The F1 path from running Caterham to rehabilitating Renault

While Cyril Abiteboul is a regular character in motorsport news pages by dint of his position at the head of one of Formula 1's grandee teams - albeit one struggling to regain past glories - somehow six years have elapsed since F1 Racing sat down for a one-to-one interview
 with him. Then he was team principal of Caterham; now he's in charge of superintending Renault's return to championship glory.

That means he's a busy man, but Cyril has found a one-hour window for us between meetings, and we convene at his hotel, the Monte Carlo Bay, where the Blue Gin Bar is conveniently empty at this time of day - the sun not yet being past the yard arm...

F1 Racing: You were very much below the radar in F1 before you became the team principal at Caterham in 2012. What happened before then - what got you interested in motor racing, and how did you get your break?

Cyril Abiteboul: I was born and did most of my education in Paris. It was a good life, a good childhood. My parents were engineers in French industry. I was born and raised as, "You will be an engineer, my son. You will work in French industry."

My dad was very keen on cars. Myself, I loved cars, speed, anything that's fast. From a push bike to whatever. As soon as I could stand on my own two feet I was trying to go as fast as possible. I loved sports. I loved competition.

I went into an engineering school in Grenoble, and basically in the last year of school you can graduate and share your time between the school and a company. By pure coincidence I was offered an opportunity in Renault's e-business activity. Renault the car company [rather than the F1 team] was starting to think the internet would become an important thing for changing the business - from procurement to engineering to sales to employment, and also engagement.

It happens the year was 2001, one of the many milestones of Renault's journey in Formula 1 [when it bought the Benetton team]. That's how I first got in contact with F1. I was asked to put together a report for the Grand Prix Manufacturers' Association [an alliance of car manufacturers plotting a breakaway series] to show how digital rights were at the time completely non-existent, under-exploited.

There was a feeling that maybe the manufacturers' part of GPMA could form an alliance and exploit a different type of rights that was here to be seized. I looked in particular at the benchmark of NBA, NHA and NFL, and the way they were already far in advance in terms of digital rights management, and tried to establish some parallel. The report went fairly high into the Renault F1 organisation, up to two, three key persons at the time: the head of sales and marketing, the head of finance, and Flavio Briatore.

I was offered a position at Renault [cars] but there was still dialogue with F1. On a regular basis I was helping them on different activities. For instance, we were the first team to stream live timing data on the internet. That was me. We were the first team to have an online store - and that was me. Those two things are obvious today, but back in 2002 or '03 I can tell you it wasn't something that was obvious...

F1R: Around that time Renault was very proactive in terms of its PR and engagement, so was that an influence on you and something you took on as you rose through the organisation?

CA: I've been extremely lucky to be able to work with people with very progressive ideas. Patrizia Spinelli, at the time in charge of PR, was also the first one to connect the world of F1 and the world of fashion. But there were also other people who were really very impressive. The head of finance at the time trained me and set up GP2 with Bruno Michel. Bruno is also someone I learned from and worked with in the set-up of GP2, in the Renault Driver Development programme. So, yeah, very progressive people. I feel extremely lucky and privileged to have had that opportunity.

F1R: How did you get involved with all these different parts of the business and GP2?

CA: Flavio was very active in that area, because it was his style. But Flavio being Flavio he wasn't always on top of all the details and he needed someone who knew all the details and would be able to be across all the departments. I would be going with Flavio to all of the meetings, not just to carry the documents but also to try and carry the knowledge and common sense [laughs], which was always difficult.

Plus, at the time [2007] Renault was very lean, and actually some people I've mentioned had gone, so I was in charge of finance, of legal, of sponsorship acquisition, of driver contracts. I was responsible for all of that, because I was trusted by Flavio and by Renault corporate. Most of my life has been in trying to establish that confidence, that mutual understanding, and respect, between the racing world and the corporate world.

F1R: That phase of Renault's involvement in F1 came to an end quickly - you had the double whammy of the global financial slowdown and 'Crashgate' [the 2008 Singapore GP controversy when the team ordered Nelson Piquet Jr to cause a safety car]. What was it like being part of the organisation at that time, when you went from being a winning team to one up for sale?

CA: The thing you haven't mentioned, which also rushed the decision and the sale, is that results were not there. We had excellence in 2005 and '06, but there was a clear watershed and turnaround when we switched from Michelin to Bridgestone [tyres]. Clearly most of the competitiveness we had in 2005 and '06 were Fernando [Alonso], Michelin and a strong aerodynamic understanding.

So, high costs, lack of results, the financial crisis, and indeed a reputational crisis with Crashgate - it was a hell of a rollercoaster, pure crisis management or mitigation. I was in charge of the internal investigation with the group of lawyers defending Renault in Crashgate. It wasn't something I desired to be exposed to. But being given the opportunity to live this type of situation gets you to grow up.

I think, on balance, Gerard Lopez and the group of investors around him were the best candidates, and I'm not ashamed of the decision taken at the time, which in hindsight allowed the company to continue to operate as a going concern. In my opinion we found a better way forward than BMW, Toyota, Honda, who decided to stop their operations.

F1R: And you stayed as part of Renault rather than the Lotus side from there on?

CA: No. Gerard offered me a position, which I accepted, because the first agreement with Gerard was that he took 75% of the business and Renault kept 25%. My position would allow me to do some business with Gerard on the rest of his activities, and still do some business for the F1 team.

The following summer the team, which was still called Renault at the time but majority-controlled and operated by Gerard and Genii Capital, was already struggling financially. The opportunity came up of doing a deal with Lotus. But it was clear that Renault would not be able to remain a minority shareholder in a team that was not called Renault any more.

Splitting my time between Gerard, the F1 team and a bit of Renault was untenable. So, I decided to take the opportunity to come back and look after the relationship with Red Bull - which was on the way up - because at the time we were doing a lot with Red Bull, a lot of sponsors, having a very integrated technical collaboration.

F1R: This would be the end of 2010, the beginning of 2011, when Red Bull was unbeatable?

CA: Exactly, it was really the period of honeymoon between Red Bull and Renault - lots of success on track, lots of technical exchanges going on. But it was not just that - let's not forget that we also brought to Red Bull lots of sponsors: Total, Pepe Jeans, Infiniti. So all of that is what I was responsible for. Bringing value to Red Bull, not just technology but also sponsorship and commercial equity to the team.

F1R: How were you persuaded to leave Renault and join Lotus/Caterham?

CA: Two things: I'd already been head-hunted by another Formula 1 team, and I wasn't clicking with the management at Renault at the time.

F1R: A particular person?

CA: If you really want to connect the dots you'll be able to look at the different presidents we had at the head of Renault F1. [The timeline suggests it is Jean-Michel Jalinier, who took over from Bernard Rey at the beginning of 2012] It was just not clicking at a personal level. So I decided to get on the move.

I had a team principal proposition from one team, which I will not name, and another one. Carlos Tavares [then chief operating officer of Renault] said 'no go' to that first option, and there was this second one with Tony Fernandes at Caterham. In addition to the F1 team, Caterham had formed a joint venture with Renault for Alpine, and Carlos Tavares felt it was positive for the joint venture to have a former Renault boy into Caterham. Not that I would spy or influence, but at least
 I would put a bit of goodwill into the relationship.

F1R: What went wrong there? Was it that the Caterham road car business was never going to have the volume to justify an F1 entry?

CA: I don't want to be negative on Tony or Caterham, it's not my style. Basically Tony tried to do something with Caterham F1 and the road car business which he did with Air Asia - which worked there because with an airline you don't build planes, you operate them. You rent them [from a leasing company] at a viable cost for your income, and it's all about marketing and branding. Tony is fantastic at that.

The problem with the road car industry and motor racing is that it's cash-intensive - and you have to put the cash up front, invest in people, facilities, infrastructure, technology, skills. You need to be stable and committed, and maybe after a few years it yields dividends.

In F1, you have to keep racing because if you stop, you lose the prize money. Every Monday we had a meeting to look at the cashflow and pay the most critical suppliers just to go racing. That was a very difficult and challenging situation. 
At the end we were short of cash and short of time to find a buyer. Quite frankly there weren't many serious buyers and Bernie [Ecclestone] pushed for Colin Kolles - but even Colin, who is very good at managing lean operations, did just a few races after I left.

F1R: How long had you been talking to Renault before you returned there?

CA: Actually it was very quick. You remember I said I decided to move on from Renault because I didn't click with someone in the organisation? Actually I was not the only person to have this, a number of other people were in the same situation.

Jerome Stoll made the decision to change the top management of the F1 activity and he offered me the opportunity to come back and look at restructuring it. The engine was bad, the relationship with Red Bull was very bad. I accepted, but only if we managed to find a buyer for Caterham.

F1R: What delayed Renault's return as a manufacturer? Was it because [Renault CEO] Carlos Ghosn and Bernie Ecclestone kept telling each other to go away and sharpen their pencils? From the outside it looked like two stags having a face-off in the park near our Richmond office...

CA: There are still some secrets which need to be kept but your description is very good. What's fair to say is that when the decision was announced in December 2015, the decision had been taken 24 hours earlier.

We had a number of conditions. The first was very clear. We knew in summer 2015 that we had two options - completely walk away from F1 or return as a team. Our analysis was clear that staying as we were, with no control or influence over the choices of the team or our image, wasn't working.

We made a proposal to Red Bull to restructure our collaboration and build a proper Red Bull-Renault team with a different way of putting our financial resources together. But that was clearly not what Red Bull wanted - they wanted to focus all their resources on the chassis to have dominance on that. If you look at Mercedes that's absolutely not how they've built their domination.

Mercedes made different choices, being fully integrated, and being capable of directing resources in accordance with necessity. At the time if you had the best engine you would be winning races.

That's what we should have done - we should have been able to have a model with Red Bull that could have allowed us to put maximum financial resources, whether they came from Red Bull or Renault, into the engine, because it was a key performance differentiator. That proposition was rejected and it was very clear we could not remain as an engine supplier on that basis - or even as a partner.

There was an appetite to stay in F1 because of our legacy in the sport, and the social responsibility in France because of our engine factory. Carlos Ghosn set very clear conditions and I had to tick those boxes.

F1R: Where did it begin to go wrong between Renault and Red Bull? The beginning of 2014, or even before that?

CA: For once I need to distance myself a little bit, because as I mentioned before I had some reasons for leaving Renault [in 2012]. Among those were that I could see things weren't going in the right direction, we weren't investing at the right level, and we weren't quick enough to recruit the right people. We were so focused on the final stint of the V8, because it all got very complicated with the exhaust blowing, that we weren't working on the future. And that was a major mistake.

So, yes, at the beginning of 2014 there was problem after problem. I was a customer at the time so I can tell you from the receiving end that Renault was massively behind in terms of understanding the whole concept and executing the product. Red Bull had become used to the success and the prize money and it came to a stop.

But criticism in the media doesn't solve the problem. The problem was massive under-investment in technology and people, all the way back to the frozen-engine period of 2007. Sorry to come back so far, but that's the reality. Flavio wanted to shut down Viry [Renault's F1 engine HQ] completely, and he sent me to speak to another team to see if we could buy an engine from them.

Mercedes at the time was diversifying, picking up additional work, researching technology that would one day become relevant in F1, and lobbying for regulation with what would be compatible with that work. Very smart, very clever. What we see today is the result of decisions Mercedes made in 2007.

To a degree I can understand the frustration of Red Bull.
 But it got to a point where it's not just criticism of the product but criticism of the brand, and that for us was a red line.

F1R: In terms of where Renault F1 is now and those conditions Carlos Ghosn set - winning in a five-year timeframe, at a reasonable cost. Has it been more difficult than expected?

CA: We set out to spend 15% less than Mercedes, but that was 2015 Mercedes. If you look at what they're spending now we're more like 30-40% down. That is what's been underestimated. Time: we said five years starting in 2015, and it's an easy excuse, but we weren't assuming the decision would be made in December 2015. In summer we could have built a new car for 2016 and that didn't happen. We had to use an old car.

So I think it's not stupid to say it's become a six-year plan, and that puts you into 2021 to be able to fight for championships. I continue to stand by that roadmap, but I have to accept the intermediate milestones were tougher than I was expecting.

* Our thanks to the Monte Carlo Bay Hotel, Monaco.