Ferrari's Hungarian Goulash

For Michael Schumacher, the Hungarian Grand Prix was a weekend of dropped balls and missed opportunities, and nothing any team did on Sunday was as spectacularly unfathomable as the team's decision to leave Michael Schumacher out until the bitter end on intermediate tyres. But, as you will see, it seemed like a good idea at the time...

It goes without saying that Schumacher's first mistake was to throw away the opportunity he'd been presented in the form of Fernando Alonso's qualifying penalty by collecting his own. The fact that it involved passing the Spaniard when the red flags were out was just extraordinary.

Five minutes before the fateful Saturday morning practice session, I had been pondering Alonso's penalty with Pat Symonds. Hadn't the team drummed it into Fernando that he should be ultra careful, and not give the FIA any ammunition to beat him with? No, he admitted, but perhaps they should have. It was a little bit reminiscent, I reminded him, of Schumacher passing Damon Hill on the formation lap of the 1994 British GP.

No more than 30 minutes later, we had the red flag caused by Jenson Button's engine failure, and once again Schumacher passed cars when he should not have. Afterwards both Ferrari principal Jean Todt and the German himself kept repeating the mantra 'watch the video', as if we would see Alonso hang out a sign that said something like 'Running in, please pass.'

It was all very well to spread such innuendo, but the incident was not widely seen at the time and a tape was not easy to find. Those who saw it reported that Alonso did appear to slow at the end of the lap, which appeared to support the Ferrari suggestion that Michael was 'tricked' into passing. But a red flag at any time means no passing and, most importantly, be prepared to stop.

Jean Todt and Schumacher on Saturday, after receiving news of the stewards' penalty © Reuters

There was no comparison with the Alonso yellow flag offence, where the Spaniard missed a single flag which had been out, been withdrawn, and then came out again. It was a genuine mistake of observation, while he was focusing on getting past Jarno Trulli, and he paid the price.

In contrast, Schumacher first saw a red flag as early as Turn 2. He passed them for the rest of the lap, while presumably talking to the team about what to do to the car on his arrival back at the garage, and only at Turn 13 did the incident happen. And remember, he passed both Robert Kubica and Alonso.

The Polish rookie's account made for interesting listening: "The red flag was already out for one lap. Alonso had it before corner number three; I had it before corner number two. I was closer than Michael to Alonso, and I didn't have to overtake him.

"Alonso was going at quite a consistent pace for a whole lap, Michael came quicker. He didn't pass me at first, but he was like showing me to go quicker. I was keeping for six or seven corners the same speed as Alonso, but 300 metres behind him."

Kubica certainly closed up on Fernando towards the end of the lap, but so what? Michael was obliged to stay behind both of them. And FIA sources pointed out the passing happened as Michael went round the outside of the turn, not because the others braked early into the corner and his momentum carried him past.

It was just a cock-up by a guy who was keen to get back to the pits before the temperature went out of his tyres, and might just have thought that Alonso was playing games for just that reason.

The result of it all was that Schumacher ended up in 11th position on the grid, pushed up one place from 12th by Jenson Button's penalty. In fact, it was the perfect place to be, in that he was on the cleaner racing line. More importantly, he was just outside the top 10 and yet still had total freedom on fuel strategy, while all those ahead (bar Nick Heidfeld, who had also moved up) were already locked in.

The fact that he had not progressed to Q3 meant that he had more dry tyres left to play with on race day than otherwise would have been the case. Bearing in mind the graining problems the team had experienced in practice, this was no bad thing. Everyone had hit unexpected tyre problems due to the low temperatures, and had it been dry, the race would have been something of a lottery. Ferrari was much more concerned that most.

Michael Gets his Laps in

Having that freedom with the fuel conferred one big advantage. If you can put in as much as you want, you have the freedom to use up some of it by doing extra warm-up laps between 1:30pm and 1:45pm, by ducking through the pitlane. Those who need to conserve every drop have no option but to go straight to the grid.

Schumacher had a blinding start, moving from 11th to 4th on the first lap © LAT

Usually it's not such a big deal, and we see only a handful of cars getting in an extra lap, but bear in mind that most drivers had virtually no wet weather running experience in Hungary (there has only been the odd damp Friday morning session). Any extra laps before the start could thus be very valuable, allowing a driver to properly assess the conditions, and find out where the worst puddles are.

So at 1:30pm I stood opposite the Ferrari pits to see what Michael would do, and it was as intriguing as I had expected. He left the pits on extreme wet tyres, did a lap, drove through the pitlane, did another lap, and came back in. He switched to intermediates, and repeated the schedule. He then switched to another set of intermediates and drove to the grid. He had thus done five laps, four more than most of his rivals. And he had scrubbed a set of intermediates that he could use later in the race.

In contrast, teammate Felipe Massa, locked into a light fuel load, did but a single lap - and even managed to spin on it. Little wonder that he had rather less confidence than Schumacher come the start...

Michael wasn't the only driver to run multiple laps, and even some of the top 10 qualifiers could see the value of it. Both Toyota drivers sacrificed a lap of race fuel by doing an extra lap, switching from Bridgestone extreme wets to inters, but they had run relatively heavy in qualifying and thus had some to spare. Others did not, and as far as I could see, Alonso did only one lap. This was despite him having complete freedom with his fuel load. So did he go to grid with a full tank and did not want to waste any? Quite possibly.

Armed with the knowledge of Schumacher's practice laps, I suggested to sceptical colleagues that we could expect a 'Senna at Donington'-style first lap from the Ferrari driver, who was clearly better prepared than anyone else. The rider was I didn't necessarily mean he'd fare best over the longer term...

Michael didn't let me down. I was watching his car on the grid, and he didn't get off the line particularly well, so all the work was done under braking at Turn 1 and ducking and diving round the rest of the lap. He passed Heidfeld, Kubica, Trulli, Giancarlo Fisichella, Ralf Schumacher, Mark Webber and Massa to finish the lap in fourth. It was an awesome performance, but unlike Ayrton's, it was not perfectly captured for posterity by the TV cameras, since the director didn't know which way to look.

But hold on, didn't Alonso do at least as well, I hear you say? He certainly did. The world champion gained a spot with Klien starting from the pitlane, and from what had become 14th he moved to sixth, having actually passed one more car than Schumacher. So his too was an amazing lap, especially taking into account that he hadn't enjoyed Michael's extensive reconnaissance of the conditions.

But the key point is, Michael was on tyres that were all but hopeless in the very wet conditions at the start. Just look at the following:

Main Bridgestone runners on first lap:

M.Schumacher:  11 to  4  (+7)
Massa:          2 to  7  (-5)
Webber:         5 to 17 (-12)
R Schumacher:   6 to 12  (-6)
Trulli:         8 to 14  (-6)

In other words, a combination of his extra preparation and his own sheer genius overcame the shortcomings of the equipment. But after the first lap, he was suddenly human again - even he could do nothing about the crushing superiority of the Michelin intermediates in the wettest conditions.

It must have been galling for him to slide down the order again and see the gap to the leader increase by the lap. He was miles off Kimi Raikkonen's pace; the margin was 4.5 seconds at the end of lap 1 and had grown to 32.4 seconds by lap 16, just before the Finn pitted.

Schumacher clipped his front wing to the back of Renault's Giancarlo Fisichella © Reuters

But compare again with Massa in an identical package. As early as lap 11, the Brazilian was as much as 50.5 seconds behind Raikkonen. The next lap he came into the pits, and bearing in mind he qualified second, that must have been pretty much on schedule, so he was much, much lighter than Schumacher. And still he was miles slower.

In a move that smacked of desperation, and with more rain falling, Massa put extreme wet tyres on (uniquely, Rubens Barrichello had started on extreme Michelins, and got rid of them on lap 5).

In fact, Felipe then started putting in times that pretty well matched what Michael had been doing on intermediates. Considering that he clearly wasn't driving with the same degree of confidence as his teammate, the logical conclusion is that Schumacher might well have done better overall had he gone for extreme wets at the start. As noted earlier, he did give them a go just before going to the grid, and rejected them.

Thou Shalt Not Pass

Schumacher had other problems to consider. On lap 17, he made a silly mistake when Fisichella passed him on the exit of Turn 1. Having twice touched with the Italian exiting the last corner, Michael seemed to get in a bit of a wobble, and instantly wiped his wing off on Fisichella's rear wheel after the Italian was clearly through.

It was all great entertainment and a reflection of the feisty nature that makes Schumacher the champion he is, but very unnecessary on a day when it was already clear that damage limitation - literally - was the most sensible approach.

He lost time coming back to the pits with the wing falling off, but at least he was in the stop window, although he still had a lot of fuel on board, and thus could have gone a lot further.

He took on fresh tyres (the set of intermediates he had scrubbed before the start), and a new nose. Incredibly, Ferrari did the whole job in a little more than a second longer than it had taken McLaren to do their normal pitstops just before.

After resuming, Schumacher was a whopping 67 seconds off new leader Alonso, who hadn't stopped yet. That gap continued to extend until lap 24, when for the second time in the race Michael was passed by the Spaniard.

You could almost see the body language in the car as he desperately resisted the urge to make life difficult for Fernando; just after the Renault went by, a 'Blue flags waved for car number 5' message came up on the screen, which guaranteed that had he tried to hold up Fernando any longer, a drive through penalty would have resulted. And that would have been really embarrassing...

Schumacher was able to unlap himself thanks to the safety car © XPB/LAT

Luck fell Michael's way when the Raikkonen shunt brought out the safety car. He was still not too far behind Alonso, so when the leader pitted, Michael got his lap back. On lap 27, with the safety car out, he was officially timed at being 2 minutes and 13.8 seconds behind Fernando, and yet they were on the same lap! In convoy with immediate rivals Heidfeld and Coulthard, he eventually caught the pack up.

He was at the very back of the queue for the restart, and yet was only 9.5 seconds behind leader Alonso as they swept across the line for the restart. Now seventh overall, he was well placed to make up some ground, but he blew it with a spin at Turn 2. At the end of that flying lap, Schumacher was 5 seconds off Heidfeld and Coulthard, having been ready to pounce on them at the restart.

The Tide Turns for Bridgestone

The tide turned for Schumacher and Ferrari as the track began to dry and the Bridgestone intermediate became the tyre of the moment.

On lap 38, Schumacher set a faster time than Alonso. He then lost some time behind Heidfeld - they made contact at one point - before finding a clear track and getting going again. He was soon clearly the fastest man on the track, taking huge chunks of time out of Alonso and of course everyone in between. By lap 46, when he came in for his second stop, he was fifth.

He had run 29 laps since the first stop, which had been premature because of the damaged nose. He now made the interesting call to leave the same set of steaming inters on the car, something that Button did on the same lap (and his Michelins by coincidence had also done 29 laps). He also took on enough fuel to get him to the flag, now 26 laps away.

These days, a set of used, hot intermediate tyres is acknowledged as a very good compromise when the transition to dry tyres is not far away, and it worked very well for both Schumacher and Button.

Indeed, Michael did his fastest lap on lap 57, by which time the track was dry. But the fact that it was his personal fastest lap was a distracting irrelevance. Others had already long gone to dries, and they were seconds faster than the Ferrari driver on his old inters.

At this point, Alonso was out, and Schumacher was second, with only Button ahead. But the Briton had just slipped in an extra pitstop to go from inters to dries on lap 54, just eight laps after the stop where he'd kept his old inters on. We waited for Schumacher to do the same. And waited, and waited...

If we take a snapshot on lap 58, the lap after his fastest and therefore a watershed of sorts, here's how things stacked up:

Race order, lap 58:

1. Button               1:25.4
2. Michael     (-16.1)  1:28.1
3. de la Rosa  (-24.7)  1:27.1
4. Heidfeld    (-36.4)  1:26.6
5. Barrichello (-40.9)  1:29.3
6. Coulthard   (-83.3)  1:29.7

Around this time, Schumacher actually wanted to come in for dries. Staying out was a pit decision, and not a driver decision. So why was it made?

Now imagine that you are in Ferrari technical director Ross Brawn's seat on the pit wall. There are 12 laps to go, and your man is 8 seconds ahead of the guy in third, 20 seconds ahead of the guy in fourth, and 24 seconds ahead of the guy in fifth.

Schumacher made his first pitstop earlier than planned, on lap 29 of the Hungarian GP © LAT

If you stay out, the worst you can probably do is drop to fifth as three cars catch and pass you, because Coulthard is about to be lapped and is out of the picture. But there's a chance that one or two of them won't catch - or at least pass - you, so maybe you can still salvage a third or a fourth.

At this point, all the timings suggest that if you stop next lap for dries, you will probably drop around fifth, either just in front of or just behind Barrichello.

But there was a further factor at play here. After the problems with graining on Friday, Brawn was extremely wary of going to dry tyres on what was now a totally green and very cold track.

In essence, he thought that they would at best be only marginally faster than the old inters, which by now were almost slicks. He thought that if Michael stopped, his lap times would be such that even beating Rubens would be a stretch. With the number he had in hand, it just wasn't worth making a stop.

But was he right to be so cautious? The top Michelin runners had been flying on dries for five or six laps, but it was dangerous to use that as a reference. What about the Toyota guys? Ralf Schumacher and Jarno Trulli had been on Bridgestone dries even longer, and they were now dipping a couple of seconds below Schumacher's times. The problem was that their dries were of a different type to Ferrari's, and again they were not necessarily an accurate reference point.

The answer was close at hand. Team insiders now concede they were way too slow to bring Felipe Massa in, stick him on dries, and see what happened. He was the perfect in-house guinea pig, and since he was out of the points and a lap down in ninth, there was little to be gained by letting him run round to the flag on inters, even ones that were a lot younger than Michael's, having been fitted on lap 41.

Massa came in at the end of lap 60 (actually his own 59th), a full 10 laps after Barrichello went to dries, and nine after Alonso and de la Rosa. His first flying lap was already 2 seconds quicker than Schumacher managed on the same lap.

Soon the Brazilian was setting purple sectors, meaning he was the fastest man on the track all race, and on lap 65, he set what turned out to be the fastest lap. It was all too obvious to Brawn and co that a switch to dries would have been a blinder.

All of that was too late for Schumacher, of course, and by now Ferrari were utterly committed to keeping him out. By lap 62, just four laps after our earlier snapshot, Pedro de la Rosa was right on the German's tail, having honed in at as much as 3 seconds in a single lap. Everybody on dry tyres was getting quicker and quicker, and Schumacher's times had dropped off because his inters were shot.

Thou Shalt Not Pass... Part Two

Schumacher battles with McLaren's Pedro de la Rosa for second place © XPB/LAT

It was now that the team as a collective unit made another mistake. With a full eight laps to go, and a 3 seconds discrepancy in their lap times, Schumacher had absolutely no chance of dealing with de la Rosa.

The most logical course was to let the Spaniard by with the minimum of fuss, concentrate on lapping as quickly and smoothly as possible within the limits of those tyres, and focus entirely on being prepared for the arrival of Nick Heidfeld - who was still some 12 seconds down. At the current rate of approach, he would be with Michael with a couple of laps to go, and it might just be possible to hold him off and save third.

But Schumacher had other plans, and as we all saw, decided to fight his ground. It was great stuff to watch, and a classic piece of motor racing action. It was also an utterly useless, futile effort when you're in a championship fight and your rival has retired. A racer to the core himself, Brawn's big mistake was to not have the heart to tell his man to give up and cede position, something he's probably not had to do too often since they first got together in 1991...

Michael held Pedro off for three whole laps, on one occasion jumping the chicane but not giving up his place. McLaren team manager Dave Ryan got straight on the radio to race control, registering his displeasure at Schumacher gaining an unfair advantage.

Charlie Whiting had a quick look at a replay, and decided that it was marginal. As such, it wouldn't require a call to Ferrari to ask him to drop back, the usual answer in such situations. But on the very next lap, de la Rosa got past anyway, as Schumacher made a second trip across the infield.

So at the end of that lap 66, Schumacher was third and already 3 seconds down on de la Rosa by the time he'd got back on the track. And right in his mirrors now was Nick Heidfeld.

The bottom line was that the BMW was there two or three laps earlier than if Michael had let Pedro go and focussed on his own pace, rather than launching a ragged defence. In total, the Ferrari man had lost at least a priceless 6 seconds during the fight with de la Rosa, and that had not been factored into Brawn's sums when a pitstop was considered.

Now Schumacher was in exactly the same situation with Heidfeld, four laps to go, and from nowhere Barrichello was closing in fast. Once again he refused to concede, and no 'let him go' message came from the pits.

Nick Heidfeld took third place from Schumacher, and led to the German's retirement © XPB/LAT

When Heidfeld eventually snuck past, Michael left as little room as possible. And just as with Fisichella, he needlessly clipped the back of the BMW Sauber. This time a track rod was broken, and in an instant, his race was over. He trailed back to the pits to retire.

Even staying out on those intermediates, he might just have held Heidfeld off for third, had he not messed around with de la Rosa. He would certainly have kept Rubens out of fourth, assuming again he didn't waste too much time with Nick.

But Schumacher's own irrepressible nature, and the pit wall's reluctance to rein him in, cost the German and his team dear. Fourth would have been five points - four more points than he got eventually. World championships have been won and lost by a lot less.

But what if he had changed tyres? Although his dries did begin to grain after seven or eight laps, much later than expected, Massa set some awesome lap times. In fact, when Schumacher was messing about with de la Rosa, his Brazilian teammate was at times a full 6-7 seconds a lap quicker!

And last Sunday, Massa was not in Schumacher's league. A fully inspired, podium-chasing Schumacher would have been even faster on dries, and would surely have been capable of making the most of them earlier than Massa, when the track was still a little damp.

Imagine a stop around the time of our snapshot, with no fuel needed, and with 12 laps to go. Schumacher would certainly have been able to deal with Barrichello and Heidfeld. It was going to be tough to stop and re-catch de la Rosa, never mind pass him in the last couple of laps, but he might not have been too far away from stealing second.

Since we're talking about a few seconds here and there, it would be wrong to overlook earlier mistakes that proved costly later on. Schumacher spun after the safety car, and of course that he crunched his nose on Fisichella before that. This not only cost time on that lap, but also brought him into the pits way earlier than expected. It meant that when he finally retired, those worn out intermediate tyres had done an astonishing 50 laps. That he was able to fight so hard with anyone is pretty impressive.

Had he pitted on schedule, they would have been in that much better condition in the closing laps, and so on. Consider those other delays, and it doesn't take much imagination to realise that, despite Bridgestone's struggle in the wet, despite being lapped by the leader at one point, had he played things just a touch differently, Schumacher could have easily finished second. Even if Button would have, in all likelihood, stayed out of reach.

What Could the Team have Done Better?

Schumacher on the Ferrari pit wall © XPB/LAT

If Ferrari compile a list of lessons learned from this race, it must contain these three major items:

1) We should have used Massa as a guinea pig a lot earlier to test the dry tyres while they were still a real option for Schumacher;

2) We should not have so rigidly doubted the potential of the dries, despite the negative assumptions after practice;

3) We should have told Michael not to fight for position.

And that last one is probably the most difficult of all to take on board.

One final point. After Schumacher's imminent retirement was obvious, there was still plenty of time for Ferrari to get on the radio to Massa and tell him to park the car. That would have left Schumacher eighth and Massa ninth (no one else could have caught the Brazilian), instead of the other way round.

And it would ultimately have given the German seventh - and a valuable extra point when Kubica was disqualified. Of course, the team would be getting into dangerous territory, because voluntarily retiring a healthy car is frowned upon by the FIA. But not if you don't make it too obvious, of course.

I can only presume that good sportsmanship is why Ferrari didn't stop Massa. I'd hate to think that they just never thought of doing it...