Red Bull's conspiracy to win

People love conspiracy theories. So said Neil Armstrong, a man who found himself on the receiving end of one or two.

That desire to unlock hidden forces that shape events, to find a secret explanation for happenings that don't fit in with your world view, is commonplace in Formula 1 too.

Sunday night at Suzuka was no different. The very second that Mark Webber expressed "surprise" post-race at having been switched onto a three-stop strategy - which had helped the two-stopping Sebastian Vettel secure victory - the conspiracy talk was floating around again.

In one camp, there were those who claimed that the team had deliberately stitched up Webber to favour its golden boy Vettel.

With a three-stop being marginally slower than a two-stop (between five and eight seconds depending on the team), Red Bull's pitwall had simply made the call to get the Australian out of the way of the man gunning for the title.

And it had played out beautifully. When Webber pitted for a second time, Vettel's path was clear to attack the leading Lotus of Romain Grosjean.

Webber congratulates Vettel in parc ferme © XPB

When the German then eked out those crucial extra laps during his penultimate stint, he was well set for a victory that has left him with one hand on his fourth world championship trophy.

Red Bull's own version of events was slightly different, however, suggesting that Webber's fate was sealed not when the call was made to put him on to a three-stop, but in the early laps.

The team had gone into the race thinking that a two-stop was marginal but possible, especially if it had the clean air that it expected after locking out the front row of the grid.

That plan went out of the window when both Red Bulls got away poorly and were stacked up behind Grosjean early on.

It's widely known that in this era of high-degrading tyres, one of the best ways to burn through rubber is to run close-up behind another car, as sliding more due to the turbulent air simply eats the Pirellis up.

For Webber, whose situation was further compromised by a lower downforce setting than Vettel, it meant his tyres were finished by lap 11 and he had to pit.

Webber hurt his tyres chasing Grosjean early on © XPB

It was clear that what was a marginal two-stop call pre-race was now unrealistic - and there was no way that Webber was going to overhaul Grosjean if Red Bull stuck to its plan.

For a team as ambitious as Red Bull, doing nothing was not an option.

All that would have done was ensure Webber finished behind Grosjean, because Lotus had changed its pre-race tactics to simply shadow what the Australian was doing as he didn't have the pace to stage an undercut.

Always on older tyres, Webber would never have found a way past.

Red Bull knew it had to do something aggressive, which meant switching one of its drivers to a three-stop.

With Webber having pitted three laps before Vettel first time around and, at risk of running out of tyres at the end of the race, which would have easily allowed his team-mate to overtake him, it was worth considering a three-stop switch.

That consideration was given further credence by the fact that Daniel Ricciardo's alternative tyre strategy in starting on hards had served to delay a host of drivers, opening a big gap of free track for Webber to fall back into if he was put on three stops.

Early on it looked like these two would be the other way around on the podium © LAT

As Red Bull boss Christian Horner later explained, that effectively meant Webber had a free stop as he wasn't going to lose any more time needing to overtake other cars. It was pretty much a no-brainer to do something different.

Webber's strategy change left the way clear for Vettel to shadow Grosjean, and force Lotus - because it now feared the undercut from the German - to stop as early as it dared for the final stint to try to stay ahead.

By the time of everyone's final stops, it was still unclear which of the two Red Bull strategies was going to succeed.

Had Vettel got stuck behind Grosjean for too long at the beginning of his final stint, rather than powering past the Lotus at his first opportunity, then that could have handed Webber the vital few seconds he needed to come hard at the German in the end.

Had Webber also cleared Grosjean much quicker on his final set of mediums - and crucially not missing out on a DRS move early on by hitting the button just before the activation zone so his flap didn't open - then he would still have been within shouting distance of Vettel.

Indeed, the threat from Webber was being felt by Vettel, who made it clear over the radio that he was getting frustrated with traffic because it could cost him.

In the end Vettel held on, and Webber's challenge fell short.

Vettel hunts down Grosjean © XPB

One of the things about conspiracy theories, though, is that they are often immune to counter evidence and rational explanation.

In fact, the more there are explanations as to why there's no conspiracy, the more those explanations prove the conspiracy. The logic goes that the more Red Bull denies there was a conspiracy, and the more explanations show the logic of the strategy choice, the more it therefore proves there must have been a conspiracy.

Conspiracy denials become the fuel of the conspiracy itself.

Another factor to take into account is that very often strategy calls get retrospectively appraised by results. When a driver wins, it's automatically assumed he was on the right strategy, and that the guy who finished second must have been on the wrong one.

Yet grands prix are hugely complicated events, and when you have the quickest car and do the best job, it's easy to make whichever strategy you choose result in success. So when you win, it becomes the right strategy - even if it was wrong.

If Vettel had been delayed behind Grosjean, and Webber had got past the Lotus quicker, then three stops could well have been the right strategy to be on.

At Suzuka, it was all too easy to interpret Webber being put on the 'wrong' strategy because he didn't win. But imagine for a second that Vettel's contact with Lewis Hamilton on the run down to the first corner had broken his front wing and put him out of contention.

This dramatic pass could've been the one that sealed Suzuka victory © XPB

Webber's race would most likely have played out in repeat circumstances and he would have three-stopped to overtake Grosjean for the lead on the penultimate lap.

That would have delivered a sensational victory that he would then have thanked the team for because of its brilliant strategy call in helping him find a way past Grosjean.

There's no doubt that there have been days when Red Bull has worked in favour of Vettel, but equally there are days when both drivers are given equal opportunities as the team is looking at the bigger picture of doing what's best for itself, not for either of its men in the cockpit.

Suzuka was one of those latter days. In putting the team's ambitions first, it duly delivered a 1-2 finish on a day it could easily have ended up with a 2-3.

After all, if Red Bull had deliberately wanted to hamper Webber in Japan, it could have given him some KERS issues to deal with. Instead, it was Vettel who encountered those on qualifying day...

It could also, knowing how marginal Webber was on tyre wear, actually have kept him on a two-stop - knowing full well that Vettel would get him late on in the race.

Sometimes people seek conspiracies when there aren't any. It actually says much that on Sunday night - as most of the paddock expressed its belief that Vettel will win the final four races of the year - there was one man saying he hoped it didn't happen.

"Mark got pretty close today," said Horner. "It would be great to see Mark win a race before the end of the year as well..."

There is no conspiracy in that.