The legacy of Imola 1994

The deaths of Ayrton Senna and Roland Ratzenberger at Imola 20 years ago this week shook Formula 1 to its core. But their legacy is of vastly improved safety, not just in grand prix racing but all of motorsport.

Senna's death, live on TV in front of around 200 million people, ensured there was the will for drastic changes. This led to a revolution in motorsport safety that means there are drivers and trackside workers still with us today who otherwise would have been lost.

THE INITIAL REACTION

Action was swift, as shown by the FIA releasing a statement the day after the 1994 San Marino Grand Prix making clear that action would be taken.

The statement read: "Following the tragic events at the San Marino Grand Prix, the FIA is gathering reports from its technical, medical, safety and supervisory staff, as well as from the relevant team and circuit personnel.

"As soon as these reports are received, they will be studied as a matter of urgency. At the request of the Automobile Club d'Italia, a top level FIA meeting will be held in Paris on Wednesday 4 May to review the events at Imola and decide on any action which may be necessary.

"Only when all the facts are known can we determine if the additional safety measures introduced in 1993 and 1994 need to be extended, those agreed for 1995 be brought forward, or whether further measures should be introduced."

In the weeks following Imola, numerous changes were announced, some of which were knee-jerk and rejected by the teams.

Safety moved to a new level after Imola 1994 © LAT

As Gary Anderson, now AUTOSPORT's technical expert but 20 years ago technical director at Jordan, put it when a raft of changes were announced: "they've gone around like a chicken with its head cut off and made changes without looking at them and their implications deeply enough."

Initially, several proposals were made for the Monaco GP that followed. While plans to draw lots pre-race to allocate fuel-stops and prevent too many cars being in the pits at one time were, thankfully, dropped, the pitlane speed limit was introduced along with rules preventing crew hanging around outside the garages.

This followed the accident during the race at Imola when a wheel shed by Michele Alboreto's Minardi struck several mechanics.

As FIA president Max Mosley put it: "mechanics were simply standing in the pitlane watching the race. That is wholly unnecessary and very dangerous."

Various tweaks were made to trim downforce, although perhaps the most sensible short-term move was the adoption of the wooden plank under the car to prevent an excessively low ride-height - still one of the possible factors contributing to Senna's accident.

"One of the greatest dangers is extreme conditions of use, having a very low car, which is never good mechanically," said Alain Prost at the time.

These early raft of changes, which were phased in from the Monaco to the German GPs of that year, are not so significant in themselves. But they are evidence of the atmosphere of necessity that was created by Imola '94.

THE LONG-TERM

What really mattered after Imola was the long-term reaction, for the immediate changes were nothing more than quick fixes. The FIA was a key player in the research-driven change that has had a tangible effect.

As Andy Mellor, technical director of the FIA Institute for Motor Sport Safety, said when giving the Motorsport Safety Fund Watkins Lecture at AUTOSPORT International last year, 1994 was "the watershed year" for motorsport safety.

One crucial area of improvement was in the protection of the driver's head. Raised cockpit sides were mandated in 1996, as well as the introduction of an energy-absorbing headrest.

"That year, the first accident where the headrest made a difference and possibly saved a life was that of Jos Verstappen when he crashed at Spa," said Mellor. "The headrest was destroyed, so instead of the energy going into the helmet and the head, we have now managed to put all of that energy into the headrest."

Other significant advances were made with the introduction of accident data recorders [in 1997], improved safety barriers, and changes to crash-test regulations and nose design, along with improved side-impact protection. The introduction of the HANS device in 2003 and the new 8860-2004-standard 'advanced F1 helmet' for the '04 season were also crucial.

HANS device was introduced in 2003 © XPB

"Probably the first accident where HANS made a difference and potentially saved a driver's life was in 2004 when Felipe Massa crashed in Canada," said Mellor.

"The HANS carried a huge load during that impact and, if that load had been carried by Felipe's neck, then it probably would have been a very grave outcome."

The unfortunate Massa was involved in a second accident that might well have proved fatal without the new helmet standard. His crash during qualifying at the Hungarian GP in 2009 did cause serious head injuries when he struck a damper spring weighing 833g shed by Rubens Barrichello's Brawn, but without the extra protection the outcome might have been much worse.

What changed most obviously was that the decisions made in terms of safety technology became data-driven. With more thorough analysis of accidents came greater understanding. Finally, the days when safety measures were introduced based on intuition were behind F1.

That progress continues to this day. This year, all F1 drivers have a tiny three-axis accelerometer in their ear that records data in the case of impacts.

This kind of information allows greater understanding of the kinds of forces drivers are subjected to in impacts and what forces can be not just survived, but walked away from.

Prior to this revolution in evidence-based safety measures, many changes had been based on best-guesses. Often, one problem could create another. Take catch-fencing, a measure that, in isolation, is pretty good at slowing cars down.

But in the real world, in which the equation is about more than simply how to prevent impacts with the barrier, there were some narrow escapes when drivers were struck by posts and, in one case, almost garrotted by the wire fencing.

Pre-Imola, some remarkable safety work had been done, notably by Professor Sid Watkins, but after it the whole sport recognised the necessity of such changes rather than relying primarily upon the zeal of conscientious individuals. With that mandate, the safety campaigners had the unquestioned support needed to make changes.

Post-Imola, the approach changed from hits and misses to, for the most part, hits. Ideas are now evaluated, exhaustively, and only introduced if the research conclusively proves them to be a benefit. Today, the FIA Institute is at the forefront of this work and its impact must not be overlooked.

It would be wrong to state that none of these changes would have happened without the death of Senna. Improvements were inevitable, but would surely have been slower had F1's biggest name not perished.

While his crash was the most high-profile, there were other accidents. In Monaco two weeks later, Karl Wendlinger crashed at the chicane, suffering head injuries that left him in a coma. Prior to Imola, both JJ Lehto and Jean Alesi had major testing crashes that sidelined them for two races each.

Then there was Andrea Montermini, who took over Ratzenberger's seat at the Spanish GP and crashed heavily exiting the last corner, breaking a foot and a heel. Lotus driver Pedro Lamy also suffered multiple injuries, including two broken legs, in an alarming crash in testing at Silverstone in which the tub of his car came to rest in a spectator tunnel.

The FIA Institute continues to work on safety improvements today

It was time for big improvements, but without Senna the same impetus would not have been there.

As Max Mosley, FIA president from 1993-2009 and a prime mover in the safety changes, told Reuters last week, it is not just those competing in motorsport who have reason to be thankful for the legacy of Imola '94.

The benefits of the research conducted in its wake have spread far and wide and includes the Euro NCAP road safety crash tests that have saved countless lives.

"That [weekend] was the catalyst for change on the roads that has literally, without question, saved tens of thousands of lives," he said.

WHAT CAUSED SENNA'S CRASH?

Ayrton Senna's death was caused by a suspension part attached to the right-front wheel striking him in the head and penetrating the visor of his helmet, leading to what was described during the ensuing trial as "a massive blow above the right eyebrow".

But there is no definitive answer to the question of what caused his Williams to fly off the road at Tamburello, across the nine-metre run-off area and into the wall.

During the trial, prosecutor Maurizio Passarini contended that Williams had "modified, acting with negligence and imprudence, the steering column of the vehicle".

A 12.3cm section of 18-inch steel had been inserted into the existing 905cm, 22-inch steel column pre-season. The column did break, but Williams believed this was likely a result of the impact.

A power-steering failure is also possible. Data from the Renault black box (the Williams black box contained no recoverable data) confirmed that the power steering had not failed outright, but an unexplained rise and then fall in the hydraulic pressure moments before Senna went off was noted.

Senna had also run over a small shard of debris, believed to be from JJ Lehto's Benetton, which had stalled on the grid and been collected by Pedro Lamy's Lotus shortly before the accident. It is possible that this became lodged in the car and destabilised the aerodynamics.

The FIA acted right away after Senna's death © LAT

It is also possible that low tyre pressures, caused by the slow pace behind the safety car before the race was restarted on the lap before Senna's crash, lowered the ride height. The car did bottom out, leading to visible sparks two tenths of a second before the rear-end stepped out and one tenth of a second before Senna corrected before going off.

Adrian Newey, then the chief designer at Williams, is uncertain as to the cause but has suggested that a puncture from debris, which lowered the ride height and led to the car bottoming out, is the most likely cause.

Goodyear confirmed that a tyre failure was not responsible, and if this is the case it would have been a slow puncture, leading to only a partial loss of pressure.

During the trial, suggestions that Senna had blacked out were conclusively shot down, not least because he was able to brake and shed speed before striking the wall.

But whatever the exact cause, it seems an outright driver error is very unlikely given that Tamburello was a corner easily taken flat out.