How F1 created its qualifying shambles

It proved to be an extraordinary fortnight in a global championship in which even the most bizarre comments seldom raise little more than quizzical eyebrows or nervous coughs.

The period began with Formula 1 CEO Bernie Ecclestone trashing his product in a newspaper interview, and ended with the FIA's World Motor Sport Council - F1's supreme body - issuing a media release containing words like "principles" and "should".

Not "will", or "must", but that vaguest of vague terms - "should", as in: "The [WMSC] approved the new qualification format, the principles of which were unanimously accepted by the F1 Commission. The [revised qualifying] system should be introduced for the first round of the 2016 FIA Formula One World Championship". (Italics added)

Taking that literally, only the "principles" of the format were approved. So the system would only be instituted after the fine print has been put to a further vote, which would most likely be via e-vote, this decade's replacement for what had become known as a fax-vote.

That the first race was then just two weeks away - with Friday's FP1 nine days hence as this is written - seems not have perturbed the august body. The net effect is that cars and kit are being crated for Australia, yet not a soul knows for certain which qualifying procedure - the tried and trusted or the new, unproven elimination concept - will prevail, with the detail, within which the devil invariably lurks, still to be sorted.

Using a mix of analysis, research, off-record conversations, gossip, plain supposition and old-fashioned assumption this writer set about unravelling said fiasco, which made F1 the laughing stock of the sporting world. Worse, team bosses, whose businesses ultimately bear the wrath of fans through dwindling eyeballs - which generate the largest share of F1's revenues - shrug the affair aside as though it were a massive joke.

Tellingly, it was left to the likes of Mercedes CEO Dieter Zetsche (pictured) to haul Ecclestone over the coals for his comments, and then only after questions were put to him during an unrelated passenger car launch. This in turn begs the question: are the relationships between team bosses and F1's executives founded on fear, or why else do grown men and women so readily defend the indefensible?

It seems the latest saga had its roots in plans floated late last year to scrap the current qualifying procedure, with grid positions instead decided by the results of a one-hour sprint race held in place of the traditional white-knuckle hour. That grid would, in turn, be decided by the outcome of Saturday morning's practice three. Friday's first and second practice sessions would therefore constitute the weekend's only pure practice sessions.

During an impromptu chat at the Race of Champions last November, a team boss suggested that such a revamp was under consideration, but admitted at the time that it "still needs a fair amount of fine-tuning". Another source subsequently confirmed that one-hour sprint races to decide Sunday grids had variously been discussed during Strategy Group meetings.

Indeed, the matter was touched upon during an early January Strategy Group sitting, with one team boss confiding that the overall consensus was along the lines of: "Bernie, we the teams will do what we're told to do. It should not be up to us to vote on qualifying, you should talk to your customers such as TV broadcasters and race promoters to see how they feel about any changes."

It seems Ecclestone did precisely that, but only after granting said interview to the Daily Mail, in which the 85-year-old said "Formula 1 is the worst it has ever been. I wouldn't spend my money to take my family to watch a race. No way," before blaming Mercedes and Lewis Hamilton for their current qualifying and race hegemony, and, by extension, dwindling ratings.

To quote Zetsche, most folk "don't understand how someone who is not only the CEO, but [also] the partial owner of [F1] talks that way about this..."

It seems, though, there was at least some method to Ecclestone's apparent madness, for his comments were made in the run up to February's Strategy Group meeting, where the concept of the sprint race was again tabled.

Convinced it would be voted through, Ecclestone had seemingly voiced his opinion in the belief that post-meeting he could say: "I said 'F1 is the worst it's ever been', but we fixed the predictability issue by changing qualifying..."

Except that when he bounced the concept off TV broadcasters prior to the Strategy Group session they slated it on the basis that the gaps between Q1/2/3 generate the majority of advertising revenues, and changes to that format would see them lose heavily. A one-hour sprint race would clearly fail to deliver the same commercial windows.

Channel 4's business model is, for example, predicated upon commercially-loaded qualifying sessions to enable races to be broadcast ad-free. Indeed, a TV source suggested at least one broadcaster threatened to rip up its contract should traditional qualifying be substituted by a sprint race.

While certain race promoters with experience of similar formats in GP2/3 (and A1GP), were in favour of the concept on the basis of its punter potential, others pointed to the risks of potentially losing a star from Sunday's feature race through injury or damage incurred during the sprint race. Hence the thumbs-downs from various quarters.

The matter therefore received short shrift at Strategy Group level, and in the subsequent Formula 1 Commission meeting - at which all teams and various race promoters were present. This potentially left Ecclestone with egg on his face, for, if nothing changed going forward, F1 would clearly remain "the worst it's ever been".

Hence a hurried proposal to introduce knockout qualifying, a format that had previously been considered but rejected on account of losing the nailbiting 'sudden death' factor in the final stages. Still, scrambled eggs are tastier than raw eggs went the logic, and the Strategy Group and F1 Commission voted through this fallback proposal - one that had previously been rejected.

Only then did Formula One Management's computer boffins get to hear about it, and allegedly stated they needed three months to recode FOM's programmes - something any capable hacker should be able to do in a couple of nights. Indeed, there exist gnawing suspicions that the reason for suggesting the delay was to buy time in the hope that fans would forget the entire fiasco.

No such luck: a meeting of sporting directors was convened by F1 race director Charlie Whiting last Wednesday, the day after the combined Strategy Group/F1 Commission summit. In an inexplicable twist a 'hybrid' knockout qualifying system was proposed, with Q1/2 running to the new procedure and Q3 sticking to the old 'sudden death' format. Talk about getting into a muddle.

Subsequent tweets from every direction added to the confusion, particularly as certain team bosses (and FIA officials) were not even aware of the 'revision'. However, F1 seemed to have been taken in by the hybrid Q1/2 knockout system, and seemed resigned to running under what was by now the third procedure in a week. Indeed, at Barcelona Sebastian Vettel spoke out against "the chaos and confusion", and Fernando Alonso called it "sad".

In the interim Fiat CEO/Ferrari president Sergio Marchionne - who sits on the WMSC as (all) team representative - came out against any changes to qualifying, in the process taking a sideswipe at Ecclestone. "We need more discussions about the new qualifying format," Marchionne said during the Geneva Motor Show. "We must be careful not to upset the system. I'm not sure Ferrari can accept Bernie's ideas."

Yet Ferrari's delegate on the Strategy Group (and F1 Commission), team boss Maurizio Arrivabene, is said to have favoured the original knockout concept - and legal-eagle Marchionne surely knows that votes cannot be changed retrospectively. That said, the hybrid concept had not followed due process, so there was no way that could be adopted without being put to the vote.

A WMSC meeting had long been scheduled for March 4, but, bizarrely, a source with knowledge of such agendas was adamant that no F1 matters were listed - despite the end of February being the cut-off date for regulation changes for subsequent years, and with the championship set to adopt revised aero and tyre regulations in 2017, these 'should' (that word) have been ratified by the WMSC during the latest meeting.

However, prior to flying off to attend the previous week's Strategy Group/F1 Commission summit, during which the aero proposals were accepted "in principle" (that phrase) ahead of WMSC ratification, a team boss suggested that a two-month delay in finalising the regulations changes would be requested, and most likely be granted.

This extraordinary step proves yet again how muddled is F1's governance procedure - all was said to have been sorted in December last year, then suddenly there were doubts about Pirelli's tyres being able to handle the stresses - and it beggars belief that a series in which split seconds are decisive should constantly request more time and shift what should (!) be inviolate dates.

Back, though, to the WMSC: while the meeting was in progress news leaked out that the original knock-out qualifying format had been approved. F1 had rewound two weeks - yet, all was still not what it seemed, as the wording of the subsequent press release, littered with its caveats made clear.

The absolute irony is that F1's qualifying format was not broken in the first place - indeed, the fact Channel 4 identified that specific hour as its weekend revenue spinner points to the expected eyeballs. As the foregoing proves, the only thing that is broken, is F1's governance system.

HOW DOES F1'S 'BROKEN' GOVERNANCE PROCESS WORK?

The current governance process was introduced in 2013, and runs to 2020. Devised by Formula One Management at a time when CVC Capital Partners, the investment fund that controls F1's commercial rights for the foreseeable future, planned its (aborted) flotation on Singapore's stock exchange, it has come back to bite F1 on a regular basis.

As a sop to markets, in place of what had become known as the Concorde Agreement - the document that between 1982 and 2012 outlined the procedural, technical and sporting obligations of the governing body, the teams and commercial interests - CVC subsidiary FOM entered into a series of bilateral agreements with the teams, four of whom are, in the best traditions of George Orwell, treated more equally than others.

The sport's governing body, the FIA, holds a separate agreement with FOM - known as the Concorde Implementation Agreement - but this document depends upon a Concorde Agreement being in place, which it is not despite the EU Commission's 2000 approval of F1's governance structures being conditional upon such an agreement.

The quartet of favoured teams - Ferrari, McLaren, Red Bull Racing and Mercedes - sits on F1's Strategy Group, together with Williams (seat granted on a heritage basis) and the top team not already represented (currently Force India). Each team has a single vote, with the FIA and FOM holding six apiece. The group is charged with devising strategies for the championship, with voting being on a simple majority basis.

Therefore the majority of independents are not represented, making it unlikely that motions that could favour them will be adopted. Hence the three-year argy-bargy about cost control. The sporting regulation meetings and technical equivalents act in advisory capacities primarily to the Strategy Group. However, one struggles to identify a single cohesive strategy devised by the Strategy Group in its three-year existence.

Carried motions are escalated to the Formula 1 Commission, a 26-seat body on which all teams, selected race promoters, engine and tyre suppliers and various technical and commercial partners are represented, as are the FIA and FOM. Ecclestone is president of the commission, and voting is on a 70 per cent majority basis. The Commission may not amend motions, it can only approve or reject agenda items as tabled.

Motions forwarded by the F1 Commission are tabled at WMSC level, a body with 27 members, the full list being available here. Again, the WMSC may only ratify or reject motions, not amend them, while Ferrari holds a veto over the entire process.

The regulatory procedure is riddled with flaws, from the exclusion of independent teams at the start of the process through to Ferrari's overall veto at the end.

As long as this situation prevails, F1 will continue to find itself in a regulatory malaise. No ifs, buts or shoulds about it.