ahead and build a chicane!

So Briatore went out and brought the drivers in, to explain to them that the situation will be abnormal. And he explained to the drivers that there will be a chicane, that they will have to run differently. Rubens Barrichello (from Ferrari) also came in, and Michael Schumacher came in last.

But he said, 'look guys, you do what you have to do, it's not my business - I'm a driver, I have no personal problem with one way or another', and he left. That was fine, his was a very normal position. He just said, I'm a driver and I will drive whichever way is necessary. He didn't say anything bad, he just made the point that he's not involved.

And then, after a few words with some drivers, everybody left to prepare themselves for the race.

I went to my garage to put on my fire suit. I ran into a journalist who told me, 'OK, they are making the chicane'. I got optimistic and went to the track, to attend the start of the race. But then, when I arrive on the grid, I realised - the chicane wasn't there.

As everyone left the grid for the formation lap, I started walking away, and then I felt it. I realised, there will not be a race, with all those cars, and I couldn't feel my legs anymore. I went slowly behind the box, and I cried for a few minutes.

*   *   *

Some time afterwards, I was in the United States for the car show in Detroit. The guy who picked me at the airport brought me a report from a newspaper about a NASCAR race in Charlotte where, if my memory is good, they had six crashes in testing and then eight crashes in the race. All of them due to tyre failures. And NASCAR is NASCAR - standard tyres made once for the whole year, the cars don't change, the tracks are the same.

But one thing was different this time: the Charlotte track was resurfaced and treated with a diamond cut by the same method that was done to the track in Indianapolis.

I am convinced today that the diamond resurface of the track was the determinant factor of the Michelin tyre failure in Indianapolis. Of course, there are various parameters, but my belief is that this was the determinant one.

I am not hiding the fact that we screwed up: our evaluation of the track has been incomplete, and the tyres we had on the premises were not able to do the job. That is very clear. Our tyre was not appropriate for Indy, that's all.

But the reaction Michelin received was, we feel, more positive than negative. I've been sent to the US twice afterwards, to the Detroit and Vegas auto shows. The idea was for me to face possible reaction from the crowd, from the people.

And all the reaction I had - without exception - was 'well done for taking responsibility and for taking care of the refund'.

So my perception is that everybody understood what the situation was: everybody understands that Michelin screwed up but treated the situation with responsibility and in the best possible way under the circumstances.

But, still, people are upset because there should have been a race.

At Indy, that weekend, everybody believed that the race will be on somehow - with a trick like a chicane, or something like that. The Michelin teams said immediately that they will race not for points, not to worry about it, just make sure that the race will be on. But any suggestion that was thrown around didn't look feasible.

Someone told me afterwards that Max Mosley believed that weekend, absolutely strongly, that this was a political manoeuvre from the manufacturer-backed teams and Michelin against him personally.

So I think Mosley has been badly advised on this. Mosley didn't understand the situation. It was so obvious.

The more Bernie or Ron Dennis or Briatore talked to him, the more against he was. He was totally negative. He did not perceive the situation, did not evaluate the situation properly. He was badly informed. He's a smart person, so I am convinced that he's been badly informed and badly advised.

So yes, we screwed up. But we did the right thing, and we also offered solutions. The FIA simply did not want to help.

To this day, it defies belief that a solution was not found.

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